Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1978

THE USSR AND AFRICA

The African Environment
Colin Legum

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

Book Reviews

Jürgen Rohwer
James C. Hsiung
C. I. Eugene Kim
M. K. Dziewanowski
Roger P. Hamburg
Stanley G. Payne

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Problems of Communism

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JAN-FEB 1978 VOL XXVII

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Cover: Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and N. V. Podgornyy of the USSR in Dar es Salaam during the Soviet official's 1977 tour of East and Southern Africa. (Podgornyy was removed from office in June 1977.) Photo by S. A. Qayum/ Camera Press.

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The USSR and Africa

EDITORS' NOTE—Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war of 1975-76 and in the current conflicts in the Horn have focused attention on the evolving relationship between the USSR and Africa. This relationship reflects a complex array of influences—e.g., African interests and perspectives, Soviet aims and actions, continental and global politics. The following articles explore three major dimensions of the relationship. Mr. Legum looks at the spectrum of African attitudes toward the USSR and changes in the character of these attitudes in the last few years. Mr. Albright discusses the priorities, general approach, objectives, and operating style that have shaped Soviet policy in the recent period. Mr. Yu examines the nature of Sino-Soviet rivalry on the continent and its implications for Soviet- African relations.

The African Environment

By Colin Legum

Analysts of recent Soviet policy toward Africa often tend to overlook one important fact: the continent comprises a growing number of independent states each of which judges the policies of the major powers by the degree to which they advance or harm its own perceived interests. Thus, while the Soviet Union may approach Africa with a particular set of strategic objectives in mind, the tactics it employs must respond to the African context. What African leaders and governments perceive and do about Soviet policies, in short, is an important, perhaps crucial, determinant of Moscow's course on the continent.

Currently, major Soviet objectives in Africa, as in the rest of the Third World, appear to be four in number. The first is to spread the political and economic influence of the Soviet Union in a manner consonant with its role as a world power. The second, related to the first, is to diminish or eliminate Western influence and control. This goal, it should be stressed, is pursued outside the general framework of East-West détente. The third objective is to promote the USSR's political-security interests, especially as these involve the Soviet navy. In order to achieve effective deployment of its navy on a global scale, for purposes of offsetting Western nuclear delivery systems (particularly, nuclear-powered missile submarines) and of projecting Soviet political power, the USSR seeks to arrange a worldwide system of naval and air facilities similar

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Six MIG-23 fighters at a military airport in Tobruk, Libya, in July 1977. These aircraft represent deliveries under the massive arms deal that the USSR signed with Libya in 1974.

—Henri Bureau/Sygma.

to those obtained at an earlier period by the Western powers.[1] Finally, the Soviet Union seeks to counter the ideological and political challenge of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Moscow has pursued these strategic goals in Africa through a series of tactical moves that at first glance seem incoherent or even contradictory. Some observers therefore tend to characterize these tactics as "opportunistic." However, such a label is valid only to the extent that the tactical maneuvers represent pragmatic, ad hoc responses to promising opportunities created by developments on the African continent. Without such opportunities, any policy course—no matter how consistent and principled—would be futile.

It is clear that through much of the half-century of Soviet-African interaction since the late 1920's the interests and attitudes of Africans did not afford the USSR many openings. Only in the post-independence period, after 1960, did certain African leaders and governments—for a variety of economic, political, and military motivations—decide to invite Soviet involvement in the affairs of the continent. The lesson of this history is important: it is essential to examine Soviet-African relations from an *African* rather than a Sovietological perspective if one is to reach valid conclusions about them.

In what follows, we shall first briefly review the reactions of Africans to the early efforts of the USSR through the Comintern and then the Cominform to win over the anticolonial movements of Africa. Then we shall examine the first decade of African independence, when the Soviets and the new post-colonial governments mutually explored the possibilities of developing expanded relations. This exploration demonstrated that African and Soviet interests tend both to converge and to diverge. Analysis of the interaction permits one to identify the sorts of situations in which local interests are favorable for Soviet initiatives and those in which African governments or movements see involvement with Moscow as unwanted or even harmful.

Initial Attitudes Toward the USSR

In the interwar period and especially after the 1920's, Africa's anticolonial movements explored Marxist ideas and the policies of the Soviet Union as possible sources of inspiration and support for their liberation struggle. Even a nationalist leader such as Dr. D. F. Malan, who later became the first apartheid Prime Minister of South Africa, saw "the Bolshevik victory" as having immense significance for all those engaged in the anti-imperialist struggle!

[1] These new requirements have been amply described by Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov in his 1976 volume *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva* (The Sea Power of the State), excerpts from which were selected and translated by Reuben Einsztein in *Survival* (London), January-February 1977, pp. 24-29.

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However, these explorations, despite enthusiastic encouragement and support from the Comintern and the Cominform, produced not only remarkably few positive results, but also some strongly negative ones. With few exceptions, no black leaders of any stature remained firmly attached to Moscow, and only three communist vanguard organizations—the parties of Egypt, the Sudan, and South Africa—came into existence prior to the 1950's. At the same time, a number of black leaders once ardently pro-Soviet (such as the late George Padmore, the guiding influence for some years in the formation of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ideas) turned strongly against Moscow; they became either Trotskyite Fourth Internationalists or obsessive anti-communists.[2] Moreover, several future African rulers who had sought support from Moscow or the European communist parties (e.g., President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast) grew highly disillusioned with Moscow even before they had won power, for they found communism incompatible with their sense of nationalism and their preference for a system of private enterprise.

It is a remarkable political phenomenon that as of the end of the 1960's the entire anticolonial struggle in Africa had failed to produce a single Marxist-minded regime, or even an important communist party except for the three mentioned—the South African, the Egyptian, and the Sudanese—in any of the countries which had achieved their independence. The nearest thing to a Marxist regime was Sékou Touré's government in Guinea. Significantly, Guinea had been the only British or French colony in black Africa to completely sever its relations with the metropolitan colonial power at the point of independence. This exceptional case was the result of a personal feud between Charles de Gaulle and Sékou Touré and of the wish of other Western powers not to upset Gaullist France by supporting Guinea. As a consequence, Guinea had no option other than to turn for aid to anti-Western powers for its immediate economic survival. Even so, the "revisionist" nature of Sékou Touré's Marxist ideas put his ruling Democratic Party of Guinea (*Parti Démocratique de Guinée*—PDG) outside the framework of the international communist movement.

The fact that international communism proved unable to exploit the situation in Africa during the anticolonial struggle is not just of historical interest, for the elements which contributed to this outcome are still at least partially relevant to the present situation. The fundamental cause of the failure was that communism and nationalism are antipathetic forces.[3] Both must rely for their success on two basic requirements: they must be mass movements, and they must produce significant numbers of vanguard cadres. The communists had no chance of becoming mass popular movements in competition with the nationalists. At most, they could hope to produce Marxist cadres within the various nationalist movements. But because the Marxist cadres operated as cells of opposition to the predominant "bourgeois," or otherwise nonrevolutionary, elements of the nationalist leadership, they achieved, at best, only a limited influence.

One can distinguish six major characteristics of African nationalism which made it unreceptive to Soviet political and ideological overtures during the pre-independence and early post-independence periods. First, African anti-imperialism was directed against all foreign governments, not just the former colonial powers. At the historic moment when they were engaged in expelling alien rule, Africa's nationalist leaders were not about to accept the patronage of or intimate involvement with, let alone control by, even such avowedly anti-imperialist powers as the Soviet Union and its allies. Second, except in Algeria, none of the major African nationalist movements before the middle of the 1960's were truly revolutionary; instead, they were either reformist (conservative/bourgeois) or radical. Third, African nationalism was highly eclectic with regard to its political ideas. Some nationalists, especially in Francophone Africa, borrowed many of their perspectives from the Marxists but, even more, drew their basic inspiration from Western democracy and from Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The outlooks of Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Patrice Lumumba, and others all evidence this eclecticism. Fourth, African nationalism was strongly imbued with ideas of black consciousness, negritude, Pan-Africanism, and the "African personality," all of which tended to limit the impact of non-African concepts.[4] Even the radical socialist strand among the nationalists initially insisted on describing their ideas as "African socialism" in order to emphasize the cultural differences between them-

[2] George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* London, Dobson, 1956.

[3] See Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism and Communism,* London, Methuen, 1964.

[4] See Colin Legum, *Pan Africanism,* London, Pall Mall, 1962, pp. 104 ff.

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

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selves and the international socialists. (Although the idea of "African socialism" still persists, it has tended to be emphasized less as the independence struggle has receded into the past.) Fifth, the international aspirations of African nationalism were strongly influenced by the ideas of nonalignment and "the Third World," which ruled out close alliances with either the West or the Soviet bloc. Finally, all the nationalists—including radicals like Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and Nyerere—denied the "historical necessity" of "class struggle," viewing it as irrelevant to the African experience.[5] Thus, Touré, who spoke Jesuitically of Marxism in its "African dress," proclaimed:

The Marxism which served to mobilize the African populations, and in particular the working-class, has been amputated of those of its characteristics which did not correspond to the African realities.[6]

His draft of Guinea's trade union manifesto declared its rejection of the class struggle "because of African social groups' identity of living conditions and lack of differentiation into antagonistic classes."[7] Nkrumah, who described himself as a "Christian Marxist," also subscribed to this view.[8]

Leeriness among African nationalists about involvement with the Soviet Union was strengthened in the early post-independence years (i.e., dating from the early or mid-1960's) by a number of experiences. First, Moscow supported Marxist and other groups that challenged the governments which came to power upon independence. Soviet backing went to such groups as the late Félix Moumié's Cameroon People's Union (*Union Populaire de Cameroun*—UPC), small Marxist intellectual groups that emerged as vestiges of the former anticolonial Democratic African Assembly (*Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*—RDA) in some of the countries of West and Equatorial Africa, and Oginga Odinga's People's Party in Kenya. Second, Moscow intervened in power struggles *within* post-independence regimes, notably in support of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (Leopoldville)—now Zaire—and of opponents of Sékou Touré in Guinea (the ostensible reason for the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador from that country in late 1961[9]). Third, Moscow tried to get the nationalists to identify themselves openly with the USSR both against the West and especially, after the Sino-Soviet rift, against China. Finally, Soviet diplomacy in general was too heavy-handed for the sensitivities of most of the leaders of the new African governments.

It should be noted that early African-Soviet encounters in the case of South Africa, Egypt, the Sudan, and Algeria differed considerably from the general pattern set out above. The first three of these countries were not typical colonial societies: each had a sophisticated urban intelligentsia, an emergent working-class proletariat, and a small Moscow-oriented communist party. While not as advanced socially, Algeria too had a communist party loyal to Moscow.

In South Africa, the communist leadership was mostly white or Indian, and the local communist party was strongly opposed by the traditional nationalist movement—the African National Congress—and later by the Pan-Africanist Congress as well. In Egypt, the local communists felt themselves betrayed both when the Soviets, pursuing their courtship of Gamal Abdel Nasser, remained silent about the heavy repression of the Egyptian Communist Party, and even more so when Moscow laid down the line of "national communism" as a technique to allow the Marxists to join the Nasserite regime. In the Sudan, too, Moscow had the problem of advising local communists on how to relate to the regime of General Ja'far Muhammad Numayri. Here, again, the Soviets urged a "national communist" course, which encouraged the local communists to support Numayri and to help him develop a new national political movement, the Sudan Socialist Union. However, this course split Sudan's communists, and a dissident faction supported the abortive coup against Numayri in 1971,[10] an event which led to a temporary recall of ambassadors as Numayri accused the Soviets of complicity.

In the case of Algeria, Moscow likewise urged the local communist party to merge its interests with the dominant nationalist organization, the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*—

[5] See Julius Nyerere, *UJAMAA: Essays on Socialism*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968; also, William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., *African Socialism*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1964.

[6] Quoted in Aimé Césaire, "The Political Thought of Sékou Touré," *Présence Africaine* (Paris), No. 29, 1960.

[7] See *ibid.*

[8] Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, London, Heinemann, 1961; and idem, *Ghana: An Autobiography*, London, Nelson, 1957.

[9] Whether, indeed, the USSR was seeking to overthrow Touré or merely wished to use contacts in the official trade union organization to urge the Guinean President to adopt more radical policies remains open to question. On this, see William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks*, New York, NY, Harper-Row, 1967.

[10] See Colin Legum, "Africa's Contending Revolutionaries," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1972, pp. 2-15.

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Africans share the spotlight with Soviet Premier N. S. Khrushchev and President L. I. Brezhnev at the 1963 May Day parade in Moscow. At the left is Oginga Odinga, then Home Minister of Kenya, and third from the left is Ahmed Ben Bella, then President of Algeria.

—Camera Press.

FLN), and this even after the more conservative Houari Boumediene succeeded the radical Ahmed Ben Bella as FLN leader in 1965. Previously, at the height of the Algerian struggle for independence, Moscow had tried to steer the Algerian communists toward a course of accommodation with France and had kept its arms shipments to the FLN at a low level in order not to upset General de Gaulle, whom the USSR was then courting.

The realpolitik nature of Soviet relations with Gaullist France, Nasser's Egypt, and China did not escape the African leaders, who concluded that Moscow was not nearly as pure-minded as it claimed to be in posing as the ally of the world's progressive revolutionary forces, particularly when its open support of such forces might adversely affect Soviet national interests. They came to see the Soviet Union as simply another superpower pursuing its own interests—a view which gave some substance to Peking's charges of "Soviet imperialism."

Changing Context

While these earlier African attitudes toward the Soviet Union still persist, changing interests in the continent have brought a new relationship between some of its governments and movements on the one hand and the Soviet bloc on the other. This is the consequence, in part, of two interrelated developments.

First, in the post-independence period, nationalist forces of liberation, with very few exceptions, ceased to be mass popular movements. Most of the movements came under the control of particular power groups concerned with preserving their dominant positions in highly centralized governments. Sometimes these groups have been military in nature, but the majority have consisted of civilian parties, usually centered on either a single dominant personality or a coalition of strong sectional interests, whether economic, regional, or tribal. These ruling groups always equate their interests with "the national interest," but these claims have usually been strongly challenged by competing interests who often have at least as much claim to representing the national interest as the groups in power. Thus, while it can be argued that the ruling parties of Tanzania and Somalia (which are among the few still based on mass movements) genuinely pursue national interests rather than particularist ones, this is hardly true in Idi Amin Dada's Uganda, "Emperor" Bokassa I's Central African Empire, or Macias Nguema's Equatorial Guinea—to name only three of the most extreme cases.

Second, some African regimes and movements, anxious to buttress their own weak power (either to ensure survival of a regime which has lost its popular

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base or to promote a conceived national interest), have weakened their commitment to genuine nonalignment and Pan-Africanism and have enlisted the support of major extracontinental powers, either from the West or from the East, or from both sources. Where a regime is strongly supported by one or more Western powers, the temptation is for its opposition to turn toward the communist nations for help. This tendency is also to be found in the case of governments pursuing a national interest hostile to a neighboring state. For example, Libya, engaged in a quarrel with Egypt, turned to Moscow after President Anwar al-Sadat began to look toward the West; similarly, Somalia originally sought aid from Moscow because the US and other Western powers were supporting Somalia's enemy Ethiopia. The reverse process also occurs: governments or opposition political forces turn to Western nations when their "enemy" is buttressed by the Soviets. There is, of course, a third option, namely, to look to Peking. However, this option is not as promising, because of China's inability to produce the kind of military-logistical support that either of the superpowers can provide and, especially since the end of the Cultural Revolution, because of China's perception of its primary role in the Third World as being to provide moral rather than material support to the self-reliant efforts of individual states to reject dominance by outside powers.

This trend toward externalization of African conflicts is symptomatic of the continuing weakness of the continent's own political system—in particular, of the inability of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve African disputes. In this connection, it is important to understand that external intervention in Africa is made possible, and usually produced, by Africans themselves. Africans are not, as in the past, simply the passive victims of major foreign powers; they themselves now constitute the agents who introduce foreign powers into the continent's conflicts (whether for good or bad reasons is not immediately relevant). Because economic, political, and military power is still so minimal in the majority of African states (and especially for opposition movements operating in single-party states), the need frequently arises to enlist the support of foreign allies. Sometimes this support is solicited in conformity with the criteria set by nonalignment, but frequently this is not so.

A few key illustrations will suffice to make the point. Egypt, under Nasser, was incapable of pursuing its Pan-Arab concerns without invoking the Soviet factor to offset the US factor in the Middle East; similarly, Anwar al-Sadat cannot implement his "Egypt first" policy without US support—a choice largely forced on his country by its unhappy experience with Soviet policy in Egypt and in the Middle East. Another example is Dr. Agostinho Neto's decision to seek Soviet and Cuban support to avert defeat of the forces of his Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*—MPLA) by his opponents, who enjoyed the support of both African and Western governments.[11] Typically in these cases, Africans found it necessary to involve a major foreign power in order to pursue a particular African interest.

While the changing environment in postindependence Africa has opened the way for the USSR (as indeed for Western nations and for China) to assume a new role in the continent's affairs, it has not, however, fostered the emergence of a new alliance system between foreign powers and African states. The "alliances" formed are often temporary and intended to achieve mostly short-term objectives. For example, in just over seven years (1969-77), the Sudan moved from a strong Western orientation to an even stronger Soviet orientation and back again to an essentially Western and Arab orientation.

Such rapid shifts in a nation's alliance strategy, occasioned by changing local and foreign interests, reflect the current stage of political development in many nations of the Third World; this fact in turn requires a dialectic interpretation of political relations. Those who characterize African governments or movements as being pro-Western or pro-Soviet almost always do so out of a failure to understand why certain African leaders, governments, or movements find it useful to choose a particular foreign ally at a particular point in time. These relationships are largely transient, both because most African governments are short-lived and because the central thrust of continental politics (despite some aberrations) is still toward nonalignment and the exclusion of foreign intervention in African disputes. "Hands off Africa" remains the strongest aspiration of the majority of African leaders, irrespective of their political complexion.

In striking up relationships with Moscow, Africans understand that, like themselves, the Soviets are engaged in promoting their own interests. African leaders are seldom beguiled by Soviet claims to being motivated solely by the desire to give ideological support to the world's progressive movements. A

[11] See Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, *After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa*, London, Rex Collings, 1976.

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particularly fulsome example of such claims was provided by Yuriy Bernov, the Soviet ambassador to Ghana, who in explaining his country's assistance to those "fighting for freedom," asserted that the USSR "does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions or seek political domination or military bases. In fact, we act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience." [12]

African Reactions to Soviet Actions

We have seen how the changing African political environment has led some African leaders to consider inviting greater Soviet involvement in the continent as one means of pursuing specific African objectives. However, the decision to pursue such an option is also affected by how Africans react to previous Soviet activities on the continent. When we look at this latter dimension of the African-Soviet relationship, it is possible to discern among Africans certain broadly shared attitudes concerning Soviet behavior.

In the first place, Africans see the Soviets as engaged in a worldwide competition with the Western nations for influence, power, and trade. The "anti-imperialist" packaging of this communist thrust finds a natural emotional response among African nationalists. Soviet readiness to support liberation movements against those in power in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa—all of whom are associated in African eyes with Western economic, political, and military interests—is very much welcomed in Africa, even though Moscow's motives are clearly perceived.

On a more practical level, Africans feel that their interests are served by developing trade and aid relations with the Soviet bloc; few African governments refuse to enter into this type of relationship. At the same time, Soviet trade and aid terms are seldom felt to be exceptionally generous or advantageous.[13] In particular, the USSR stresses barter agreements, which Africans regard as mostly harmful.

African leaders are also frequently critical of the disproportionately small share of economic (as compared to military) assistance in the aid programs of the Soviet Union. In the years 1954-74, the USSR extended military assistance totaling US$4,132 million to African countries, while in the roughly comparable period of 1955-74, it offered $2,662 million in economic assistance to states on the continent. (The countries of Eastern Europe provided an additional $1,749 million in economic aid commitments in this period, but Africans tend to view Eastern Europe as distinct from the Soviet Union when it comes to questions of foreign assistance). To be sure, Egypt received well over half of Moscow's total military aid commitments, and if one excludes both

[12] Ghana News Agency, Accra, Mar. 9, 1976.

[13] For a balanced evaluation of Soviet economic aid, see Christopher Stevens, *The Soviet Union and Black Africa*, London, Macmillan, 1976.



Dimensions of Moscow's aid to Somalia: at the left, Soviet Chief Engineer P. I. Markov confers with Somali operating personnel at a milk factory built in Somalia with Soviet assistance; at the right, the Somali armed forces display their Soviet tanks in a military parade.

—Photos by L. Maksimova/TASS via Sovfoto and by Camerapix-Keystone.

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military and economic assistance to Egypt, the picture looks somewhat different. Other African countries obtained only $682 million in Soviet military aid, but garnered $2,340 million in economic assistance. At the same time, one must remember that African perceptions tend to derive primarily from the recent period, and Soviet military and economic commitments to African countries have tended to follow the pattern of Soviet aid to the Third World in general. During 1971-76, Soviet military aid commitments to all Third World countries amounted to $13,850 million, but economic assistance reached only $4,217 million.[14] Of course, African complaints about the great size of Soviet military aid programs are valid only in the context of comparisons with Soviet economic aid programs; after all, if USSR military aid is great, that is only because Moscow has provided what (or, in some cases, even less than) the African states themselves have asked for.

Many African leaders complain about the selectivity of the Soviet Union's aid programs—e.g., the concentration of the 400 major Soviet projects in a relatively few countries. The majority African view likewise takes exception to the Soviet policy of channeling aid to regimes of which Moscow approves and of tying political strings to Soviet aid.

Moscow, of course, does not seek to hide the fact that its policy is to give economic aid only to those regimes that it regards as "progressive." At the same time, the USSR gives assistance to such widely differing regimes as those in Uganda and Nigeria, neither of which qualify as "socialist countries." Nigeria is of special interest to the Soviet bloc (as it is to the Western nations) because of its enormous economic resources and its importance in Africa's political system. As a result, Moscow has decided to play a major part in the development of Nigeria's important steel complex.[15]

Moreover, in dealing with the USSR, Africans feel that in certain fields Soviet technology is inferior to that of the West. As a result, a country like Algeria elected to import American mining equipment at a time when it had no diplomatic relations with Washington, while the Marxist regime in Angola has chosen to maintain its ties with the transnational corporation, Gulf Oil, because of the superior American offshore oil technology and better marketing opportunities that this link offers. Nevertheless, transnational corporations, though recognized to be highly efficient, are in general looked upon with considerable suspicion because of their economic power; consequently, Soviet antipathy to transnational operations in the Third World evokes a ready response from most Africans.

Second, Soviet policy is seen by Africans to be heavily influenced by Moscow's rivalry with Peking. Soviet diplomacy is regarded as clumsy or even downright bullying in its attempts to influence African leaders to adopt hostile attitudes toward the PRC. Such actions are a major irritant to most African countries and political movements, many of which seek to maintain a strictly neutral position vis-à-vis the two world communist centers. By contrast, the Chinese almost everywhere in the continent are admired for the sensitivity of their diplomacy. Thus, although Tanzania has particularly friendly relations with China, Peking made no direct attempt of any kind to dissuade Tanzanian President Nyerere from endorsing the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola despite China's frenzied opposition to that action. [16]

Soviet diplomatic pressures in general seem to Africans to be as severe as those from any other major power. During the Angolan crisis in 1975-76, Moscow pressed on Uganda's President Amin (then chairman of the Organization of African Unity) so hard to switch his stand to support for the Soviet-backed MPLA that Amin expelled the Soviet ambassador, notwithstanding Uganda's total dependence on Moscow for military aid. While expressing gratitude for that assistance, Amin declared that "the Soviet Union should not try to dictate to him what to do for the people of Uganda or Africa." [17] He complained that the Russians had withheld spare parts for his army and had insisted that Ugandan pilots get Soviet approval before being allowed to fly. Amin noted that the Presidents of Sudan and Egypt and other Arab leaders had complained of similar experi-

[14] Compiled from US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977; and US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, Washington, DC, Jan. 27, 1976, table 8 in Appendix. Figures for Soviet military aid do not include a $1,000 million arms sales agreement between the USSR and Libya signed in 1974. For the years 1954-76, the USSR and Eastern Europe extended a total of $5,145 million in economic aid to African states, of which $3,100 million came from the Soviet Union. These figures compare with $2,334 million in economic aid extended by the People's Republic of China. See US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.

[15] See Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1976-77*, London, Rex Collings, and New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1977, pp. B/681 and B/687.

[16] Legum and Hodges, op. cit.

[17] Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76*, London, Rex Collings, and New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1976, p. B/365.

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ences in their dealings with the Soviet Union. (Despite this exposure of his real feelings at a moment of sharp diplomatic conflict, Amin nevertheless soon resumed "normal relations" with Moscow, another telling example of how a local African interest dictates the need for a close relationship with the USSR.)

Similarly, President Numayri of the Sudan has spoken of the manner in which the USSR used its military aid to pressure his regime and to intervene in the Sudan's internal affairs. In a broadcast to the nation on June 27, 1977, a month after he had expelled Soviet military advisers because of Moscow's support for Libya and Ethiopia, Numayri charged that during their seven-year stay in his country these military experts had "played a role not of development but of hindrance. The experts were here, yet 40 to 60 percent of the Soviet armaments were completely unserviceable, and we could not but ask friends to come to help with the repairing." Numayri added that, since the abortive coup against his regime in 1971, the Sudan's MIG fighters had been grounded, even though Soviet experts were on hand. He explained:

It was because the Soviet Union refused to supply us with the necessary oil. The Soviet Union set a condition for getting spare parts for Soviet airplanes and tanks, that is, they should be paid for in advance. But, even after paying the money, the spare parts still failed to arrive.[18]

Africans widely perceive a racist strain in Russian dealings with colored peoples; the "communists" seem to behave no differently than "Western supremacists." Feelings of resentment over this situation are expressed most strongly in private conversations, but they are also reflected in the African press. The strongest antagonism, however, is reported by Africans who have studied in the USSR or in East European countries. Similar resentment over "white racism" is often strongly expressed by African military men regarding their relations with Soviet advisers—an attitude which, incidentally, does not extend to ties with Cuban advisers. In Angola, for example, diplomats found sharp distinctions in the attitudes of MPLA cadres toward Cuban and Soviet advisers.

Most African governments regard Soviet policies as opportunistic and contradictory—sometimes even cynical. This attitude has been markedly strengthened by Moscow's role in the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, where the USSR is seen to have let down its Somali ally and abandoned the Eritrean Liberation Front in the process of establishing itself as Ethiopia's patron. Numerous other actions have also contributed to the widespread view that Moscow is much more concerned with promoting particular national interests than with adhering to "pure revolutionary ideology." These have included, for example, Soviet silence at the repression of the Egyptian Communist Party and the USSR's care not to offend de Gaulle during the Algerian war (both already mentioned), and Moscow's alliance with the militantly anticommunist Libyan leader, Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi. Many Africans find it especially baffling that a communist power should lend its military support to sustain a regime like that of Amin, a man described by some prominent leaders (including Presidents Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, and Sir Seretse Khama) as an "African Hitler." [19] However, some African leaders (nota-

Major General Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, President of the Sudan, at a May 1977 press conference, two weeks before he expelled all Soviet military advisers from his country.

—UPI.

[18] Radio Omduhrman, June 27, 1977.

[19] *Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76*, p. B/332.

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bly those with Marxist-Leninist leanings) tend to explain contradictory Soviet behavior in dialetical terms: the Soviets' positive policies require them to take account of political realities in order to exploit every opportunity to defeat "imperialism, Zionism, and the revisionists," and to strengthen the "progressive forces."

Finally, African leaders display three general views about the degree to which the USSR constitutes a threat to the continent. A number of influential leaders have come to feel that the Soviet Union poses a serious communist threat to all noncommunist leaders and regimes. Others, perhaps fewer but no less convinced in their judgments, believe that the USSR plays a valuable role in countering the continuing domination of the West. The majority, though, take a middle position: they are uneasy about the activities of all the major powers, but they do not see the Soviet Union as either a major threat or a particularly reliable friend of African causes.

Moscow's intervention in Angola and, even more, its involvement in the conflicts in the Horn of Africa have, however, stirred debate about the true nature of Soviet ambitions and the USSR's role as a military power in Africa. Until these events, Africans had paid little attention to the writings of such Soviet military figures as Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, who advocates a worldwide political role for the Soviet navy. This debate has sharpened the differentiation of attitudes with regard to the specifically military activities of the USSR on the continent. These attitudes therefore deserve more detailed analysis.

The Military Factor

In terms of attitudes about what military role the Soviet Union should be allowed on the continent, Africans fall into seven broad categories. First, there are pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninists who, apart from needing Soviet assistance anyway, feel friendship for the communist world. They invariably react favorably to Soviet intervention and with hostility to any type of Western intervention. This group includes Angola's President Neto, who has termed the Soviets "Africa's true friends." It also embraces the present military regime in Ethiopia, some leading figures in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau,[20] and individual leaders in the various liberation movements.

Even in this category, though, one finds strong elements of Afro-communism—reflected in a desire not to be wholly dependent on Moscow, as well as in constant private complaints of irritation with Soviet diplomats and advisers. Dr. Neto, who was himself dropped by Moscow at one time, displays this ambivalence toward Moscow; he seems to be much happier with the Third World Cubans. Somalia manifested a similarly ambivalent attitude until its recent experience of "Soviet perfidy" when Moscow transferred its exclusive support to Ethiopia.

Second, there are pro-Peking Marxist-Leninists, who automatically suspect all forms of Soviet aid. While active among the intelligentsia and in the liberation movements, these "Maoists" have not achieved positions of power in any of the African governments.

Third, there are those governments, with either Marxist or radical leanings, who welcome Soviet help but with careful reservations. These include the governments of Algeria, Benin, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, and the People's Republic of the Congo. Perhaps most of the liberation movements in Southern Africa also fall into this category. While they rarely make public criticisms of the Soviet bloc, they engage in strenuous arguments with the communist states in private diplomacy.



CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev welcomes Agostinho Neto, President of the People's Republic of Angola, to talks in the Kremlin in September 1977.

—V. Musaelyan/TASS via Sovfoto.

[20] Although these figures hold prominent government positions, they do not necessarily reflect the majority view of their regimes. They should rather be seen as pro-Moscow pressure groups within the ruling parties.

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

Soviet tanks destined for Uganda pass through Nairobi, Kenya, in June 1975 on their way from the Kenyan port city of Mombasa to the Ugandan capital, Kampala.

—Mohamed Amin/Nancy Palmer.

Fourth, there are governments—notably those in Libya and Uganda—which are overtly anticommunist but nevertheless find it convenient to accept military assistance from the Soviet bloc. They tend to overcompensate for their nonadherence to Marxism by sycophantic-sounding praise of the Soviet Union. At the same time, unlike those in the previous category, they are on occasion inclined to make public their differences with Moscow.

Fifth, there are governments which are genuinely nonaligned and use the Soviet bloc as only one of several sources of military supply. These include Nigeria and Ghana (and perhaps Algeria—although it is not easy to decide whether to place Algeria here or in category three above since that country's attitudes toward all foreign powers tend to fluctuate depending on the particular issues involved). While those in this category, like those in the next group, tend to make pragmatic decisions about any particular Soviet policy, they are less inclined to state their objections or reservations in public.

Sixth, there is another group of nonaligned governments which, out of choice, do not seek Soviet military assistance; they prefer, for the most part, to accept China's help. Those in this category—notably, Tanzania and Zambia—are as suspicious of Soviet as of Western intervention elsewhere in the continent. However, they do not make a priori judgments based solely on the source of the intervention forces. Thus, President Nyerere of Tanzania strongly endorsed the Russian/Cuban intervention in Angola but has sharply criticized the Soviet Union for supplying arms to Tanzania's neighbor Uganda;[21] by contrast, Zambia's Kaunda—a close friend of Nyerere—denounced the Russian/Cuban intervention in Angola as "the tiger and his cubs stalking in the continent," yet a few months later was ready to invite Soviet military support to help crush the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia.[22]

Finally, there are governments and leaders who view Soviet aims in Africa with even deeper suspicion than they do Western or Chinese aims. Those in this category regard Soviet military (and economic) programs as designed to establish "control" over Africa and subvert governments of which Moscow disapproves. The bluntest warnings about the "Soviet threat to Africa" have come from two African leaders who once accepted large-scale Soviet military aid—Egypt's Sadat and the Sudan's Numayri. In a message to the peoples of Africa on May 25, 1977, President Sadat spoke—without mentioning names—about his country's experience with Soviet military ambitions:

It is the desire of certain States to try and establish military bases in some of our States, exploiting disputes left over among us from previous regimes, and tempting us with arms on the pretext of confronting the ambitions of neighboring countries. This will involve us in the struggle among the big powers and threaten our safety and security, as well as our free-

[21] *Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76*, p. B/333.
[22] Ibid., p. A/28.

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dom and independence. . . . Egypt wishes to draw the attention of all African peoples and States to this plot which is aimed at returning them to superpower spheres of influence which service the economic interests and political and military considerations of those superpowers.[23]

Numayri, in a similar vein, has stated:

I would like to draw the attention of African countries which have relations with these social neocolonialists who enter Africa by flaunting the banner of supporting developing countries and liberation movements. Be careful not to fall into their trap. I sincerely advise you. My advice comes from our experience.[24]

And in a June 27, 1977, Khartoum telecast, Numayri bluntly asserted, "Soviet military aid can become the basis for imposing enslavement on you." [25] Likewise, King Hassan II of Morocco is concerned about Moscow's support of Algeria in the conflict over the former Spanish Sahara and about Soviet actions in Libya, where, he claims, the USSR has built a military base supplied with some 800 tanks and 100 aircraft "of a type they [i.e., the Libyans] could not handle themselves for another twenty-five years." [26]

Such implacable hostility to Soviet ambitions is shared by Presidents Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, and H.K. Banda of Malawi. Perhaps less hostile, but still watchfully suspicious regarding Soviet intentions, are the rulers of Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Senegal, and Tunisia.

All of the countries in this seventh category prefer to get their military aid from Western sources. In fact, as demonstrated in the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, some even invite a more extensive and effective Western arms commitment than the Western powers themselves are willing to undertake or think prudent.

Where Interests Converge

From what has been said, it is clear that there are times when the interests of Africans and of the Soviet Union converge and times when they diverge. The Soviet bloc has found it expedient in pursuing its own interests to tailor policies to the requirements of particular African situations. However, the continent is passing through a period of considerable instability—involving frequent changes of government, not to mention changes of policies by any given government. Consequently, the Soviet encounter with Africa is much more likely to continue to be marked for some time by shifts of "alliances" rather than to produce a solid base of Soviet influence, let alone control. Therefore, in attempting to understand current or future Soviet actions, the best one can do is delineate those situations in which African interests seem to converge with Soviet interests, and hence provide some basis for a special relationship (however temporary), and those situations in which African interests seem to provide no opening for the USSR.

The major opportunities for Soviet action emerge in those African countries where the government finds itself in need of substantial economic or, especially, military assistance and where it either chooses not to, or fails to, get such aid from Western sources. Such circumstances have occurred in states of widely differing political complexion and in all parts of the African continent.

Guinea offers the earliest example of this type of situation. Although Guinea's ties with Moscow have had their ups and downs, a special relationship still exists. Despite reliance on Western commercial interests to develop its mining industry and a partial restoration of relations with Paris in 1976, Guinea remains deeply suspicious of French interests and has relied on the Soviet Union for the bulk of its military aid. In return, the USSR gained access to certain military facilities in Guinea, although this arrangement may not be as unquestioned at the present time as it once was.

In Algeria, we have a case of a country whose main economic links are with France and Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Algerian government has responded to its troubled postindependence relationship with France by deliberately inviting Soviet military support and economic assistance, but without severing its military ties with France.

Libya, after its decisive break with Egypt in 1974, entered into special military relations with Moscow since the Soviet Union was the only place where Qadhafi could obtain the arms he desired. This is a prime example of a relationship of mutual convenience—cemented by common enmity to Sadat's regime in Cairo and to Numayri's in Khartoum. Qadhafi himself espouses an Islamic revolutionary ideology which condemns "godless communism," and sharply

[23] Radio Cairo, May 25, 1976.
[24] Radio Omduhrman, May 18, 1977.
[25] Khartoum TV, June 27, 1977.
[26] Radio Rabat, Apr. 15, 1977.

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disagrees with Moscow's policies regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Somalia sought and accepted Soviet military aid in order to pursue the goal of reuniting the "five parts of Greater Somalia"—British and Italian Somaliland (which constitute the present Somalia), Djibouti, the Ogaden and other border areas of Ethiopia, and portions of the Northern Frontier province of Kenya. This relationship was established after the civilian Somali government in the early 1960's had failed to obtain effective Western military assistance to work toward this national goal. However, after 1969, when the military, led by an avid Pan-Somali nationalist, General Siad Barre, seized power, Somalia asked for and received much more extensive Soviet military aid. Barre was willing, as a quid pro quo, to provide Moscow naval facilities in Berbera and lesser facilities in two other Somali ports.

Ethiopia had a traditional Western orientation and a heavy dependence on mainly US military aid. However, when the post-imperial Addis Ababa military regime (the Dergue, as it is known) committed itself to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary policies which intensified internal opposition, especially in Eritrea and the Ogaden, Washington proved unwilling to furnish the military assistance the Dergue felt it needed to consolidate its power. Faced with widespread disintegration at home and mostly hostile neighbors (led by Somalia and the Sudan) on its frontiers, the Dergue saw an alliance with the Soviet bloc and Cuba as its only salvation.[27]

Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, right, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ethiopia, leads a state delegation to Moscow in May 1977. To Mengistu's right is N. V. Podgornyy, then Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

—P. Nosov/TASS via Sovfoto.

Uganda, under General Amin's dictatorial rule, found itself unable to attract the effective Western economic or military support on which the country had previously relied, and, despite a militant pro-Palestinian stand, it failed to attract adequate Arab support. For these reasons Amin turned to Moscow, even though he has always been strongly antagonistic to communism in any shape or form. Moscow found it expedient to enter into an arms agreement with Amin because all his neighbors are, in varying degrees, anti-Moscow and three of them (Tanzania, the Sudan, and Zaire) get military aid from China. This Soviet support alone has enabled his tyrannical regime to survive.

In the People's Republic of the Congo and Benin, the emergence some years after independence of military regimes committed, at least in theory, to Marxism-Leninism brought strains in former close relations with France. As a result, these regimes turned to Moscow as a source of military aid, even though they still depended very largely on French economic support. Mali's relations with the French also became difficult following its decision to secede from a short-lived union with Senegal; it, too, felt it necessary to find new allies, which it did in both Moscow and Peking.

An important factor in Mozambique's decision to establish close relations with Moscow in 1976 was an urgent need for the backing of a strong ally in light of the threats it faced along its borders. Having emerged from its own long struggle against Portuguese colonialism, the new FRELIMO government felt it had an inescapable commitment to help the other liberation movements in Southern Africa carry on their struggles. However, this commitment placed Mozambique's security in immediate jeopardy from neighboring Rhodesia and possibly, over the longer term, from its even more powerful neighbor, South Africa. This decision also reflected Mozambique's Marxist-Leninist orientation as well as its strong brotherly ties with Angola's MPLA, which had shared its long struggle against Portugal and which finally won power mainly through the help of the USSR and Cuba. It should be noted, however, that the relations of President Samora Machel's Mozambique

[27] See Colin Legum and Bill Lee, *Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, London, Rex Collings, and New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1978.

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A soldier of Mozambique photographed at the border with Rhodesia in April 1977.

—Nick Allen/Pictorial Parade.

with Moscow are not nearly as close—let alone as dependent—as those of Angola, although Mozambique's decision to strengthen its relations with Moscow did tend to alienate China, which had been FRELIMO's major non-African supporter during its long liberation struggle.

The Soviet Union has found openings, too, when African liberation movements have been unable to attract Western support and thus have felt compelled to look to anti-Western forces for military, economic, and political backing. The outstanding example comes from Angola, where independence found three rival movements engaged in a power struggle which had assumed civil war proportions. Two of the movements, Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*—FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional pro Independencia Total de Angola*—UNITA), had the support of both African and Western governments (France and the US as well as South Africa). The third movement, Dr. Agostinho Neto's MPLA (which had a strong contingent of Marxist cadres in its leadership) appealed to Moscow and Havana for support. As a result of the effective military intervention by the Soviets and Cubans, the MPLA succeeded in gaining local ascendancy. (In order to maintain and consolidate its hold on power, the MPLA has had to rely on the continued strong support of its foreign allies.)

Other liberation movements in Southern Africa have similarly looked to the communist nations for backing in their struggle against regimes in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, which they see as Western in origin. Moscow's terms for support are that the movements refuse China's aid and appear on international platforms to denounce Peking's stand in the quarrel between the two world communist centers. Reactions to this demand have differed. When the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, despite its long tradition of nationalist opposition to communism at home, failed to attract any Western military support for its liberation struggle, it accepted the only other option, which was to seek aid from the communist countries. The Soviets, supported by the minority pro-Moscow cadres in the ANC, succeeded in getting the ANC to come out strongly against China. In the case of the divided Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) liberation movement, the dominant military cadres of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) chose not to forfeit the assistance they had long received from China. Moscow therefore gave its support to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), despite the fact that its leadership is known to have strong links with important Western interests and to have what Marxists describe as "bourgeois tendencies." The other major liberation movement in Southern Africa, the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, has to date insisted on maintaining a nonaligned posture as between Moscow and Peking.

Divergent Interests

Just as the course of events in Africa produces local interests that facilitate Soviet efforts to establish special relationships on the continent, so other situations create serious obstacles to Soviet ambitions. These situations arise not just because of African nationalism, with its preference for nonalignment and for noninterference by foreign powers in the continent's internal conflicts, but also because of particular circumstances.

First of all, some African governments have had unhappy experiences from a deep involvement with the Soviet bloc. The outstanding examples are, of course, Egypt and the Sudan. In the former case, Egypt placed considerable reliance on Soviet support in the effort to recoup the losses of the 1967 war in the Middle East. However, Cairo grew increasingly perturbed by what it perceived as in-

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sufficient help from the USSR, and in 1972 Sadat expelled the Soviet military advisers as a prerequisite to turning for support to the West. Although Soviet arms shipments to Egypt appear to have taken a temporary turn upward again as Cairo prepared for the war of October 1973, Sadat's disillusionment with Moscow continued to grow. Finally in March 1976, the Egyptian President abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and ordered the end of Soviet access to naval facilities in Alexandria. In the Sudan's case, President Numayri's regime, upon winning power in a military coup in 1970, proclaimed itself oriented toward the "progressive forces in the world." Its leadership was originally made up of a coalition of radical nationalists, Arab socialists, Marxists, and Baathists. When the radical nationalists, headed by Numayri, resisted the policies of the communists and Baathists, the two latter groups attempted a coup. This failed, and Numayri reacted strongly against Moscow, building his own regime on support from China, Arab countries (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and, more recently, the Western nations.

As a consequence of their experiences, the Sudan and Egypt have emerged as leaders of a coalition of anti-Soviet forces on the continent. These two states view Soviet policy in the Horn as designed to gain "control" of the Red Sea and to use the Horn as a base of operations to destabilize the Sudan, Egypt, and Kenya. They see an even larger Soviet strategy aimed at extending influence over the entire northeastern portion of Africa—from Kenya along the Indian Ocean and Red Sea littoral to Egypt in the Mediterranean, inland to the Sahara frontier of Chad and then down the Nile valley to link up with Uganda, and finally back to the coast via Kenya.[28]

The Sudanese-Egyptian perspective would doubtless enjoy even greater support in Africa if the black African states did not regard it as being too closely linked with Arab interests in the area. This impression may have been strengthened by the Sudanese-Egyptian initiative, backed by Saudi Arabia, to organize a summit of Red Sea states—all of which, except for Ethiopia, belong to the Arab League.[29] The black African states are also hesitant to join the Sudan and Egypt in supporting Somalia against

[28] Conversations of the author with diplomats in Mogadiscio and Khartoum.

[29] See Legum and Lee, op. cit.



An Egyptian SAM-2 antiaircraft missile of Russian origin captured during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

—Simonpietri/Sygma.

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Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast, seen during a May 1976 trip to Paris.

—Alain Nogues/Sygma.

Ethiopia because black Africans remain opposed to Somalia's support of secessionism in Eritrea and to Mogadiscio's use of force as a means to change the border between Somalia and Ethiopia and help "liberate" the Somali populations in the Ogaden.

Somalia, too, has been dismayed to see its special relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorate. Moscow's attempt to justify its decision to begin supplying arms to Somalia's enemy as "a revolutionary duty" aimed at ensuring the success of "progressive revolutionary forces" fell on deaf ears as far as Siad Barre was concerned. He viewed the Soviet decision to be the main arms supplier for both hostile neighbors in the Horn as sheer political expediency. When his remonstrances to the Soviet Union proved of no avail, and in fact the USSR moved to curtail arms shipments to Somalia, Barre finally responded in November 1977 by expelling all Soviet military advisers and terminating arrangements for Soviet military use of Somali naval and airport facilities.[30]

[30] In May 1977, Somali President Siad Barre said that Moscow's decision to arm Ethiopia was a danger his government could not ignore and that it could eventually affect Soviet-Somali relations. In November 1977, Barre expelled all Soviet advisers. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Exeter), No. 11, Dec. 15, 1977, p. 4651.

Morocco, which at one point developed friendly relations with the Soviet bloc (as well as with the Western nations), has turned increasingly against Moscow because of the latter's support for Libya in its conflict with Egypt and especially because of Soviet backing for the Polisario Front in the former Spanish Sahara. The Polisario Front, which has strong support from Algeria, is opposed to the partition of the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. Moscow initially attempted to maintain a neutral position in this conflict. It faced a dilemma in the fact that Ali Yatta, leader of the Moroccan communists and a loyal Soviet-line Marxist, ardently supported King Hassan's policy toward the Sahara, whereas Algeria, a major Third World friend of the USSR, vigorously championed Polisario's cause. Moscow showed that its major interest was not to upset Algeria when it finally indicated in June 1977 that the USSR backed "the inalienable right of the population of Western Sahara to self-determination." [31] The decision to take this step predictably angered King Hassan, and also severely strained the loyalty of the Moroccan Communist Party to Moscow.

In addition to one-time "allies" who have grown disillusioned with Soviet policies, there are some African leaders who have never had close dealings with Moscow and who view the Soviet presence in Africa as anathema. President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast affords a good example. A vigorous champion of capitalism at home and of close ties with France in his foreign relations, he has come into conflict with various radical African governments—e.g., those of the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Sékou Touré in Guinea, both of which he has charged with being under "communist influence." Moscow, for its part, has made no attempt to hide its hostility toward Houphouët-Boigny's government. In part, this open enmity arises from the fact that in 1969 Houphouët-Boigny ordered the Soviet diplomatic mission to leave after accusing its personnel of involvement in student strikes against his regime. Diplomatic relations have never been restored. Moreover, the Ivorian leader has put himself at the head of a campaign to warn Africa against the dangers of "Soviet penetration." His campaign parallels that led by Egypt and the Sudan, but the two centers of opposition to Moscow have not yet merged.

The only other prominent black African leaders who adopt a hostile attitude toward Moscow are Malawi's president, Dr. H. K. Banda, and Zaire's

[31] *New Times* (Moscow), No. 24, June 1977, p. 25.

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Several regiments of the Polisario Front parade in the Sahara on February 27, 1977, in observance of the first anniversary of the "Saharan Arab Republic." In July, the Soviet Union's New Times *(Moscow) endorsed aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara for self-determination.*

—Spengler/Sygma.

president, Mobutu Sese Seko. Banda basically shares Houphouët-Boigny's political outlook. As for Mobutu, his quarrels with the Soviets originated in the early post-independence struggles of Zaire—when it was still known as the Congo—over the USSR's attempts to intervene to assist the first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, to stay in power. Subsequently, in 1967, the Soviets gave military backing to a rebellion against Mobutu, and when this failed, they gave sanctuary and extended support to one of the defeated leaders of that insurrection, Antoine Gizenga. But the bitterest issue between Moscow and Kinshasa has been over Angola. Mobutu was the principal supporter of the opponents of the MPLA, and he sees the Soviet role in MPLA-dominated Angola as a direct threat to himself and his regime.

* * *

Afro-Soviet relations have undergone numerous changes in the last 20 years and still remain in a state of considerable flux. Some Soviet successes in fostering special relationships on the continent have not lived up to their promise so far. Governments in each of the three areas which earlier seemed to offer the greatest potential for Moscow—Egypt, the Sudan, and Somalia—have dealt the Soviet Union heavy setbacks. Only Angola can be counted among Soviet achievements—and this thanks largely to the important Cuban role. Furthermore, it is too early to speculate intelligently about whether the Angolan-Soviet relationship will prove more durable than Moscow's relationships with Egypt, the Sudan, or Somalia.

It is likewise impossible at present to predict the outcome of the risky Soviet enterprise in the Horn of Africa. Aside from Ethiopia, no African state publicly accepted the USSR's justification of its shift of support to Ethiopia as flowing from a sense of "revolutionary duty." Even the Marxist-Leninists in Angola, Mozambique, and elsewhere remained si-

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lent. In fact, the only states in the area to support the Dergue are Libya (hardly a regime noted for wishing to spread revolutionary communism), the People's Democratic Republic of (South) Yemen (which has close ties with the Soviet bloc), and Kenya (which generally falls in the anti-Soviet camp in Africa). Both Libya and Kenya back the Dergue out of particularist considerations. Libya's interest stems from its hostility to the Sudan's Numayri and Egypt's Sadat. Since the Dergue and Numayri were at daggers drawn, Libya saw gains in Addis Ababa as contributing toward destabilization of the Sudan. Kenya's own problems with Pan-Somali ambitions give it a strong national interest in seeing that Ethiopia's Ogaden province is not "liberated" by the Somalis. While Libya and South Yemen endorse Moscow's intervention, Kenya opposes all Soviet involvements in the continent. Moreover, even among African governments which tend to be sympathetic toward Soviet assistance to beleaguered Ethiopia and hence to reject the view that Moscow is acting as an "aggressive superpower" in the conflicts in the Horn, the basic antipathy to *any* foreign intervention in the continent prevents them from openly expressing their support.

Judged in terms of overall Soviet strategic objectives, Africa has not afforded the USSR any conspicuous successes. Nevertheless, Moscow in recent years would appear to have committed increased resources there and, in fact, to have accorded the continent a much higher priority than have Western powers. But, as the analysis above emphasizes, success or failure in the Soviet case (as in the case of Western policy toward Africa) is likely to depend less on the capacity of the Soviet Union to provide aid than on the degree to which the economic and military assistance offered by Moscow is perceived by Africans to be relevant to their aspirations and interests.

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Soviet Policy

By David E. Albright

Since 1975, Soviet activity in Africa has increased markedly. One need cite only a few facts to illustrate the point. During the course of 1975, Moscow, persuaded that the Portuguese at last intended to turn Angola over to local rule, threw the full weight of its support behind the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*—MPLA), one of three rival claimants to power in the colony; and after the Portuguese withdrew in November of that year, the combination of a massive influx of Soviet arms and significant numbers of Cuban combat forces helped install an MPLA government in Luanda. This chain of events ultimately led to the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and the new People's Republic of Angola in October 1976.[1] In March and April 1977, Nikolay Podgornyy, President of the USSR Supreme Soviet, made the first major trip through the continent by a top Soviet leader. He and a retinue of 120 persons stopped in Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Somalia. During his stay in Mozambique, the USSR and the newly independent People's Republic of Mozambique concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation.[2] Shortly after Podgornyy's trip, during a visit to Moscow by Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia issued a mutual declaration on "the foundations for relationships and cooperation." This action had been preceded by the conclusion of a secret military assistance agreement between the two states in December 1976 and by Ethiopia's expulsion of most US officials and Washington's cessation of military aid to Addis Ababa in April 1977.[3]

Such a trend raises some obvious questions. For example, what place does Africa now occupy in Soviet calculations? Has there been some shift in Soviet global priorities? If so, what might the nature of that change be? If not, what accounts for the increased activity? What kinds of perspectives inform Soviet behavior? Does Moscow have some grand design for Africa that it is seeking to implement? If so, what is the character of that broad vision? Or does Soviet policy flow from less grandiose considerations? If so, what sorts of factors govern Soviet outlook and actions with regard to the continent?

These questions have intrinsic importance, for the general capacity of the USSR to make its weight felt around the globe has been growing during the last decade or so—at least in military terms.[4] Beyond this consideration, the substantial controversy that has marked recent discussion of Soviet intentions toward Africa—with assessments ranging from the basic irrelevance of these intentions to the dynamics of events on the continent, to the imminence of armageddon there[5]—suggests the need for an effort to explore the questions in systematic fashion.

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[1] For the text, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 9, 1976.

[2] See the TASS version of the text in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Apr. 4, 1977, pp. H/2-5.

[3] For the text of the Soviet-Ethiopian declaration, see the TASS translation in *FBIS-SOV*, May 9, 1977, pp. H/8-9. On the other details, see *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1977.

[4] On Soviet military might, see, for example, the annual volumes of *The Military Balance and Strategic Survey*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

[5] For two contrasting but far from extreme interpretations, see the articles by Robert Moss in the *Sunday Telegraph* (London), Feb. 20, 1977, and by Colin Legum in *The Observer* (London), Mar. 20, 1977.

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In trying to assess where Africa fits into broad Soviet thinking about the outside world today, it is essential to bear in mind that Moscow does not approach the continent in a tabula rasa fashion, free of prior impressions. The USSR has now had more than two decades of direct experience with Africa and Africans, and while that experience probably does not determine present Soviet outlook in any mechanistic way, it does appear to color current Soviet attitudes to some extent. At the very least, it affords a framework within which Moscow evaluates changing realities on the continent and judges the significance of new developments. For this reason, it deserves a brief review here.

The Historical Backdrop

Serious Soviet attention to Africa dates back only to the mid-1950's, and it developed initially in quite a specific context.[6] In the wake of the 1955 Bandung Conference of African and Asian States, Moscow became convinced that it had erred in regarding the passage of lands from colonial status to political independence in the post-World War II era as formalistic and essentially meaningless. Indeed, it now perceived that a major restructuring of the world political scene was under way. As Nikita Khrushchev observed at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956, "the present disintegration of the imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world-historical significance."[7] Within such a context, events in Africa took on a new importance. While the USSR

[6] The analysis in the ensuing pages draws upon work done for the author's *The Dilemmas of Courtship: The Soviet Union, China and Ghana*, forthcoming. See also Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1970.

[7] Report of the Central Committee to the 20th Party Congress, in Leo Gruliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, New York, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, p. 33. For a more extensive exposition of the new perspective, see E. Zhukov, "The Eastern Peoples and World's Destiny," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1956, pp. 45-51.

These tanks were among the examples of Soviet military equipment shown by the forces of the People's Republic of Angola at a mid-1976 parade in downtown Luanda. The display also reportedly included air defense units and Soviet Mig-21 aircraft.

—Coburger/ADN-ZB via Eastfoto.

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

Figures in the crisis in the Congo (Leopoldville) at the outset of the 1960's: at the left, Patrice Lumumba, who looked to Soviet support to regain his position as Premier of the Congolese government; at the right, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu (in spectacles) speaks with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in November 1960. President Kasavubu's delegation was subsequently seated as the Congolese representative in the UN General Assembly instead of a rival Lumumbist delegation.

—Paris Match/Pictorial Parade and UPI.

initially focused on the Arab North, its interest soon expanded to the continent as a whole.[8]

The assessment that the demise of colonialism loomed on the horizon in no way altered Moscow's fundamental preoccupation with the United States and Western Europe, but it did generate some significant expectations on Moscow's part. According to Leninist doctrine, imperialism constituted "the highest stage of capitalism," and the breakup of the colonial system would deal a major, if not lethal, blow to world imperialist forces. Thus, in Soviet eyes the disappearance of colonialism would inevitably redound to the advantage of the USSR and its socialist allies. Moreover, while Soviet observers had few illusions about the outlooks of contemporary leaders in many newly independent countries,[9] there was a sense of a rising revolutionary tide that would submerge these leaders and launch their states onto a "genuinely socialist" course. In fact, one finds certain parallels in the optimism of Soviet commentary about events in former colonial lands in the mid- and late 1950's and that which pervaded Bolshevik outpourings on world revolution in the years immediately after the October Revolution of 1917.

From the Soviet standpoint, then, the critical question was how to capitalize on this favorable trend in the colonial and newly independent areas. Until late 1957, Moscow pursued what might best be termed a "defensive" option. Perceiving the correlation of global forces to favor the United States and its Western allies, Soviet leaders sought cooperation with former colonial lands in Asia and Africa as a means of buttressing the USSR's position against any possible Western onslaught. This approach was formalized in Khrushchev's enunciation at the 20th Congress of the concept of a "zone of peace" embracing the socialist countries and those states which "proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policy."[10]

After the USSR successfully launched both an

[8] To trace this evolution in Soviet outlook, see, for example, S. Datlin, "Africa Through Colonialist Eyes," ibid., December 1956, pp. 110-20; I. I. Potekhin, "The Reviving Significance of Africa in World Economics and Politics," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, April 1957, pp. 100-13; idem, "The Collapse of the Colonial System in Africa," ibid., No. 17, December 1958, pp. 99-112; and an editorial on "African Renaissance," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 4, January 1959, p. 4.

[9] With regard to Africa, for example, S. Datlin wrote in *Pravda* on Feb. 17, 1958: "The African nations have not all been equally successful in the struggle for freedom. . . . And there are some who juggle lightheartedly with the concepts of sovereignty, little realizing what forces and efforts will be required before the people achieve their cherished goal."

[10] Report of the Central Committee to the 20th Party Congress, loc. cit., p. 33.

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intercontinental ballistic missile and an artificial earth satellite toward the end of 1957, however, Moscow adopted a more "forward" strategy based on the premise that a situation of mutual deterrence now prevailed between East and West in military terms. That is, it attempted to encourage the newly independent states, whose ranks were growing rapidly, to "consolidate" their political independence by embarking on the "socialist path of development." It cited the USSR's achievements as evidence that socialism constituted the wave of the future, and it held out the inducement of concrete economic aid to those that chose such a course.[11]

In practice, the USSR found many ex-colonial states far less tractable than it had anticipated. Perhaps the most notable case—and certainly the most grievous to Moscow—occurred during the Congo (Leopoldville) imbroglio of 1960-61.[12] The Afro-Asian nations unanimously approved the dispatch of UN troops to the Congo in July 1960 in the wake of the mutiny of the Congolese *Force Publique*, the intervention of Belgian troops, and the secession of Katanga Province; but differences quickly developed among them regarding the UN operation. These eventually led to a major split in Afro-Asian ranks after Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu dismissed the country's Soviet-backed premier, Patrice Lumumba. To Soviet dismay, the UN General Assembly, with major Afro-Asian support, recognized a Kasavubu delegation as the legal representative of the Republic of the Congo and spurned a Lumumba delegation.[13]

As a consequence of such experiences, Moscow during 1959-61 reappraised its view of the newly emergent states in Asia and Africa, and it decided that it had been too facile in assuming that the crumbling of the colonial system heralded an imminent swing of these states toward the Communist orbit or that a revolutionary tide was flowing high throughout the Afro-Asian area. It now tried to distinguish between countries where genuine revolutionary potential existed and countries where it did not. Having made that determination, it began to devote the vast preponderance of its energies to the former.

In general, African states dominated the favored group. With the establishment of the so-called Casablanca bloc in January 1961, this African contingent took concrete organizational shape. The bloc included Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic.

Over the next two years, the Casablanca bloc gradually lost cohesiveness as a grouping and finally became submerged in the larger Organization of African Unity, Morocco distinguished itself from the other countries by giving vent to its basic conservatism, and Guinea had a falling out with the USSR over what Sékou Touré apparently regarded as Soviet efforts to push his regime toward extremist policies. But the radical states of Ghana, Mali, and the United Arab Republic—plus Algeria after it gained independence in 1962—remained at the heart of the Soviet approach to the Third World for a number of years thereafter. More important, the behavior of these states seemed to confirm the Soviet judgment that genuine revolutionary opportunities existed in their domains. Not only did they show increasing willingness to collaborate with the USSR on matters of foreign policy, but they also indicated at least a desire to move in the direction of radical domestic reforms.[14]

For Moscow, the thorny issue during these years was how to nurture such "progressive" trends so that perceived revolutionary potential might ultimately be realized. Contrary to earlier Soviet assumptions, the "deepening" of the revolution had not swept away the existing leaderships of these states and brought new rulers to the fore; rather, the old leaders had themselves been responsible for the adoption of more radical postures. Equally important, few steeled Marxist-Leninists yet existed in any of the countries involved, and as the Guinean episode clearly underscored, current rulers displayed great sensitivity to anything which smacked of either internal or external challenges to their own authority.

Hence, despite considerable misgivings on the part of some Soviet analysts and political figures,[15] the USSR wound up endorsing the credentials of "revolutionary democrats"—statesmen "who sin-

[11] Khrushchev himself capsulized Soviet outlook in his remarks at the 21st CPSU Congress in January-February 1959. See Leo Gruliow, Ed., *Current Soviet Policies—III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 55, 201.

[12] For analysis of the Congo affair and its ramifications, see Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence, January 1960-December 1961*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965; and W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 119-61.

[13] For the Soviet government's bitter statement of Dec. 7, 1960, see *New Times*, No. 51, December 1960, p. 39.

[14] For more detailed discussion of these developments, see the author's *The Dilemmas of Courtship . . .*, Chs. 4 and 6; Legvold, op. cit., Chs. 4-7.

[15] For more extended treatment of this point, see the author's *The Dilemmas of Courtship . . .*, Ch. 6; Legvold, op. cit., pp. 194-201; Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the 'Third World,'" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1965, pp. 21-31.

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cerely advocate noncapitalist methods for the solution of national problems and declare their determination to build socialism."[16] Underlying this endorsement was a twofold calculation. First, Moscow believed that by encouraging local Marxist-Leninists to work together with the "revolutionary democrats," it could "educate" the latter to embrace "scientific socialism" wholeheartedly and reshape their societies and policies accordingly. In line with this belief, the USSR even pressed the formal Communist parties in the United Arab Republic and Algeria to disband and join the official government parties in the two countries. Second, Moscow deemed that the USSR could reinforce such local "educational" efforts by selective measures of its own, especially by providing political training and by extending economic assistance to enterprises in the state sector.[17]

Life again administered disappointments, however. By 1965, Soviet commentators were acknowledging that the "revolutionary democratic" states faced many severe problems, especially in the economic realm.[18] These analysts soon began to suggest that the revolutionary process there would probably turn out to be more protracted than originally forecast.[19] The overthrow of President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria by Colonel Houari Boumediene in June 1965 produced yet another shock. While Boumediene's perspectives and the nature of his policies greatly reduced the specific damage to Soviet interests, the coup pointed up the possibility that the "revolutionary democrats" did not have the requisite skill and resources to forestall, or at least to thwart, internal challenges and that "reactionary" takeovers in their constituencies were not wholly inconceivable. The ouster of President Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in February 1966 transformed this possibility into reality.

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, right, meets with I. I. Potekhin, the first Director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, during a Nkrumah visit to Moscow in 1961. At the rear is M. V. Keldysh, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

—Wide World.

In the aftermath of Nkrumah's overthrow, Moscow undertook a fundamental reexamination of its outlook toward the Third World in general, and it reached two key conclusions: (1) The "revolutionary democratic" leaders in the Third World suffered from such monumental faults that they would probably never effect a transition to "genuine" socialism.[20] (2) The Third World offered no promise of great revolutionary advances in the discernible future, for "reactionary"

[16] This was the language that Khrushchev used in what purported to be an interview with the editors of two Algerian newspapers, a Ghanaian one, and a Burmese one in December 1963, as reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 22, 1963.

[17] For an explicit statement of the notion that the USSR could function as a "vanguard," see Georgi Mirsky, "The Proletariat and National Liberation," *New Times*, May 1, 1964, p. 9.

[18] See, for example, Viktor Mayevskiy's report on a trip around Africa under the auspices of the World Peace Council, in *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1965; Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Afriki, *Nezavisimyye strany Afriki: ekonomicheskiye i sotsial'nyye problemy* (The Independent Countries of Africa: Economic and Social Problems), Moscow, "Nauka," 1965; A. Vladin, "Professional Education in Ghana," *New Times*, July 8, 1965; L. Aleksandrovskaya, *Gana* (Ghana), Moscow, "Mysl," 1965.

[19] See, for instance, K. Ivanov, "National-Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs*, May 1965, pp. 59-60; K. N. Brutents, "Several Peculiarities of the National-Liberation Movement," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), June 1965, p. 36; Fyodor Burlatskiy's article in *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1965; "The National-Liberation Movement and Social Progress," *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1965, pp. 20-24; R. Ul'yanovskiy, "Several Questions of Non-Capitalist Development of the Liberated Countries," ibid., No. 1, January 1966, pp. 113-15; and K. Ivanov, "The National-Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs*, No. 2, February 1966, pp. 20-21.

[20] For a particular biting capsulization of the thinking on this matter, see the comments of Lufti El Kohli, an Egyptian Communist, at a seminar held in Cairo in October 1966 on "Africa's national and social revolution." The seminar was sponsored jointly by *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (Prague) and *At-Talia* (Cairo), a monthly that El Kohli edited. El Kohli's comments may be found in *The World Marxist Review* (Toronto—the North American edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), January 1967, pp. 18-19. That these comments accurately conveyed Moscow's disillusionment with "revolutionary democrats" was made amply clear by Soviet reactions to events preceding and following the fall of Modibo Keita's regime in Mali in November 1968. See Legvold, op. cit., pp. 290-302.

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forces still retained an upper hand over "progressive" forces everywhere. As one Soviet writer put it with respect to Africa, "the effective achievements of the national liberation movement on the continent, the establishment, in a few years, of dozens of new national states tended to create the erroneous impression that the struggle was almost at an end, that the way to liberation was easy and the forces of imperialism were played out"; but now "as the African revolution gains in depth, the internal weaknesses and objective difficulties in the liberation movement on the continent become increasingly evident."[21] At the heart of the problem, according to Soviet commentators, lay the prevailing conservatism of African society.[22]

Out of this reassessment, in turn, gradually emerged a new Soviet approach to the Third World. This approach, aptly characterized by one Western observer as a "strategy of counterimperialism,"[23] had several components. On the political plane, it entailed emphasis on states and political groups of some inherent importance rather than on those which happened to qualify as "progressive" by Soviet standards. No longer, in short, would the USSR pursue revolutionary will-o'-the-wisps; instead, it would select countries for courtship on the basis of their intrinsic significance. Tied in with this new political pragmatism was a geographic—or, to be more precise, a geopolitical—feature. Henceforth, Moscow would concentrate its attention on the countries in a broad arc to the south of Soviet borders, from North Africa around to South Asia. These countries included not only "progressive" Arab states such as Algeria and the United Arab Republic, but also states formally aligned with the West such as Turkey and Iran. Finally, economic relations would take place in a different context. Instead of trying to use economic aid to win political influence, the USSR would exploit its own political and economic strength to gain privileged economic positions for itself. In effect, it would seek to produce an "international division of labor" with Third World countries.[24] After this new approach had gradually been implemented over a period of several years, Premier Aleksey Kosygin finally accorded it formal sanction in early 1971 in his report to the 24th CPSU Congress.[25]

The Third World had, of course, never surpassed the United States (with its superpower capacities), Western Europe (with its imposing combination of military and industrial might), and East Asia (with its increasingly hostile People's Republic of China and its economically dynamic Japan) on the list of Soviet priorities. But Moscow's revised approach to the Third World did amount to a downgrading of its general position on that list. Thus, the approach virtually guaranteed a major reduction of Soviet interest in Africa as a whole, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

To be sure, Moscow still valued correct and businesslike relations with all African countries willing to deal with it, and Soviet officials behaved accordingly in their contacts throughout the continent. Moreover, the USSR showed itself quite capable of wooing African states that it judged to be intrinsically important. Nigeria afforded the classic example. Although the process was somewhat tortuous and Soviet analysts displayed many qualms along the way, Moscow came to support the central government headed by Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon against the Ibo secessionist forces of Biafra under Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, and the USSR eventually extended military assistance to Gowon to help quell the rebellion.[26] Thus, the Soviet Union emerged from the civil war years of the late 1960's with enhanced stature and substantial goodwill in this most populous and potentially wealthy African country.

Nonetheless, the level of Moscow's concern with Africa in toto dropped significantly. Aid figures provide a good index. From 1954 to 1964, Soviet economic aid extended to the Third World totaled

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[21] K. Brutents, "African Revolution: Gains and Problems," *International Affairs*, January 1967, p. 21.

[22] See, for instance, Yuri Bochkaryov, "The Outlook in Africa," *New Times*, Apr. 27, 1966, p. 9; N. Gavrilov, "Africa: Classes, Parties and Politics," *International Affairs*, July 1966, p. 43.

[23] Richard Lowenthal, "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,' " *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1976, pp. 52-63. See also his "Epilogue" in *Model or Ally? The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 359-76.

[24] For more extended treatment of the various elements of the revised Soviet approach, see Fritz Ermarth, "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia, PA), November 1969, pp. 31-40; Legvold, op. cit., pp. 275-344; Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, IL, Aldine, 1971, and "The USSR and the Third World," *Survey* (London), Summer 1973, pp. 41-49; Lowenthal, "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,' " loc. cit.

[25] *Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1971. The economic aspects of the strategy, it should be noted, received explicit endorsement in Kosygin's report of Apr. 5, 1966, to the 23rd CPSU Congress (ibid., Apr. 6, 1966); however, no top Soviet official articulated both the political and economic dimensions of the strategy until Kosygin's address to the 24th Congress.

[26] For a good analysis of the evolution of Soviet attitudes toward the unfolding Nigerian crisis, see Legvold, op. cit., pp. 311-30.

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US$3,794 million. Of that, $1,766 million went to African countries, with sub-Saharan African states getting $477 million. Over the ensuing decade—i.e., 1965-74—Soviet aid extended to the Third World climbed to $5,634 million. Of that figure, African countries received $715 million, with sub-Saharan Africa garnering only $194 million. If one compares the two periods, Africa's share of overall aid fell from 47 to 13 percent; North Africa's, from 34 to 9 percent; and sub-Saharan Africa's, from 13 to 4 percent.[27]

The Current Picture

Recent years, clearly, have brought some major changes on the international political scene, and these have in turn stimulated rethinking in the USSR on a number of issues. For example, the energy crisis, the world economic recession, the victories of Communist armies in Indochina, and other developments of the first half of the 1970's seem to have provoked debate about whether the global balance of forces has shifted irreversibly in favor of the socialist world.[28] Similarly, the rising fortunes of some Communist parties in Western Europe appear to have stirred disagreements about the proper course to be followed.[29] Yet thus far one searches in vain for any hint of a reexamination of either the assumptions underlying the approach that Moscow adopted toward the Third World in the late 1960's or the fundamentals of that approach.

While Soviet commentators continue to proclaim that socialism will ultimately triumph in Third World lands, they convey gloomy prospects for the arrival of such a millennium in Africa in the foreseeable future. They do distinguish between states with a "capitalist orientation" and states with a "socialist orientation," but they define the latter category in modest terms:

The socialist orientation is not a special social formation, but a stage of transition from precapitalist or early capitalist phases to socialism via intermediate stages; it is the highest stage of the national-democratic revolution. The movement along that way is headed by the revolutionary democrats, who rely on the awakening sections of the peasantry, the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the patriotically-minded national intelligentsia, including the military.[30]

Moreover, they eschew any suggestion that opting for the "socialist orientation" automatically removes a state from the capitalist sphere. Indeed, according to V. Solodovnikov, formerly Director of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and now Soviet ambassador to Zambia, "a specific feature of the development of the socialist-oriented countries in Africa is that even after their choice of the non-capitalist way they are still in the orbit of the world capitalist economic system."[31]

Equally trenchant, Soviet analysts argue that "the progress of socialist-oriented countries is obstructed by serious obstacles of an objective and sometimes subjective nature," and that these countries "are taking [only] initial steps, often confined to isolated democratic reforms, social and political alike."[32] To buttress such contentions, Soviet observers point out, for example, that "the socialist-oriented countries have found it very difficult to carry out agrarian transformations against the odds of the extremely backward countryside, the shortage of material and financial resources and specialists, the resistance put up by the reactionaries, and the conservative attitudes of the bulk of the peasants."[33]

[27] These figures are the author's calculations based on data given in Leo Tansky, "Soviet Foreign Aid: Scope, Direction, and Trends," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 775; and in Orah Cooper, "Soviet Economic Aid to the Third World," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 194. In evaluating the figures for the 1954-64 period, it is important to bear in mind that most of sub-Saharan Africa did not attain independence until the 1960's. Figures for both periods represent aid offered by the USSR, not aid actually drawn by Third World countries.

[28] See, for instance, the conflicting positions set forth by Sh. Sanokoyev and N. Kapchenko in their contributions at a "scentific conference," held in May 1976 under the joint auspices of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Political Economy of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee and the Editorial Board of *International Affairs*, on "the present stage in the general crisis of capitalism and world relations," *International Affairs*, August 1976, pp. 13 and 33, respectively. From the late 1950's until the mid-1970's, the standard Soviet thesis had been that the correlation of forces was changing to the advantage of the USSR.

[29] For a review and analysis of some of the literature on this subject, see Joan Barth Urban, "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1976, pp. 1359-402.

[30] V. Solodovnikov and N. Gavrilov, "Africa: Tendencies of Non-Capitalist Development," *International Affairs*, March 1976, p. 33.

[31] V. Solodovnikov, "Elimination of the Colonial System, an Expression of the General Crisis of Capitalism," ibid., August 1976, p. 24.

[32] O. Orestov, "Independent Africa in the Making," ibid., November 1975, p. 75.

[33] Solodovnikov and Gavrilov, "Africa: Tendencies of Non-Capitalist Development," p. 36.

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As a consequence of these factors, Soviet writers maintain, "present-day development of individual countries cannot rule out the possibility of departure from or breaches in the non-capitalist way of development." [34] A typical elaboration of this judgment notes that while states such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, the People's Republic of the Congo, Somalia, the People's Republic of Benin, and Ethiopia have at one time or another declared their commitment to a "socialist orientation," not all have steadfastly upheld this commitment. "Some of them," the article declares, "have either deviated from the progressive line or slowed down their advance." In certain cases, this situation has resulted from the ouster of "progressive" leaders because of overestimations and excesses on their parts; in others, it has stemmed from the "betrayal" of "the cause of socialist orientation" by particular leaders or from "interference" in local domestic affairs by "some outside imperialist forces." [35]

For these reasons, Soviet commentators depict "the shaping of independent Africa" as a "long and complicated process." "Apparently," they say, "an appreciable period of time may pass before all African nations ultimately find the road which accords with their interests." In the meantime, "every year, serious political shake-ups, changes and conflicts occur in one spot on the continent or another," and "imperialist circles carry on their subversive activities, using the services of local reaction opposed to progressive socio-economic changes." While there has been a "growth of the vigilance of the peoples, who are coming to better comprehend the unseemly role that the local bourgeoisie and feudal reaction, in concert with imperialism, are playing at the current stage," it is to be expected that "reactionary forces" will "launch recurrent attacks against the gains of the working people in African countries." [36]

The evidence also indicates that Moscow persists in trying to apply standards of intrinsic merit—skewed though these may be by Soviet interests—in its dealings with Third World countries. As the foregoing capsulization of the present Soviet image of Africa implies, embrace of the "socialist orientation" does not confer exalted status upon a country in Soviet eyes. Certainly, it does not trigger any specific actions on the part of the USSR. By the same token, classification as a country of "capitalist orientation" has no great stigma attached to it. These generalizations are borne out by data on Soviet economic aid extended to the Third World in 1975-76. Known credits totaled $2,174 million. Of these $438 million were earmarked for African countries. Algeria ($290 million) and Somalia ($63 million) accounted for the bulk of that figure, but Tunisia, categorized as a state of "capitalist orientation" by Soviet writers, received credits of $55 million. Even more telling, the USSR's commitments to Afghanistan and Turkey, hardly states of "socialist orientation," came to a total of $1,075 million, more than double commitments to all of Africa. [37]

As for the geographic focus of Soviet attention in the Third World, there are many signs that concentration on states in an arc around the USSR's southern borders still prevails. For example, Leonid Brezhnev in his report to the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976 described the Soviet-Indian treaty of friendship and cooperation as of "enormous importance," and he pledged that "close political and economic cooperation with the Republic of India is our steady course." [38] Since then, the electoral defeat of Indira Gandhi's Congress party in the spring of 1977 and the accession to power of rulers less inclined toward cooperation with Moscow have by no means caused the USSR to pack its bags and go home. Rather, the Soviet Union has taken great pains to persuade the new leaders of India of the mutual interests served by maintaining bilateral relations at a reasonably intimate level. [39] Similarly, the USSR has evinced no disposition to allow its setbacks in portions of the Arab world over the last few years to deter it from trying to exert major influence in the affairs of the Middle East. Not only has it gone ahead with economic aid projects in Egypt as a means of preserving a role there even in the face of escalating conflict with President Anwar al-Sadat, but on October 1, 1977, it issued a joint statement with the United States looking toward a Geneva peace conference on the Middle East in which the USSR would function as a cochairman. [40] As mentioned previously, Moscow provided both Turkey and Afghanistan with whopping new economic credits in 1975-76. Moreover, it offered the great

[34] Ibid., p. 32.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Orestov, loc. cit., p. 81.

[37] These figures are taken from US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977, pp. 11-13. This is available through the Documents Expediting Service of the US Library of Congress.
[38] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976.
[39] For more detailed discussion, see William J. Barnds, "The USSR, China, and South Asia," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1977, pp. 44-59.
[40] For the text, see *The Washington Post*, Oct. 2, 1977.

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bulk of its economic assistance to Africa during those years to Algeria and Tunisia, both of which fall within the areas upon which the USSR began to focus in the late 1960's.

Finally, dedication to creating an international division of labor between the developing countries and the USSR continues to pervade all Soviet discussions of international economic relations. A recent survey of Soviet-African trade, for instance, depicts the USSR's logical role as a supplier of machinery, equipment, and other producer goods to Africa, and a purchaser of finished and semi-finished goods from African countries. To assist the African nations to expand their exports of the latter types of commodities, according to the article, the Soviet Union has granted "nonreciprocal preferences on the import of such goods," has accepted "goods turned out by industrial enterprises built with Soviet assistance in repayment of credits," has included "special clauses in long-term agreements on the priority expansion of the export of manufactured goods to the Soviet Union," has considered "the potentialities for purchases" in Africa when drawing up plans for the Soviet economy, and so on. Still, the same source admits, the volume of such goods that Africa delivers to the USSR remains quite small.



Russian and Egyptian engineers confer in July 1972 at the Hulwan Steel Works being built near Cairo with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

—Genevieve Chauvel/Sygma.

Furthermore, "there are various difficulties in increasing purchases of goods in African countries, because many of them have a small import [sic] industry and frequently lack the goods the USSR requires."[41]

What emerges from this analysis, then, is a picture of basic continuity over the last decade or so in Moscow's broad outlook and approach toward Africa. This, in turn, suggests continuity in the level of priority that the USSR has attached to the continent. In other words, Africa in general has remained well down on a rank ordering of Soviet concerns, with sub-Saharan Africa falling considerably below North Africa on the list.

In light of this consideration, it would appear that the step-up of Soviet activities on the continent since 1975 probably reflects an increase in opportunities rather than any change in approach. Even a cursory examination reveals that in recent years Africa has afforded Moscow more openings to expand its influence than has any other area of the Third World.

A Grand Design?

The preceding analysis of the overall Soviet view of Africa raises serious questions about the existence of any grand design for the continent as a whole in Moscow's policy, for it indicates that the USSR places the countries of the Arab North and the sub-Saharan South in separate categories. A survey of Soviet undertakings in Africa leads to the conclusion that in fact no grand design exists.[42] This is not to say that the USSR lacks objectives in Africa. On the contrary, one can identify four discrete goals that the Soviet Union has pursued with some consistency. It is essential to understand the nature of these in order to appreciate why one can find no broad scheme underlying Soviet activities. Therefore, let us look at each of them briefly.

[41] A. Skorodumov, "Soviet-African Trade," *International Affairs*, May 1977, pp. 117-20.

[42] Space limitations preclude a country-by-country discussion of Soviet activities in Africa here, but the following analysis grows out of detailed research of this sort that the author has conducted in connection with a larger study in progress. In tackling the issue of whether the Soviet Union has a grand design for Africa, it seems fruitless to this author to attempt to proceed from general theory or doctrine. If there is a grand design, one must assume that what the Soviet Union is doing in Africa relates to it; hence, it ought to be possible to put the various pieces of Soviet policy together into some sort of coherent mosaic. For an elaboration of this view, see John C. Campbell, "The Communist Powers and the Middle East: Moscow's Purposes," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972, especially pp. 41-43.

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

Crowds at the Alexandria shipyard gather to welcome Soviet President N. V. Podgornyy to Egypt in 1971. The shipyard served as a major repair facility for Soviet ships in the Mediterranean until 1976. The banner at center reads (in Russian and Arabic): "Long Live Arab-Soviet Friendship."

—Camera Press.

First, the USSR has sought forms of local support that would ease the logistical problems of maintaining its naval forces in waters surrounding Africa. In this connection, it is important to recall that in the early 1960's Moscow opted for a "blue-water" navy rather than one designed simply for coastal defense.[43] By 1964, the Soviet Union had deployed surface combat ships for the first time in the Mediterranean Sea—i.e., in the North African area.[44] Since then, it has extended regular naval activities to the waters along both the east and west coasts of Africa.

That the USSR has wanted to work out arrangements with local governments that would facilitate these operations is beyond doubt. For example, it has requested and received permission for its vessels to make calls at a variety of ports in littoral states.[45] It has gained access to air facilities in Guinea from which Soviet naval aircraft have carried out aerial reconnaissance of Atlantic sea lanes and US carrier

[43] For a discussion of this decision and the factors influencing it, see Michael MccGwire, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-74," in Michael MccGwire et al., Eds., *Soviet Naval Policy: Constraints and Objectives,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975 pp. 505-46.

[44] See Robert G. Weinland, "Egypt and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* (Vienna), November-December 1977. The USSR in 1958 had established a Mediterranean naval presence consisting entirely of submarines. These submarines, and a tender, were based in Vlore, Albania. As a result of developing discord between the Soviet and Albanian leaderships, however, Tirana canceled the base arrangement in 1961. Unsuccessful in obtaining an alternative base, Moscow temporarily withdrew all its combat forces from the area.

[45] US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, Supplement. This report was prepared by the Senior Specialist Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

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transits along them.[46] In the early 1970's, it acquired more or less exclusive use of seven airfields in Egypt from which it appears to have conducted, among other things, reconnaissance of the Mediterranean, and it obtained the right to various kinds of services at four harbors on Egypt's Mediterranean coast—Port Said, Alexandria, Mersa Matruh, and Sollum—and at Berenice on the Red Sea. At Alexandria, the USSR enjoyed first call on a shipyard for heavy repair and maintenance; at Mersa Matruh, it even had construction under way of some facilities designed solely for its use. As a result of the gradual deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations which began in 1971, however, Moscow by early 1976 had lost all these forms of support.[47]

Also in the early 1970's, the USSR persuaded Somalia to let it set up a naval complex at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden and to give Soviet planes access to airfields in locations from which they could reconnoiter the Indian Ocean. By the mid-1970's, the Berbera complex comprised a deep-water port, housing for about 1,500 persons, a communications facility, storage facilities for an estimated 175,000 barrels of fuel, an airfield eventually to have 13,000 to 15,000 feet of surfaced runway, and a facility for handling and storage of tactical missiles.[48] Somalia's expulsion of all Soviet advisers in November 1977 over Moscow's supply of arms to Addis Ababa, however, ended all the privileges that the USSR had acquired in Somalia.[49]

Finally, the treaty of friendship and cooperation that the USSR signed with Angola in October 1976 called for "cooperation in the military sphere" on the basis of unpublished "agreements which are

[46] Ibid.

[47] Weinland, loc. cit.

[48] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1976*, London, 1977, p. 60. See also US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Report to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, by Members of the Fact-Finding Team Sent to Somalia at the Invitation of the President of Somalia: Visit to the Democratic Republic of Somalia*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975 (committee print); US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia: Report of Senator Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975 (committee print).

[49] See the expulsion statement issued by Minister of Information and National Guidance Abdi Kassim Salad on behalf of the Central Committee of the Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party on Nov. 13, 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SSA*), Nov. 14, 1977, pp. B/2-3; and the Nov. 20, 1977, speech of President Mohamed Siad Barre on the expulsion, in *FBIS-SSA*, Nov. 21, 1977, pp. B/5-7.



Soviet replenishment tanker Boris Chilikin *refuels two Kashin-class missile destroyers east of Sardinia in May 1975. The* Boris Chilikin *is the first of a class of ships apparently designed to reduce the reliance of Soviet naval vessels on shore facilities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.*

—US Navy photo via UPI.

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being concluded between them."[50] This "cooperation" may involve Soviet use of some Angolan naval facilities, but the situation has not yet clarified sufficiently for one to be certain.

What general import all these efforts have, on the other hand, is a matter of controversy, for the longer-range motives behind them remain murky. As many observers have pointed out, the Soviet navy over the last two decades has developed substantial new capabilities to contribute to strategic deterrence, to deny an adversary the use of the sea by disrupting sea lanes, and to establish a naval presence abroad to back up Soviet foreign policy.[51] Furthermore, as other commentators have underscored, broad Soviet statements of military doctrine have contemplated the employment of all these types of capabilities.[52] Yet no one can say with assurance how Moscow weights these missions in the specific context of Africa and its surrounding waters—most critically, what importance it attaches to strictly military concerns as opposed to politico-military concerns. Consequently, speculations on the subject can and do differ.[53]

Any attempt to resolve the controversy here would plainly be fruitless. Nevertheless, it is worth noting one consideration that may bear indirectly on the issue. Thus far, the Soviet Union has not managed to acquire in Africa bases in the traditional sense (i.e., territory and/or facilities over which it exercises treaty-based rights of sovereignty), and this state of affairs inherently tends to impose constraints on the balance that Moscow strikes with respect to naval missions. To be sure, it makes little difference in terms of support for the deployment of Soviet naval forces whose flag flies over an installation as long as those forces have access to it;[54] but in calculations regarding the priority of missions, Moscow cannot with impunity ignore the absence of nominal sovereignty and the need to retain the goodwill of the countries furnishing support. The Egyptian and Somalian cases aptly demonstrate that support for Soviet naval forces may evaporate if a local government perceives Soviet actions to be contradictory to its own interests—and that such a development can seriously complicate Soviet deployments.[55] This consideration suggests that the USSR may well elect to concentrate on the sorts of undertakings which are mutually acceptable to it and to local governments as long as it continues to require their logistical support. These for the most part are likely to fall into the "naval presence" category.

Second, the Soviet Union has endeavored to gain a voice in African affairs. To some extent, this goal has manifested itself in terms of military activity. Since 1970, for example, the USSR has maintained an average of 52 ships a day in the Mediterranean.[56] Concentrated in the eastern portions of the sea, these forces have served, among other things, to register continuing Soviet concern with the Arab-Israeli conflict—a matter of importance to all the states of North Africa and especially to Egypt. Indeed, the Soviet Union has on occasion employed these forces to affect the course of the conflict.[57] While the USSR's use and improvement of the naval facilities at Berbera, Somalia, probably had more to do with Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean than with anything else,[58] it should not be forgotten that Berbera lies close to the strategic Strait of Bab al-Mandab. To exit from the Red Sea, all vessels must pass through this narrow passageway. Thus, a state that militarily dominated the seas near the Strait would possess a lot of potential influence in the countries of the Red Sea littoral. In other words, it would be in a position to affect developments in the Horn of Africa, as well as in a number of key Middle Eastern states. Last but not least, one purpose behind Moscow's extension of massive military aid to the MPLA in Angola during 1975-76 appears to have been to stake out a role for the USSR in Southern Africa. Moscow recognized that the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa had fundamentally altered the situation in the region. As a result of the disintegration of what had been a fairly solid phalanx

[50] For the treaty, see the source cited in fn. 1.

[51] For a concise exposition, see Admiral Stansfield Turner, "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), January 1977, pp. 339-54.

[52] See Robert Weinland, "Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace,' " in MccGwire et al., op. cit., pp. 547-62; and idem, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy," *Survival* (London), April-May 1972, pp. 129-33.

[53] Cf., for instance, David Rees, *Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa* (Conflict Studies, No. 77), London, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, November 1976; and Colin Legum's discussion in *The Observer,* Mar. 20, 1977.

[54] See Weinland, "Egypt and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron."

[55] On the latter point, see, for instance, ibid.

[56] This figure was calculated by the author on the basis of the yearly figures for average daily strength given in ibid.

[57] For illustrations, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Moscow and Cairo: Currents of Influence," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1974, pp. 17-28, and idem, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977.

[58] For analysis of this linkage, see, for example, Chester A. Crocker, "The African Dimension of Indian Ocean Policy," *Orbis,* Fall 1976, pp. 650-56.

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

General Yakubu Gowon, left (with pad and pencil), Head of State and of the Federal Military Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, confers with Soviet leaders in the Kremlin on May 21, 1974. On the Soviet side, from the right, are: Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, President N. V. Podgornyy, Soviet Party General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin, and Soviet Defense Minister A. A. Grechko.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

of white redoubts, it was now conceivable that all the states in the region might come under black rule in the not too distant future. Consequently, Soviet leaders sought to win the respect of national forces still waging guerrilla struggles in Southern Africa by demonstrating that the USSR had both the capacity and the will to provide effective military assistance to friends there.[59]

But hints of a Soviet desire to have a say in the continent's affairs have by no means been confined to military action. Moscow has gone to some lengths to court the larger and more significant African states, regardless of their particular political orientations. For instance, it has promised to help Nigeria build what, when completed, will constitute the largest iron and steel complex in Africa. Since the selection of a site for the complex in July 1975 and the signing of an agreement the following month that committed the USSR to provide a detailed design for it, negotiations on the precise terms of Soviet participation have proved difficult. But Soviet commentary in late November 1977, after a Nigerian economic delegation visited Moscow to talk about this and other forms of cooperation, attested to Soviet resolve to continue with this project.[60] In 1975, Soviet officials conducted extensive negotiations with Morocco concerning an agreement on development of phosphate deposits at Meskala. The proposed agreement called for Soviet construction of extraction and processing facilities in return for a guaranteed supply of phosphate rock for 20 years. In value, this deal could have been worth as much as $5 billion and represented the largest transaction the USSR had ever broached to a Third World country. However, the Moroccans eventually refused to sign the agreement once the USSR began to back the undertakings of the Polisario Front, a guerrilla group seeking independence for the Spanish Sahara, which Morocco and Mauritania had carved up between them in 1975.[61] Finally, in December 1976, the Soviet Union dramatically stepped up its courtship of Ethiopia by signing a secret accord to provide arms shipments to that African country totaling, according to Western estimates, somewhere between $100 million and $200 million in value. Moscow took this step despite

[59] For more detailed discussion of the evidence regarding Moscow's likely motivations for helping the MPLA, see Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976, pp. 747-53.

[60] For more details, see Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1975-76*, New York, NY, Africana Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 799-800, 803; US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., p. 21; Radio Moscow in English to Africa, Nov. 23, 1977, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1977, p. H/3.

[61] US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., p. 18.

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its existing treaty of friendship and cooperation with Ethiopia's much smaller and less populous neighbor, Somalia, which regarded Ethiopia as its archenemy.[62]

Third, the USSR has tried to undermine Western influence in Africa. This objective has long figured in Soviet behavior on the continent, but the signs of its existence have altered substantially in recent years. Up to the mid-1960's, offers of economic aid, in the form of both credits and technical assistance, had been the key indicator of Soviet desire to reduce Western influence in Africa. With Moscow's decision to focus its attention on those countries in an arc around the USSR's southern borders, however, the volume of such offers to African states has inevitably declined.[63] Moreover, Soviet leaders have apparently felt less need to challenge Western economic positions on the continent, for they have viewed these as weakening because of essentially natural economic processes. Certainly, Soviet analysts have interpreted the proportional drop of Western investments in the Third World over the last decade—and the proportional rise of Western investments in advanced industrial countries—as a trend of some consequence.[64]

At the same time, the USSR has clearly maneuvered to establish itself as sole military supplier and/or political patron of a number of African states which formerly looked fundamentally to the West for support. In the early 1970's, for instance, Moscow began to extend military aid to the repressive and erratic regime of Idi Amin in Uganda. By June 1975, the USSR had provided an estimated 12 MIG fighters and bombers, 60 light tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 50 antiaircraft guns, 200 antitank weapons, and 850 bombs and missiles, and the weapons were still flowing. After the Israeli raid at Entebbe Airport in July 1976, Moscow even replaced the MIG aircraft that the Israelis had damaged or destroyed.[65] In 1974, the USSR also concluded a $1 billion military agreement with Libya. Deliveries under this agreement have to date included MIG-23 fighters, TU-22 medium bombers, various types of missile systems, and an array of modern ground equipment. Since the weaponry that Libya has received exceeds what the Libyan armed forces can absorb, the USSR has in effect provided Libya with the means to function as an arsenal for local African and Middle Eastern forces that enjoy Tripoli's favor.[66] As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union in late 1976 committed itself to furnish major amounts of arms to Ethiopia, and Moscow became Addis Ababa's only source of supplies after the Ethiopian Military Council expelled most American personnel from the country in April 1977.[67] Even Soviet support for the MPLA in Angola in 1975-76 seems in part to have reflected a wish to erode Western influence. Moscow obviously did not want to see the Portuguese colonial regime there give way to a government composed of forces backed by the West in general and by the United States in particular.[68]

Fourth, the Soviet Union has striven to keep the People's Republic of China (PRC) from expanding its role in Africa and to reduce that role in any way possible. Rivalry between the two Communist powers for influence on the continent dates from the late 1950's and the early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute. During the last half of the 1960's, Peking's preoccupation with domestic conflict arising from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and China's stridently militant line in foreign policy combined to lessen greatly the challenge that the PRC posed to the USSR in Africa, but since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 Peking has revived its efforts to expand its influence in the area. In the process, it has carefully nurtured traditional ties and branched out in new directions as well. During the early 1970's, it forged particularly strong links with many of the African liberation movements.[69]

Several Soviet actions in Africa in recent years appear to have been direct responses to Chinese ventures. For instance, although Tanzania had long maintained warm relations with China and displayed a general coolness toward the USSR, Soviet President Podgornyy stopped first in Dar es Salaam on his trek around Africa in early 1977, and he took that occasion to announce a new $19.2 million

[62] See the dispatches by David Ottaway and Peter Osnos in *The Washington Post,* Apr. 16 and May 7, 1977, respectively.

[63] See Tansky, loc. cit.; Cooper, loc. cit.; and US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[64] For further discussion of this point, see Lowenthal, "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,'" pp. 62-63.

[65] See Colin Legum, *The Observer,* June 24, 1975; and US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., p. 22.

[66] Ibid., p. 17.

[67] David Ottaway's dispatch, *The Washington Post,* Apr. 16, 1977.

[68] On the relations of the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*—FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional pro Independencia Total de Angola*—UNITA) with the United States, see John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1976, pp. 407-25; Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," in Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1975-76,* pp. 3-39; and idem, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," esp. pp. 747-53.

[69] For further discussion of Chinese activities in Africa, see the article by George Yu in this issue of *Problems of Communism.*

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Vasiliy Solodovnikov, left, Soviet ambassador to Zambia, chats in February 1977 with Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo at Lusaka Airport. The USSR has long been a supporter of Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which recently joined with rival nationalist elements to form the Patriotic Front. The Front controls guerrillas fighting from bases in Mozambique and Zambia against the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith.

—UPI.

Soviet loan to Tanzania.[70] In addition, Moscow has commenced to provide military aid to the guerrillas from Southern Africa training in Tanzania and Mozambique, thereby ending what was once a Chinese monopoly.[71] Elsewhere, the USSR in 1976 countered a 1975 Chinese loan of $17 million for economic development to Guinea-Bissau, which had gained independence in September 1974 after a protracted guerrilla war against the Portuguese, by offering the fledgling state credits of $13 million. The latter figure, it is worth noting, exceeds the economic aid that Moscow has extended to Angola, a close ally and a country with nearly 10 times the population of Guinea-Bissau.[72] Perhaps most striking, the main factor behind the USSR's initial decision to back the MPLA in Angola in early 1975 seems to have been a desire to prevent the Chinese from becoming the dominant outside power in Southern Africa. China had been providing military advisers and arms for Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola at camps in Zaire since late-1973/early-1974, and the Chinese had also worked more harmoniously than the Soviets with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*—FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Rhodesia (the Rhodesian group with the most effective guerrilla forces), and the South-West African People's Organization of Namibia. Thus, China was in a good position to have considerable sway with any black governments that might emerge in the region as the result of the new strategic situation produced by the demise of the Portuguese empire. Moscow apparently deemed some action necessary to ward off this threat, and it committed itself to assisting the MPLA.[73]

These, then, constitute the discernible Soviet goals in Africa. They hardly indicate the existence of a grand design. To begin with, the bearing any individual objective has had on Soviet behavior has varied widely from place to place. To some extent, of course, this variation has reflected the relevance of that objective in specific contexts, but relevance alone does not account for it. There have been cases where, on the surface of things, a particular goal would appear to be relevant yet has had no perceptible impact on Soviet actions. The search for local support for Soviet naval forces, for example, has not visibly affected Soviet activities vis-à-vis Ivory Coast. Nor has the wish to curtail Chinese influence seemed to have much relationship to what the USSR has been doing in most of North Africa or in the Horn. By the same token, the wish to have a voice in African affairs has had no obvious effect on Soviet courtship of Guinea-Bissua or Tunisia. Finally, the intent to undermine Western influence has played no identifiable role in Soviet dealings with Chad, Senegal, or Mauritania.

More significant, there has been no evident hierarchy of objectives. In some situations, to be sure, the USSR has managed to pursue a number of the goals simultaneously because they have been essentially complementary. For example, the Soviet Angolan operation served both to check the growth of Chinese influence and to diminish Western influence. In other situations, however, Soviet objectives have conflicted, and Moscow has not always re-

[70] David Ottaway in *The Washington Post*, Mar. 27, 1977.

[71] US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., pp. 19-20; and Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," pp. 754-55.

[72] US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., pp. 12, 16, and 20.

[73] For more extensive treatment of the evidence on which this reconstruction is based see Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," pp. 747-53; and idem, "Foreign Intervention in Angola."

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solved the resultant policy dilemmas in the same way. For instance, it initially opted to furnish arms to Ethiopia to reduce Western influence in that country, even though it risked loss of naval facilities in Somalia by doing so. Then, after Somalia threw its regular military forces behind the Somali guerrillas fighting to wrest the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, Soviet desire to win a major voice in African affairs appears to have figured prominently in Moscow's decision to continue to supply arms to Ethiopia, for the USSR found that most African countries opposed Somalia's effort to alter borders by means of force.[74] In this particular case, these two goals seem to have taken precedence over that of garnering local African support for the deployment of Soviet naval forces. By electing to endorse the Algerian-backed, anti-Moroccan Polisario Front in the former Spanish Sahara, on the other hand, Moscow has plainly subordinated the same two goals to other considerations. This endorsement has antagonized Morocco and has caused it to back away from the proposed phosphate deal with the USSR mentioned earlier—a deal which would have created a substantial "division of labor" between Morocco and the Soviet Union and thereby reduced Western economic influence in the North African country. Soviet backing of the Polisario Front has also complicated Moscow's attempts to gain a significant say in continental affairs, for Algeria has failed to carry the day on the Saharan issue in either the Organization of African Unity or the Arab League. While the precise reasons for the USSR's actions in this instance are by no means clear, a wish to retain Algeria's goodwill in order to ensure that the port of Algiers remain open to calls by Soviet ships may well have entered into Soviet calculations. That Algeria's general capacity to provide support for the projection of Soviet power into Africa and its environs weighed heavily in Soviet thinking seems likely in view of the timing of the decision. Moscow apparently decided to support the Polisario Front in late 1975 during the same period in which the Boumediene government made the Algiers airport available to the USSR for use in connection with the Angolan crisis.[75]

Policy in Sum

In light of the foregoing discussion, one can best characterize recent Soviet policy in Africa as reactive and opportunistic. It has been reactive in the sense that key Soviet initiatives have come in response to developments and trends in the African countries themselves and to the behavior of other major outside powers. On balance, local African conditions have been of greater importance in triggering Soviet actions. Had not elements of the Ethiopian military overthrown Haile Selassie and subsequently embarked on a "socialist" revolution, for example, it is debatable whether Moscow would have had the chance to enhance its position in Ethiopia. Certainly, the opportunity to do so would not have been as great. Similarly, the inability of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to form some type of coalition government in Angola and the MPLA's determination to install itself in office by whatever means required gave the USSR the essential opening that led to its Angolan operation. Even the Soviet Union's arms agreements with Libya and Uganda have resulted from local requests, not from prodding on Moscow's part.

Soviet policy has been opportunistic in the sense that the USSR has sought to take advantage of virtually every opening that has presented itself in

Mozambique leader Samora Machel, right, chats with a Chinese military adviser. The People's Republic of China provided finances, arms, and training in Machel's successful drive for independence in the former Portuguese colony.

—Camera Press.

[74] For indications of Soviet sensitivity to African views on attempts to change borders by military means, see V. Matveyev's article in *Izvestiya*, Sept. 18, 1977; and Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa, Oct. 28, 1977, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 31, 1977, pp. H/4-5.

[75] See US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit., p. 14.

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An April 1975 photo of Eritrean guerrillas in their struggle for independence from Ethiopia.

—Chauvel/Sygma.

Africa, whatever Moscow's prevailing political line or existing commitments. The situation in the Horn affords a classic illustration. During the early 1970's, the Soviet Union provided Somalia with sufficient arms to transform itself into a significant military power, despite the fact that Moscow knew full well that the Somalis claimed territory—including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia—which officially belonged to Somalia's neighbors.[76] At the same time, the USSR rendered support to Eritrean nationalists fighting the Addis Ababa government for independence from Ethiopia. Yet in the wake of the 1974 military takeover in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union began to woo the new rulers in Addis Ababa. Moreover, when the growing internal chaos stemming from attempts at far-reaching social reforms and from the challenge of secessionist movements in Eritrea and the Ogaden compelled the Ethiopian military government to turn to Moscow for the additional arms that the country's traditional supplier, the United States, was reluctant to furnish, Soviet leaders responded favorably. As noted previously, the USSR soon became Addis Ababa's sole source of weapons. To try to reconcile Somalia and the Eritrean liberation forces to this state of affairs, Moscow promoted a plan for a federation of Marxist countries that would encompass Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and even Djibouti (the small French colony on the Red Sea that Mogadiscio regards as Somali patrimony but that became independent in June 1977). However, both Somalia and the Eritreans rejected the plan.[77] For a time, Moscow continued to supply

[76] For analysis of the evolving Soviet role in Somalia, see Brian Crozier, *The Soviet Presence in Somalia* (Conflict Studies, No. 54), London, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975; and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Somalia and Moscow's Problems on the Horn of Africa," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 158/77, July 5, 1977.

[77] For discussions of this plan and the local reactions to it, see James Buxton's account in *Financial Times* (London), Apr. 24, 1977; Colin Legum's report in *The Observer,* May 9, 1977; and David Ottaway's dispatches in *The Washington Post,* May 17 and 26, and June 9, 1977. Fidel Castro first broached the idea of a federation to Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia at a secret meeting over which Castro presided in Aden in March 1977.

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weapons to Somalia as well as to Ethiopia, but after Siad Barre committed regular Somali troops to the struggle in the Ogaden in July 1977, the Soviet Union cut off the flow of arms to Mogadiscio. It was this action that ultimately prompted Somalia to expel all Soviet advisers.

The opportunistic feature of Soviet policy has had certain negative consequences for the USSR that all too frequently get overlooked in recitations of the advances that the Soviet Union has registered in Africa over the last few years. Specifically, the USSR has become deeply involved in some situations where its position rests on rather shaky foundations. Those in the Horn and Angola provide the prime examples. In the Horn, Soviet leaders have now alienated Somalia to the point where the USSR is not likely to recoup its losses there in the foreseeable future. In addition, Moscow's backing of Ethiopia has poured new coals on the already hot fires of ire that Egypt and Sudan manifest toward the Soviet Union, for these two African countries, both Red Sea powers themselves, have supported the causes of the Eritreans and Somalia. Thus, Soviet fortunes have come to depend essentially on Ethiopia, and particularly on the fate of the Mengistu regime. Yet there have been abundant signs that Mengistu's hold on power is fairly tenuous,[78] and by November 1977 this was causing enough unease in Moscow to produce public, if veiled, acknowledgment of the extent of the challenges to his authority.[79] Unless Mengistu manages in quick order to bring about a reversal of the adverse military circumstances that confront Ethiopia in the Ogaden and perhaps Eritrea, he could fall, and a leader less inclined toward socialism and less favorably disposed toward the USSR could take his place.

Soviet actions at the end of 1977 suggest that Moscow is well aware of this military imperative. In late November, the USSR began a large airlift of arms and military equipment to Ethiopia with such urgency that it had its planes file misleading flight plans at refueling stations and fly over some countries without permission. It did not suspend the airlift until early January 1978. In conjunction with this massive infusion of weaponry, there was a substantial influx of Cuban and Soviet personnel into Ethiopia. By early January 1978, according to US estimates, about 1,000 Cuban military advisers and 500 to 1,500 Soviet military advisers had arrived in the African country.[80]

In Angola, the denouement of the civil war has turned out to be far less decisive than it looked in 1976. The MPLA government headed by Agostinho Neto has encountered some continuing resistance from secessionists in the Cabinda enclave and from FNLA elements in the north and northwest, and it has faced a major insurgency problem in the center and southeast, where a large segment of UNITA forces survived their earlier battles with Cuban and MPLA units.[81] UNITA has exploited its roots among the Ovimbundu, Angola's largest tribe, to wage an increasingly effective guerrilla war in this region against the Mbundu-based Neto regime. Indeed, a recent US government study suggests that Cuba has had to expand its military forces in Angola by about 20 percent in order to help Neto and the MPLA forces try to cope with the situation.[82] Furthermore, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, has ruled out any compromise with Neto and the MPLA unless Cuban and Soviet personnel leave the country.[83] To make matters worse, the Neto government itself has been rent by dissension, largely of a racial character. Some blacks have resented the heavy representation of mulattoes and whites among the MPLA elite, and in late May 1977 a faction led by two blacks—Nito Alves, former Interior Administration Minister, and José Van Dunene, a former army political commissar—staged an abortive but bloody coup against the government.[84] Thus, the USSR could find itself drawn deeper and deeper into a

[78] See, for instance, Radio Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic, Oct. 18, 1977, in *FBIS-SSA*, Oct. 20, 1977, pp. B/1-3; Radio Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic, Oct. 31, 1977, in *FBIS-SSA*, Nov. 2, 1977, pp. B/1-3; Radio Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic, Nov. 13, 1977, in *FBIS-SSA*, Nov. 16, 1977, pp. B/1-3; Radio Addis Ababa Domestic Service in English, Nov. 14, 1977, in *FBIS-SSA*, Nov. 15, 1977, pp. B/1-3; and Norman Kirkham's report in *Sunday Telegraph*, Nov. 27, 1977.

[79] See Radio Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Nov. 17, 1977, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 18, 1977, pp. H/1-2; and Moscow TASS in English, Nov. 21, 1977, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 21, 1977, p. H/5.

[80] See especially *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1977, and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 6, 1978.

[81] See the press conference conducted by a representative of the Angolan Defense Ministry in Luanda on Nov. 9, 1977, as reported by Radio Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese, Nov. 9, 1977, in *FBIS-SSA*, Nov. 11, 1977, pp. E/1-2.

[82] *The Washington Post*, Nov. 18, 1977.

[83] Report by Leon Dash in ibid., Aug. 13, 1977. This is the final installment of a fascinating account of UNITA activities based on a 2,100-mile trek through Angola with UNITA guerrillas that lasted seven and a half months. The full series ran in ibid., Aug. 7-13, 1977.

[84] The background to the attempted coup is quite complex, and some of the participants seem to have been white ideologues who favored a more dogmatic version of Marxism than Neto himself propounds. Nevertheless, the platform of the conspirators placed greatest emphasis on the racial issue. For details, see the report of Carlyle Murphy in ibid., June 28, 1977.

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

Signs of the times in Ethiopia: left, a soldier stands guard in Addis Ababa's Revolution Square during a June 1977 military parade; right, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council, addresses a mass anti-imperialist demonstration in March 1977.

—Campbell/Sygma; and Nolle/ADN-ZB via Eastfoto.

political quagmire in attempting to prop up the Neto regime, or if there is some move toward reconciliation of the country's diverse nationalist elements, Soviet personnel might be asked to withdraw entirely.

Prospects

While past policy imposes certain constraints on what the Soviet Union can do in Africa in the coming years, it does not necessarily predetermine future policy. Therefore, a few final words on the broad outlook for the years immediately ahead are in order.

Soviet policy toward the continent will depend fundamentally on two sets of variables: (1) Moscow's perspectives on Africa, including the relative priority that it attaches to the continent and the general way in which it approaches the continent, and (2) the opportunities that Africa presents. In trying to speculate about the first set, perhaps the most fruitful tack is to consider what factors might produce changes in current Soviet perspectives and to assess the likelihood of such factors arising.

If Moscow perceived growing chances for what it deemed to be "genuine" Marxist-Leninist breakthroughs in Africa, that perception might lead to revisions in its approach toward the continent. At present, Ethiopia probably offers the greatest possibilities for such a breakthrough. Yet Soviet analysts hold out no great hope for a "real" revolutionary turn of events even there.[85]

A revamping of existing Soviet strategy toward the Third World might also alter Moscow's outlook toward Africa. In view of the fact that present strategy

[85] For a typical commentary, see V. Korovikov, "A New Life Comes to Ethiopia," *International Affairs*, March 1977, pp. 127-34.

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has not yielded monumental gains for the USSR, such a development is not totally inconceivable, but it does appear unlikely. The current strategy has had some positive results, and Soviet leaders clearly recognize these.[86] Hence, the incentives for a modification of approach do not seem very strong at the moment.

Lastly, a Soviet determination that Africa had become a decisive battleground for great-power competition would obviously bring about a shift in Moscow's perspectives vis-à-vis the continent. Even if Soviet leaders reached such a conclusion, one has a hard time imagining how it could apply to Africa as a whole. Rather, Moscow would probably have in mind only specific portions of the continent—e.g., the eastern parts of North Africa or perhaps Southern Africa. From a geopolitical standpoint, moreover, it appears highly doubtful that either area would supersede Europe or East Asia as the key arena of great-power rivalry in Soviet eyes.

All things considered, then, it seems likely that the USSR will continue to endorse the basic policy framework to which it has adhered for the last decade and that the overall parameters of Soviet policy toward Africa will not change. Such prospects mean that Soviet goals on the continent will probably remain the same too.

But Soviet policy could still undergo some modification in line with the openings available to the USSR in Africa. While one cannot predict with any certainty what opportunities the USSR will enjoy in any specific area of the world, it does seem safe to say that those in Africa will in all likelihood be greater than they are elsewhere in the Third World. Currently, Africa is the scene of the most intense international and domestic conflicts in the Third World, and this state of affairs will quite probably continue to prevail. Such a likelihood suggests that Soviet activity on the continent will at least stay at its present level and may well increase.

Whether the USSR will persist in operating in as reactive and opportunistic a fashion as it has in the recent past, however, is a moot point. Old habits do not die easily, but a series of concrete setbacks in African countries might generate some rethinking in Moscow about its political style. Such reverses, on the other hand, may not come. In this event, one should probably expect continuing Soviet efforts to take advantage of whatever openings develop—even if exploiting them requires boldness and entails a substantial degree of risk.

[86] See Lowenthal, "Soviet 'Counterimperialism,'" esp. pp. 52-53, 60-63.

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China's Impact

By George T. Yu

Africa in the 1970's has become a major battleground of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The struggle there between the two communist giants takes place on two distinct but interconnected levels. On the first plane, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR seek to "win friends and influence people" through formal and informal political interaction, economic aid, military assistance, and other activities. On the second, more abstract plane, each actor attacks the other's motives and role related to Africa.

From Moscow's standpoint, then, China poses a distinct challenge in Africa, and that challenge constitutes an important aspect of the context in which Soviet policy toward the continent takes shape. This article will look at the dimensions of the Chinese challenge and the precise nature of the threat that it poses to Soviet interests. More specifically, it will examine overall Chinese activities on the continent, the image that the Soviet Union has sought to project in Africa and Moscow's perceptions of how Chinese behavior tarnishes that image, Peking's critique of the USSR's intentions and actions in Africa, and the impact that China has apparently had on Soviet policy toward the continent in the past and is likely to have in the future.

Chinese Activities

Initially, China's interaction with Africa developed in the context of the Sino-American confrontation that followed the Korean war. In the wake of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian States in 1955, the PRC launched an effort in Africa, similar to its diplomatic offensive in South and Southeast Asia, to win increased international recognition and support as a means of breaking out of the political "encirclement" that the United States had attempted to establish. As the number of independent countries on the continent grew, Peking intensified this effort, and Africa remained a battlefield in the Chinese-American cold war through the early 1960's.

With the emergence of open Sino-Soviet discord in the early 1960's, however, China's African policy began to be more and more directed against the Soviet Union. As the conflict escalated from a political-ideological dispute to a semimilitary confrontation in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the USSR replaced the United States as the main foe in Peking's eyes, and the Chinese as a result stepped up their campaign to combat Soviet influence in Africa. Indeed, Africa soon assumed major importance as an arena of Sino-Soviet competition. This competition has become especially strong in the period since the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1969, which has witnessed a major expansion of Chinese activities on the continent.

To appreciate the extent of Chinese undertakings in Africa today, it is useful to compare China's relations with Africa through 1966 with those since 1970. While Sino-African interaction did not cease between 1966 and 1970 (i.e., the period when China was preoccupied with the Cultural Revolution), it fell off substantially.

As the primary indicator of Chinese activity, we shall use economic credits and grants the PRC has extended to African states. Viewed alone, these data tell us little about Sino-Soviet rivalry. Therefore, we shall assess them in light of the credits and grants that the USSR has provided African countries during the same two periods.

Through 1976, the PRC offered a total of US$2.2 billion in economic credits and grants to African

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countries—a figure representing about 56 percent of all its aid commitments to the noncommunist world.[1] As Table 1 indicates, $428 million worth were extended during the 1954-66 period. When one compares these Chinese credits and grants with Soviet credits and grants during the same years, one finds several noteworthy things. First, China ran a poor second to the Soviet Union in terms of aid commitments to Africa. Not only did the USSR offer aid to a greater number of African states—17 against 11 for China—but its aid commitments also amounted to more than four times those of China. Second, there was Sino-Soviet competition in 10 instances, with the Soviet Union being the major communist donor in 8 of the 10 cases. China constituted the leading donor only with respect to the Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania. Third, Peking's individual aid commitments were in general smaller projects than those of the USSR, and nowhere did China's foreign aid program finance a "flagship" project of the grandiose scale of the Soviet-financed Aswan Dam in Egypt.

The relative smallness of Chinese aid commitments should not be taken as a sign that Peking lacked interest in Africa, or as a reflection of Africa's unimportance in the Sino-Soviet conflict. While use of the years 1954-66 is desirable from the standpoint of covering Soviet activity from its beginning, such a periodization does tend to skew the comparison. Chinese aid to Africa did not in fact commence until 1956 (Egypt was the first recipient), and it did not reach truly significant proportions until after 1961, peaking at $195 million in 1964. As has already been pointed out, the early 1960's witnessed the development of overt Sino-Soviet conflict.

The importance of Africa in Chinese foreign policy during the 1960's also manifested itself in the visits of Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi to the continent in 1963-64 and 1965, respectively. One objective of these trips was to round up African support for barring the USSR from participation in the "second Bandung" conference scheduled for June 1965 (but later abandoned after an abortive attempt to convene it).

[1] US Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, Washington, DC, February 1976; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977.

Chinese and Sudanese workers pictured in 1973 at the construction site of a new bridge being built across the Blue Nile in the Sudan. The project was financed and designed by the People's Republic of China.

—Diane Rawson/Photoresearchers.

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Table 1: Chinese and Soviet Aid Commitments to Africa, 1954-66 and 1970-76

(in millions of US dollars)

	1954-66		1970-76	
	China	USSR	China	USSR
Algeria	52	236	40	479
Angola	—	—	—	10
Benin [a]	—	—	44	—
Burundi	—	—	20	—
Cameroon	—	8	71	—
Central African Empire [b]	4	—	—	2
Chad	—	—	50	2
Congo [c]	25	10	—	4
Egypt	85	1,001	28	299
Equatorial Guinea	—	—	—	1
Ethiopia	—	102	85	3
Gambia	—	—	17	—
Ghana	42	93	—	—
Guinea	56	106	11	2
Guinea-Bissau	—	—	17	14
Kenya	18	48	—	—
Malagasy Republic	—	—	66	—
Mali	55	59	4	—
Mauritania	—	—	59	1
Mauritius	—	—	35	—
Morocco	—	44	32	44
Mozambique	—	—	59	3
Niger	—	—	51	2
Nigeria	—	—	—	7
Rwanda	—	—	22	1
Senegal	—	7	49	2
Sierra Leone	—	28	30	—
Somalia	22	66	111	87
Sudan	—	22	82	—
Tanzania	54	20	305	—
Togo	—	—	45	—
Tunisia	—	34	40	55
Uganda	15	16	—	—
Upper Volta	—	—	52	1
Zaire [d]	—	—	100	—
Zambia	—	—	290	—
TOTALS	$428	$1,900	$1,815	$1,019

[a] Prior to 1975 known as Dahomey.
[b] Prior to 1977 known as the Central African Republic.
[c] Prior to 1969 known as Congo (Brazzaville).
[d] Prior to 1971 known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Congo (Leopoldville or Kinshasa).

SOURCES: The data for 1954-66 are drawn from US Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, Washington, DC, February 1976; the data for 1970-76 are adapted by the author from ibid. and from US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977.

However, China's turn "inward" during the Cultural Revolution temporarily halted its budding African policy, and the PRC did not return to Africa as a major actor until 1970. Table 1 shows the degree of Chinese "reentry" onto the African scene in terms of economic aid in this and subsequent years. Comparison of Chinese and Soviet aid commitments during this period leads to a number of observations. First, there was a reversal of Chinese and Soviet roles from the pre-1966 period. China now became the chief communist aid donor to African countries. Not only did China offer almost twice the amount of economic assistance that the Soviet Union did, but the PRC also extended aid to 28 states as opposed to 20 for the USSR. Second, there were 15 instances of direct Sino-Soviet competition, and China constituted the leading donor in 11 cases. Third, more African countries received aid from China for the first time than obtained initial assistance from the USSR. Whereas China extended aid to 22 new African recipients, the Soviet Union offered assistance to only 11 African states for the first time. Fourth, the average amount of Chinese aid per recipient increased from $39 million in the 1954-66 period to $65 million in the 1970-76 period, while the average figure for Soviet assistance per recipient for the same periods declined from $112 million to $51 million. Finally, China during the 1970-76 period undertook its first "flagship" project—the construction of the massive Tanzania-Zambia railway at a cost in excess of $450 million.[2]

Other indicators also attest to China's major effort in Africa since 1970. During this period, for example, Peking carried out an intensive campaign to broaden its diplomatic relations with the continent. By the end of 1977, it had forged official ties with 24 countries with which it had not previously had formal links (see Table 2), thus bringing the total of African states with which it maintained diplomatic relations to 40. Over the same period, China's leaders have entertained an impressive number of African leaders in Peking (see Table 3). During these visits, the Chinese always reminded the Africans of the struggle against "imperialism and hegemonism"—i.e., against the influence of both superpowers.

Clearly, then, Africa in the 1970's has emerged as an area of strong contention between China and

[2] A loan of $401 million was extended to Tanzania and Zambia in 1970. In 1976, the Chinese announced that they were providing an additional $55 million or so as an outright grant to cover cost overruns. US Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.

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Table 2: The People's Republic of China's New Diplomatic Relations in Africa, 1970-77

Year	State
1970	Equatorial Guinea
1970	Ethiopia
1971	Cameroon
1971	Nigeria
1971	Rwanda
1971	Senegal
1971	Sierra Leone
1972	Chad
1972	Malagasy Republic
1972	Mauritius
1972	Togo
1972	Zaire
1973	Upper Volta
1974	Gabon
1974	Gambia
1974	Guinea-Bissau
1974	Niger
1975	Botswana
1975	Comoros
1975	Sao Tome and Principe
1975	Mozambique
1976	Cape Verde
1976	Seychelles
1977	Liberia

SOURCE: Compiled from New China News Agency releases.

the USSR, and China has managed to bolster its position on the continent considerably—at least in terms of winning increased formal acceptance from Africans. This situation has posed problems for the Soviet Union. To understand the character of these, we need to look first at the state of affairs as Moscow has viewed it.

The Soviet Perspective

At the opening session of the 1965 Moscow Conference on the Historic Relations of the Peoples of the Soviet Union and Africa, a Soviet spokesman underlined the "tradition of friendship" and the importance of Marxism-Leninism in the USSR's relations with Africa. According to him, the "tradition of friendship" derived from contacts in the 19th century between Russian travelers and Africans in areas ranging from Libya to the Congo, and it reflected the fact that relationships had been founded on "mutual respect and strong mutual interest." As for the influence of Marxism-Leninism, this had manifested itself in the Soviet Union's representation of and devotion to the working masses and oppressed peoples—including being "on the side of the oppressed nations" and extending assistance to national liberation movements. In short, he maintained that the USSR had a long and deep interest in Africa and had served as supporter of the weak and helper of those seeking national liberation.[3]

Such themes mirrored a Soviet desire to portray Moscow as the foremost champion of the international revolutionary movement, and that desire has remained constant over the years. Yet despite Soviet assistance to the "national liberation and revolutionary struggles" in Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Angola, Mozambique, etc., there have been those, say Soviet writers, who have sought "to denigrate the Leninist foreign policy of the world's first socialist state."[4] China stands at the forefront of these denigrators.

According to one Soviet source, China has been "fanning anti-Soviet sentiments and undermining friendly ties" between the USSR and Africa, while seeking to establish "a dominant position in the African liberation movement" and to impose Chinese hegemony on Africa.[5] China, the same source goes on, launched its drive to develop relations with Africa in the 1950's, and even during these early years Peking employed "special ways" of building such relations—stressing the "traditional ties" between China and Africa, supporting African nationalism, linking the Islamic community in China with those in Africa, and appealing for African friendship on the basis of racial prejudice. But it was not until the 1960's that China began to show its true colors by pursuing a hegemonic policy toward Africa.

As part of this policy, runs the Soviet interpretation, China attempted to achieve dominance over African national liberation and revolutionary movements. During the 1960's, Peking called on Africa "to adopt violent armed struggle as the only effective revolutionary method," promulgating the idea that "quick and easy victory over imperialism was possible." The insurrectionary course followed by the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*—FLN) in Algeria was selected as a

[3] African Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, *Russia and Africa*, Moscow, "Nauka," 1966, pp. 7-15.

[4] See O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945-1973: A Brief History*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, esp. p. 12.

[5] For a Soviet account of China's policy toward Africa see G. U. Astafyev and A. M. Dubinsky, Eds., *From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, pp. 112-24. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of China's African policy as seen through Soviet eyes is taken from this source.

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Table 3: Major African Delegations to China, 1971-77

Year	Leader of Delegation
1971	President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique
1971	Deputy President of Sudan
1972	President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia
1972	Vice President of Zambia
1973	President of Zaire
1973	President of Cameroon
1973	President of the Congo
1973	President of Sierra Leone
1974	President of Zambia
1974	President of Tanzania
1974	President of Senegal
1974	Vice President of the Supreme Military Council of Niger
1974	President of Togo
1974	Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria
1974	President of Mauritania
1974	President of Gabon
1975	President of the Liberation Front of of Mozambique
1975	President of Gambia
1975	President of Sao Tome and Principe
1976	President of Malagasy Republic
1976	President of Benin
1976	President of Botswana
1976	President of the Central African Republic
1976	Vice President of Tanzania
1977	President of Mauritania
1977	President of Gabon
1977	President of Sudan
1977	Prime Minister of the Congo
1977	Vice President of Somalia
1977	General Secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union
1977	President of the Supreme Military Council of Niger
1977	President of Cameroon

SOURCE: Compiled from New China News Agency releases.

"model" for African revolutionary struggle and as an example of the application of the Chinese pattern of national liberation. Other African insurgent movements which received Chinese support included ones in the Congo (Leopoldville), the Cameroons, Angola, and Mozambique. In all cases, Peking insisted "on armed struggle irrespective of change of the internal political and international situation."

Such methods, in the Soviet view, constituted "pseudo-revolutionary tactics" and "adventuristic actions" and often resulted in dividing and weakening the revolutionary forces. Furthermore, Chinese assistance to the liberation struggles consisted of little more than verbal support, with little or no practical help forthcoming.

Another aspect of China's hegemonic policy toward Africa, Soviet commentary maintains, was to launch direct attacks against the USSR. For example, Peking questioned the effectiveness of Soviet aid and support to the FLN in Algeria, and it criticized the USSR for the Soviet role in the Congo (Leopoldville)—now Zaire—in the 1960's. It even tried to exclude the Soviet Union from Africa by preventing the USSR from participating in the projected Second Conference of Afro-Asian States in 1965. The objective of all these efforts was to weaken Soviet ties with Africa, especially with the African revolutionary movements, while enhancing China's links.

China's bid for leadership in Africa, Soviet analysis insists, had distinctly chauvinistic characteristics. These became evident especially during the period of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Beginning in 1965, China sought to interfere in the internal affairs of African states "to plant the experience of the 'cultural revolution' in African soil." During the same years, Peking supported the secessionist Biafran forces in the Nigerian civil war and accused the Soviet Union of betraying the African revolutionary movement for failing to do likewise. In sum, China's activities pointed to a "Peking brand of neocolonialism."

During the 1970's, according to Soviet contentions, the PRC persisted in its campaign against the USSR and for Chinese hegemony in Africa. However, Peking adopted a "soft," more flexible line in its foreign policy. That is, it no longer called for "people's wars" in Africa; rather, it endeavored to rally African countries, as well as those in the rest of the Third World, against the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, China identified itself with and sought the leadership of the Third World, while it tried to link the Soviet Union, as a "social-imperialist," with the imperialist United States. Such a policy was "clearly designed to whitewash imperialism, to divert the peoples of the developing countries from the struggle against neocolonialism and to turn them against the socialist community." [6]

From the Soviet standpoint, then, China has come to constitute a serious obstacle to the USSR's efforts to establish itself as the patron of the national libera-

[6] O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Peking's Foreign Policy After the 10th Congress of the CPC," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1974, pp. 32-44.

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

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai delivers an airport address in Algiers on December 21, 1963, during a major tour of Africa. At the center is Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella, and at the right is Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi.

—Wide World.

tion and revolutionary movement in Africa. But Moscow has nonetheless remained determined to pursue that end. This determination has manifested itself in "positive actions" to assist the "anti-imperialist struggle" on the continent—e.g., in military aid extended to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*—MPLA).

The Chinese Charges

Having looked at the Chinese challenge from the Soviet perspective, it is now essential to explore in detail precisely what the Chinese have been saying to African audiences about the USSR. Chinese statements concentrate on the motives behind Soviet actions vis-à-vis the continent and the role that the USSR plays there.

According to the Chinese, the Soviet Union has had three primary objectives with respect to Africa. First, it has wanted access to the rich natural resources of the continent, including copper, diamonds, gold, and uranium. It has needed these to supply its industries, and in return it has sold machinery and other finished products to Africa. While Moscow has called the exchange of Soviet industrial products for African natural resources the "international division of labor," this exchange has in fact been quite different in nature. It has constituted nothing more than a device to keep the African countries "always dependent economically" by turning them into raw materials producers and finished products markets for the USSR.[7]

Second, the Soviet Union has hoped to advance Soviet global strategic interests in Africa. That is, Moscow has wished to gain control of the continent to further its efforts to compete with the United States for world hegemony. Soviet control of Africa

[7] New China News Agency (Peking), "Soviet Claws Stretching to African Continent," July 3, 1977.

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Soviet and Congolese specialists confer in April 1976 at the site of the first national enterprise of the People's Republic of the Congo for the extracting and concentrating of polymetal ores. The enterprise is being built in the neighborhood of the Mfuati settlement with the assistance of the USSR.

—A. Yerochenkov/TASS via Sovfoto.

would inherently strengthen the USSR's position in this contest. Moreover, control of Central and Southern Africa, specifically, would enable the USSR to dominate "important strategic waterways," the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. As one Chinese source has put things, "in its ambitious scramble for world hegemony, the Soviet Union seeks to take over Africa for the purpose of cutting the sea-transport lanes, the lifelines of West Europe and the United States." [8]

Third, Moscow has tried to undermine Africa's unity. For example, the USSR has sowed dissension among liberation movements by classifying them as "revolutionary, non-revolutionary and even 'counter-revolutionary'" groups.[9] It has also espoused the "reactionary theory" that African states fall into two categories, "the reactionary and the progressive." [10] Such behavior, according to the Chinese, has been designed to interfere directly in the continent's affairs and to set Africans against Africans and has clearly produced setbacks for Africa's struggle against imperialism.

As for the Soviet Union's role in Africa, the Chinese contend that Moscow's actions on the continent have revealed the USSR to be an aggressive, expansionist imperialist power. A 1976 *Jen-min Jih-Pao* editorial stated bluntly: "On the pretext of opposing imperialism and colonialism . . ., [the Soviets] stretch their tentacles into other countries to carry out colonialist domination and colonialist exploitation." [11] From this conclusion, the Chinese draw far-reaching implications—namely, that the USSR has replaced the Western powers as the key imperialist in Africa. In the words of one Chinese source, as the "Western wolf" was being repelled, the "Soviet tiger" was entering Africa.[12]

To Peking, Soviet behavior has been especially deceptive because Moscow has conducted its activities on the continent under the banner of "international duties" by a "socialist country." [13] The Chinese utterly reject this characterization. Could a "real socialist country," asked China's ambassador to the United Nations at a meeting of the UN Security Council in 1976, engage in a "policy of expansion"? [14]

In debunking the way in which the USSR portrays its activities in Africa, the Chinese attempt to set the record straight on what they regard as two key aspects of the Soviet approach to the continent. The first has to do with Soviet attitudes toward African liberation movements. Contrary to Soviet claims, the Chinese maintain, the USSR has "always bitterly resented and opposed war[s] of national liberation." Indeed, the Soviet Union has turned "away from revolution" and denied others "the right to make revolution." [15]

Consider the record, the Chinese say, of the USSR on the question of liberation struggles. The position of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev is known to all:

They have harped on a now well-known theme that "even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration" and that the next world war will be a thermonuclear

[8] Ibid., "Soviet Expansion to Africa Doomed to Failure," May 1, 1977.
[9] Ibid., "Soviet Revisionists Stir Up Civil War in Angola," July 26, 1975.
[10] Ibid., "Intensified Soviet-US Rivalry Over Southern Africa," Sept. 23, 1976.
[11] "Exposure of the Soviet Revisionists' Colonial Expansionism," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Feb. 2, 1976.
[12] New China News Agency, "Tempestuous Storm Sweeps African Continent," Dec. 27, 1976.
[13] "Exposure of the Soviet Revisionists' Colonial Expansionism," loc. cit.
[14] New China News Agency, "Chinese Representative Denounces Soviet South African Intervention in Angola at UN," Mar. 26, 1976.
[15] Ibid., "Varied Theme for Invariable Objective," Oct. 28, 1976.

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war which would mean the end of mankind. They, therefore, developed a morbid fear of and hatred for any war of national liberation.[16]

Furthermore, Soviet operations reflect this perspective. For instance, the Soviet Union refused to support the Algerian national liberation struggle of the 1950's for fear that "any small war might spark off a big one." It called the struggle "an internal affair of France." [17] Similarly, the USSR in the 1960's failed to assist the Congolese liberation struggle and even did "all [it] could to snuff out this 'spark' " [18] by approving, along with the United States, the dispatch of UN troops to suppress the liberation movement in the Congo (Leopoldville).[19] Soviet behavior since then has been "no less ugly." In 1973, Moscow prevented the Arab people "from waging a just war against the Israeli aggressors." [20]

To be sure, the Chinese argue, the Soviet Union's basic opposition to wars of national liberation has not precluded a willingness on its part to try to manipulate national liberation struggles for its own gain. In instances where Moscow has seen a struggle for national liberation going on in a region whose location and resources it deemed vital to the USSR, and where Moscow has considered control of the liberation movement a means to win control of the region, the USSR has not hesitated to "support" the liberation struggle as a cover for its own expansionism. But, say the Chinese, such Soviet behavior does not amount to genuine support of wars of national liberation. Rather, it constitutes armed invasion. Indeed, the USSR "would not hesitate to unleash a war to achieve its ambition of world domination." [21]

According to Peking, then, Soviet policy and behavior toward national liberation struggles has in the final analysis been both reactionary and aggressive. The USSR, which styles itself "socialist," has "done all the evils of the imperialists." [22]

The second aspect of the Soviet approach to Africa regarding which the Chinese seek to dispel Moscow's "myths" concerns Soviet economic and military aid. In Chinese eyes, the USSR's economic aid really amounts to economic plunder, for its purpose is to penetrate and gain control of the "key economic departments" of the recipient countries. Furthermore, Peking insists, Moscow has been far from generous in providing aid to African countries. Between 1959 and 1973, the USSR extended less than US$1.3 billion in credits to African states, and it actually furnished less than one third that total.[23] To top things off, much of the machinery and equipment that the Soviet Union has supplied to African countries has been out of date.

A similar situation prevails, according to the Chinese, with respect to Soviet military aid. Moscow has treated military assistance as a means of obtaining a foothold in the "vital departments" of the recipient African countries, and it has also used military aid programs to dispose of its obsolete arms. More important, the USSR has demanded air and naval bases from African states in return for military assistance. Indeed,

The Soviet Union has built military airfields, floating docks, oil depots, radar stations and other military facilities at some strategic sites on African coasts along the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. Its warships wantonly ply the territorial waters of other countries' airspace [sic] at will. These are facts known to all.[24]

This kind of Soviet involvement in Africa. Peking asserts, leads to Soviet "military occupation and colonial rule." [25]

Angola

The Angolan crisis of 1975-76 helped solidify these Chinese perspectives, and it likewise afforded China an opportunity to hammer home to Africans some of the themes that grow out of them. Therefore, there is utility in focusing briefly on the Chinese response to this crisis.

As Peking saw things, Soviet interest in Angola stemmed from the country's rich resources and strategic location. With regard to the former, Angola under the Portuguese had long been known as the "jewel of Africa," rich in cotton, sugarcane, oil, diamonds, gold, uranium, iron, copper, manganese, and other minerals. Moreover, the USSR had for some time cast "covetous eyes" on these resources

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., "Look at Its Past, and You Can Tell Its Present," Dec. 9, 1975.
[18] "Varied Theme for Invariable Objective," loc. cit.
[19] "A Chapter on African People's Anti-Imperialism," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 18, 1965.
[20] "Varied Theme for Invariable Objective," loc. cit.
[21] "Look at Its Past, and You Can Tell Its Present," loc. cit.
[22] "Tempestuous Storm Sweeps African Continent," loc. cit.
[23] "Soviet Claws Stretching to African Continent," loc. cit.
[24] New China News Agency, "Brezhnev's 'Revolutionary Conscience' Is Ambition for Aggression and Expansion," Mar. 21, 1976.
[25] Ibid.

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and hoped to replace the Portuguese as the masters of this African "jewel." [26]

Angola's location appealed to Moscow in two senses. First, the country was situated in Southern Africa. Thus, it would provide a springboard for Soviet expansion into Central and Southern Africa. This consideration, of course, meant that Soviet activities in Angola constituted "a prelude to further [Soviet] division and control of the whole of Africa." [27] Second, Angola lay on the Atlantic Ocean along sealanes vital to West Europe and the United States. This consideration reduced Africa to a "peripheral" status and made Angola a factor in the USSR's larger global designs, especially those connected with Europe and North America.

It was these factors and not a desire to support liberation movements, the Chinese charged, that accounted for the Soviet decision to get involved in Angola. Indeed, the Angolan crisis "proved" Moscow's opposition to liberation movements. The Chinese interpreted the sequence of events in the following fashion.

The Angolan people had carried out a protracted armed liberation struggle for national independence. While differences had existed among the three Angolan liberation organizations, those differences "were something normal and could have been fully settled through consultations without outside interference." As a matter of fact, the three groups had as early as January 1975—i.e., well before Angola's independence—jointly concluded the Alvor Agreement with the Portuguese on the formation of a transitional government to prepare for independence. The following June, the three signed the Nakuru Agreement committing themselves to a cease-fire. Thus, Angola was looking forward to independence under the banner of unity supported by the Organization of African Unity.[29]

It was at this point, Peking held, that the Soviet Union intervened, thereby weakening not only Angola's unity and independence but also Africa's struggle against imperialism:

After the signing of the Alvor Agreement on Independence of Angola, the Soviet Union hurriedly stepped in before the old colonialists withdrew their forces. First it set its propanganda machine in motion to sow discord among the three liberation organizations, and then sent large quantities of arms to Angola and even dispatched military personnel for direct maneuvering. Thus it provoked the civil war there in a deliberate attempt to undermine the Angolan cause of independence and Africa's united struggle against imperialism.[30]

Moreover, the Chinese pointed out, these were not the only consequences of the Soviet step. The Angolan civil war initiated by the USSR brought about the intervention of South Africa. South African involvement, Peking stressed, came only *after* Soviet intervention. Hence, the USSR inflicted further imperialist pressure on Angola. At the same time, Moscow capitalized upon the South African incursion to further its own aggression and expansionism in the African country.[31]

The ultimate outcome of Soviet policy and behavior, from the Chinese standpoint, was to propel Angola "into the orbit of Soviet social-imperialism." This outcome came about first through Soviet support of one Angolan organization against the two other liberation movements and then through the dispatch of Soviet military personnel and foreign mercenaries (Cubans) and the presence of Soviet warships off the Angolan coast. "All this," commented *Jen-min Jih-pao,* "clearly reveals the vicious features of the Soviet revisionists as a conqueror." [32] In short, the USSR had occupied Angola.

In asserting this conclusion, China rejected Moscow's claims that its role in Angola derived from "revolutionary conscience"—a term attributed to Brezhnev. How, asked Peking, could Brezhnev speak in this manner when the "Soviet social-imperialists took military action against two [Angolan] liberation organizations" and thereby strangled the Angolan transitional government? The USSR had even brushed aside the appeals of African states to the three Angolan liberation movements to join hands. In doing these things, the Soviet Union showed its disregard for the rights of the Angolan people. Thus, "revolutionary conscience" was nothing more than another cover for Soviet expansionism.[33]

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[26] "What Are the Criminal Objectives of the Soviet Revisionists' Intervention in Angola?" *Jen-min Jih-pao,* Dec. 7, 1975.

[27] "Exposure of Soviet Revisionists' Colonial Expansionism," loc. cit.

[28] "Soviet Expansion to Africa Doomed to Failure," loc. cit.

[29] "Look At Its Past, and You Can Tell Its Present," loc. cit. The Chinese, interestingly, did not always refer to the three Angolan liberation organizations by name. They were the MPLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*—FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*—UNITA). The Soviet Union backed the MPLA, while the Chinese supported the FNLA.

[30] New China News Agency, "Africa Will Never Allow the Soviet Union's Outrageous Interference," Nov. 7, 1975.

[31] Ibid., "Clumsy Soviet Tactics in Angola," Dec. 31, 1975.

[32] "Exposure of Soviet Revisionists' Colonial Expansionism," loc. cit.

[33] "Brezhnev's 'Revolutionary Conscience' Is Ambition for Aggression and Expansion," loc. cit.

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The Chinese also derided the notion that the USSR had merely extended military aid to the MPLA forces. During the independence struggle of the Angolan liberation movements, the Chinese argued, Moscow had never provided any real support to them; it was only on the eve of the country's achievement of independence that the USSR suddenly became a "generous" donor. It then transported several hundred million dollars worth of arms, along with 1,000 Soviet military officers and 10,000 foreign mercenary troops (Cubans), "across the oceans" to Angola. Such assistance did not have as its aim the liberation of Angola; instead, the Soviet Union simply wanted to replace Portugal as Angola's "overlord." After all, "150,000 black brothers in Angola were killed with the Soviet weapons, and many towns and villages were razed to the ground by the Soviet bomb-shells." [34]

Nor did the Chinese believe that Angola constituted the limit of Soviet ambitions. To the contrary, they saw Angola as a potential base of operations from which further Soviet expansionist adventures on the continent could be launched. Early in 1976, Peking pointedly asked:

Would there be a second or third Angola on the African continent? Would the Soviet revisionists repeat their old trick and stretch their tentacles to central Africa or even southern Africa under the signboard of "supporting the national liberation movement?" This is a serious but realistic question.[35]

Subsequent events confirmed to the Chinese the validity of their suspicions on this score. Peking interpreted the 1977 invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province by Angolan-based Zairian exiles as an instance of "premeditated and planned" Soviet expansion into other portions of Africa. The USSR, the Chinese maintained, had hired and equipped mercenary troops in Angola to carry out the invasion, thus creating "another Angola-type incident." This undertaking had once again "torn to shreds the Soviet banner of 'supporting the national liberation struggle.' " [36]

[34] "Chinese Representative Denounces Soviet South African Intervention in Angola at UN," loc. cit.

Zairian troops escort prisoners seized during the March 1977 invasion of Zaire's southeastern Shaba Province by Katangan exiles reportedly based in Angola.

—Cilo/Gamma-Liaison.

Influence and Prospects

There remains, finally, the question of the concrete effect of China on Soviet policy. While the USSR has plainly displayed great sensitivity to the Chinese challenge in Africa, has the challenge caused Moscow to do something that it might not otherwise have done, or to fail to do something that it might otherwise have decided to do? If so, to what extent?

At the verbal level, the USSR has clearly felt compelled to refute Chinese charges that it has betrayed the national liberation and revolutionary movement and become an aggressive and expansionist power, and it has even attempted to besmirch the Chinese image in African eyes by issuing countercharges against Peking. In the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the USSR has taken seriously the defense of "the Leninist foreign policy of the world's first socialist state." But when it comes to Soviet actions, the Chinese impact has been far more limited.

The China factor in Soviet policy has been most evident in instances where Moscow has perceived that the PRC might seriously damage the USSR's claims to be the chief supporter of African liberation and sovereignty. Angola affords the classic

[35] New China News Agency, "New Noose Around Neck of New Tsars," Feb. 27, 1976.

[36] Ibid., "New Tsars' Major Step in Expansion—A Commentary on the Zairian Situation," Mar. 20, 1977.

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Representatives of Zambia and Tanzania put a final section of track into place at a 1973 ceremony marking the half-way point in the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. To the right is an official of the People's Republic of China, which designed and financed the major project inaugurated in 1970.

—Camera Press.

illustration. Peking had developed close ties with the FNLA prior to the military coup in Portugal in April 1974, and, as Moscow viewed things, the FNLA and UNITA—the two most compatible allies among the three competitors—might wind up dominating any coalition government in Angola. Consequently, China might be in a position to gain an important foothold in Southern Africa for itself and to deny the USSR a role in the area. Such considerations played a major part in the Soviet decision to lend its backing to the MPLA.[37]

China's ability to pose this kind of challenge, of course, has depended on the needs of African states and groups, on one hand, and Peking's capacity to meet those needs, on the other. By and large, the number of cases in which Africans have recently experienced dramatically pressing needs has been fairly small. Most of these, moreover, have involved armed conflict of one sort or another. The struggles of the liberation movements in Southern Africa constitute the prime example. With the heavy internal demands on its scarce resources, China has found itself severely restricted in trying to fulfill what Africans regard as their requirements—especially in the military sphere. Hence, one can point to relatively few instances of direct Chinese impact on Soviet policy.

This general picture carries some implications for the future. As long as the Sino-Soviet conflict persists—and there have as yet been no signs of even a moderating trend—Chinese denunciations of Soviet intentions and actions in Africa are likely to continue, and Moscow, in turn, will probably deem it essential to wage an ongoing propaganda campaign to "correct" Peking's version of things. Furthermore, the USSR might even decide to try to maintain a rough parity between its economic aid commitments to African countries and those of the Chinese—an effort which, as we have seen, Moscow to date in the 1970's has not judged necessary—and thus reduce Soviet vulnerability to Chinese charges in this realm. Yet because China's limited capacity to support African causes in straightforward power terms will not in all likelihood increase much, China will not constitute a very formidable alternative to the USSR as a source of succor for Africans; hence, Peking's influence on Soviet behavior will probably remain quite restricted in the foreseeable future.

[37] See the article by David E. Albright in this issue of *Problems of Communism.*

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Books

The Soviet Navy: Ships and Strategy

By Jürgen Rohwer

JÜRG MEISTER. *Soviet Warships of the Second World War*. London, Macdonald and Jane's, 1977.
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SERGEI G. GORSHKOV. *Red Star Rising at Sea*. Ed. by Herbert Preston. Trans. by Theodore A. Neely, Jr. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1974.
SERGEY G. GORSHKOV. *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva* (Sea Power of the State). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976.

THE INCREASING presence of Soviet warships on all oceans, the numerous calls made by Soviet military vessels in ports of developing countries, and, above all, the appearance in force of strong Soviet naval squadrons in crisis areas have drawn the attention of the West to an aspect of Soviet armament efforts which until recently was largely ignored. For a long time the West, secure in its knowledge of the superiority of Anglo-American naval power, focused its attention in military matters first on the runaway arms race between East and West in intercontinental strategic weapons systems and second on the continual strengthening and modernization of Soviet army divisions in Eastern Europe, which were already vastly superior in numbers to the Western forces facing them. Now, however, the West must ask whether the Soviet Union, having gained a degree of technological parity with the West and numerical superiority of land and air forces and of strategic missiles, has set new priorities for its arms programs, aimed at challenging the West's position of superiority in the final, extremely vital area of power at sea.

Discussions in public fora and discussions in specialized litera-

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ture offer such a great variety of figures and points of view in regard to this question that it is difficult for a reader to determine which assertions derive from hard fact and which from speculation. The root causes of discord, which increases with every new type of ship and every new weapons system that the Soviets develop, are many.

First, in the Soviet Union ideas for new weapons systems are not discussed in public long before the first screw is tightened or seam welded, as so often happens in the West. We know operational military requirements and their technical solutions for Western ships before construction is started, but we have to rely largely on speculation for similar information about Soviet vessels right up to the moment completed ships finally appear on the high seas and can be observed. Thus, information on Soviet naval development is always late in coming.

Second, differences in Western assessments of Soviet weapons result from the fact that the frames of reference of those doing the appraising vary and can influence the nature of their evaluations. Looking only at the role of domestic political factors in this context, for example, one can see that to fight against low appropriations, the military establishment and industries interested in defense contracts might describe new Soviet systems in particularly threatening terms. Opponents of the so-called military-industrial complex, on the other hand, might try to discredit pessimistic assessments and any demands for increased spending arising from them, often using irrelevant comparisons and appeals to emotion to do so.

Third, even discussions among experts often fail to make necessary distinctions between different types of analysis. The responsible soldier, for example, is charged with studying all the *capabilities* of a new system, drafting a worst-case threat analysis for his own country, and recommending appropriate countermeasures for such a worst case. The politician, in contrast, seeks to understand the *intentions* behind the armament efforts of his opponent. In carrying out this task, he must avoid several pitfalls. For example, he must not use threat analyses based on the world situation at the time of deployment as an indication of why the opponent decided to initiate development of the system under evaluation. He also must not base his assessment of enemy intentions on his own desires and perspectives—e.g., a commitment to détente. A proper evaluation of new vessels and weapons systems by soldier and politician alike requires an effort to reconstruct possible Soviet views held during the drafting stages of new military hardware concerning the likely evolution of the world situation. Such an undertaking, in turn, necessitates a retracing of underlying Soviet military thinking four to twelve years into the past, depending on the type of system under consideration. Michael MccGwire, several of whose edited volumes are under review here, deserves credit for having been the first analyst to point out this fact.[1]

Finally, even sophisticated studies of the present state of the Soviet navy and naval weaponry are not sufficient for full understanding. The continuous thread which runs through the evolution of Soviet naval strategy becomes clear only if the Soviet navy and

[1] Michael MccGwire, "The Background to Russian Naval Policy," *Brassey's Annual* (New York, NY), 1968, pp. 141-58.

Reviewers in This Issue

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naval armament programs are perceived as components of an overall Soviet armaments concept, and only if an attempt is made to view each individual development as part of the course of evolution of Soviet naval and general history. Each present-day decision is rooted to some extent in the past.

In light of the general state of confusion which exists in Western analysis and in light of the fact that the Soviet Union has not chosen to present an open and self-critical review of the development of its naval strategy and naval armaments (i.e., of the underlying motivations and implementation of its recent naval policy) that would enable us to appraise this evolution with authority, there arises the question of how to approach the subject. At the outset, we can analyze the types and quantities of equipment that Soviet industry has turned out for the navy. The weapon systems which have come into existence reveal much about Soviet strategic planning, and the rates of delivery and deployment for various types of systems provide clues as to when major changes might have taken place in overall military plans and concepts. By correlating this information with important domestic political events in the USSR and with developments in international politics and in the arms technology of the West, therefore, it should be possible to reach certain conclusions regarding the possible motivation and nature of changes in Soviet naval strategy and arms policies over the years.

A NUMBER OF the books under review here provide the data base for more far-reaching historical examinations along these lines than have been possible up to now. By means of painstaking, often tedious research, their authors have reconstructed Soviet building programs for warships, compiled lists of ships actually delivered and their whereabouts, and analyzed the weapons systems with which each ship has been equipped. Jürg Meister, in his *Soviet Warships of the Second World War,* provides the most comprehensive overview now available of the composition of the Soviet navy up to the end of World War II. Based on a thorough evaluation of relevant Soviet literature and on extensive correspondence with friends and colleagues in Eastern and Western Europe and overseas, Meister's book offers a wealth of technical specifications and reliable diagrams—and often hitherto unknown photographs—of Soviet vessels of the day, including small fighting ships, support ships, and river boats, which are frequently neglected in such studies. The only shortcoming of the book—one which seems typical of many British reference works—is that it has no name register of vessels discussed.

While Meister in his work could rely to some extent on the data in Soviet literature, specialists attempting to classify post-World War II Soviet warships have had to work without such data. After the first basic classification efforts made in 1964 by the well-known German expert on the Soviet navy Siegfried Breyer, the results of which were presented in an expanded American edition in 1970,[2] it was Michael MccGwire who brought order to the confusing picture of Soviet warship construction, by thorough analyses of Soviet industrial and wharf capacities in journals such as *Brassey's Annual* and *Marine-Rundschau,* and above all in his three compendia based on the annual symposia on Soviet naval policy organized by Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. MccGwire's research on Soviet warship construction programs lay the foundation for historical analyses of Soviet naval activities —such as those undertaken elsewhere by the present reviewer[3]— and also provided material for two new reference volumes on the present size and composition of the Soviet navy.

The first treated here, by John E. Moore, is based on the source materials of the most renowned international navy manual, *Jane's Fighting Ships,* which Moore himself publishes. The ships of the Soviet navy are categorized and presented with technical specifications, silhouettes (unfortunately not drawn to scale), and some photographs, as well as with brief construction histories. Moore's emphasis in this exercise is clearly on combat ships; smaller ships and support vessels are dealt with more briefly. Moore's introductory chapter provides an overview of the growth of the Soviet navy, with most attention given to the evolution of ship types and less to analysis of the concepts underlying this evolution. Still, the expansion of Soviet naval operations since 1964 is presented in a very impressive manner. Special chapters on Soviet naval air forces, on the marines, and on weapons systems round off the book. Unfortunately, this volume also lacks an index.

Similar to Moore's book in nature, but much richer in details, is

[2] A second expanded American edition of this book, coedited with Norman Polmar, was published in 1977 by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, unfortunately after this essay-review was completed.

[3] See, for example, Jürgen Rohwer, *Superpower Confrontation on the Seas,* Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1975.

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the two-volume study by Ulrich Schulz-Torge, a young officer of the German Federal Navy. After a few not completely satisfactory opening chapters on Russian maritime history and on the personnel structure and organization of the Soviet navy, the first volume moves into very detailed individual descriptions of all Soviet warship types, as well as their weapons systems and sensors. The second volume contains diagrams, technical specifications, and illustrations for each type. While the two-volume format results in a great amount of repetition, it permits a comprehensive listing of all significant data for each ship. Diagrams are drawn to scale, although the scale used varies widely. And the great number of heretofore largely unknown photographs, many obtained from the German Federal Naval Archives, is especially valuable. A detailed register of all ship types and ship names identified to date deserves particular attention. The Schulz-Torge volumes together with that of John Moore certainly illustrate the development of Soviet naval weaponry since 1945, and provide a fairly reliable picture of the current Soviet situation on which to base more wide-ranging analyses.

DURING THE late 1960's and early 1970's, a number of books not concerned basically with detailed research into ship types also appeared. These attempted to reconstruct the evolution of naval strategy in the Soviet Union. In the basic book, Robert W. Herrick's *Soviet Naval Strategy,* the author drew upon a great volume of published Soviet literature—including newspaper and journal articles—on the navy to give a convincing presentation of the context and rationale of repeated shifts in naval strategy—from acceptance of the forward-based oceangoing force concepts of the classical school to the essentially defensive coastal force concepts of the French *jeune école*. Despite Herrick's use of a different methodological approach to the subject, his conclusions about these changes in many respects paralleled those of Michael McGwire adverted to earlier in this essay.

In contrast to Herrick and McGwire, who limited their work predominantly to the navy, David Fairhall tried to include coverage of the role of the merchant marine, fishing fleet, and research fleet in his discussion of Soviet naval expansion. Wolfgang Höpker painted a picture of the Soviet navy's expansion on the world's oceans which stayed largely within the framework of traditional analysis and barely took notice of more recent research findings. And Admiral E. M. Eller, former longtime Director of Naval History in the US, and the first analyst to attempt to look at the ups and downs of Russian and Soviet efforts at sea mainly in the context of parallel American developments, outlined what he saw as threatening Soviet developments primarily from the perspective of a US navy officer ordered to prepare a threat analysis. The German Admiral Edward Wegener attempted a critical analysis of Soviet naval policy from a similar perspective. He organized his data so as to differentiate between seapower and domination at sea during war, on the one hand, and maritime power and presence during conditions of "non-war," on the other.[4]

[4] On this point, see also Edward Wegener, "The Role of Sea Power in Our Time," in E. B. Potter et al., Eds., *Seemacht: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Sea Power: From Antiquity to the Present), Munich, Bernard und Graefe, 1974, pp. 1084-97.

Analyses such as these predominated until about 1972-73. Then a shift in emphasis became apparent in the literature, as more Western experts began investigating the context within which Soviet naval weaponry and policy were made, with an eye to gauging Soviet intentions and in order to develop hypothetical conflict scenarios. The findings of analysts engaged in such work appeared in naval journals such as the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* the *Naval War College Review,* and the *Marine-Rundschau;* in pamphlet form as typified by the works of Barry Blechman and Norman Polmar under consideration here; and, especially, in the collections of papers and contributions presented at the Dalhousie University symposia on Soviet sea power already mentioned.

A concern with intentions as well as capabilities is also evident in the monograph *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* by Donald W. Mitchell. While Mitchell deals less with the post-World War II period than with older Russian and Soviet naval history, his last chapters provide a useful overview of opinions expressed and the state of research up to 1972.

DESPITE THE WEALTH of Western literature on Soviet naval policy—and only a small part of it has been mentioned here—one ought not to lose sight of the fact that Western analysts continue to confront major difficulties in their research related to this subject area. As a consequence, Soviet sources merit particular attention, especially when they seem to possess a degree of authoritativeness.

The third edition of a book on Soviet naval warfare published by a team of authors headed by Captain A. V. Basov should not be ignored. It contains interesting

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and verifiable data for the period preceding World War II and important clues to the navy's course in the postwar period. Deeper insights are provided, however, by the material in *Red Star Rising at Sea,* which longtime Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov, first published in 1972-73 as a series of articles in the authoritative naval journal *Morskoy sbornik.* In 1976, a considerably expanded version of these materials appeared in the USSR as a book entitled *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva,* but no published translation of this latest edition into a Western language exists as of this writing. While many critics in the West complained that the first version of Gorshkov's writings represented merely a partial revision of Russian naval history, publication of the second version altered assessments greatly. It is now generally accepted that Gorshkov's book—if interpreted correctly—has great political importance. Its significance will be discussed in what follows.

WHAT PICTURE of the evolution of Soviet naval strategy emerges from the books discussed here and from recent articles? In the opinion of this reviewer it is possible to distinguish six periods in the evolution of post-1917 Soviet naval strategy.

1. From 1917 through most of the interwar period, reconstruction of the Russian navy, which had for all practical purposes been destroyed during World War I and the Russian Civil War, was carried out in accordance with the ideas of the French *jeune école,* already generally considered obsolete elsewhere. Soviet efforts began with the rebuilding of shipyards and naval supply industries and with the restoration of the few ships which remained afloat. Reconstruction was severely hampered, though, by the contraction of the Russian Baltic littoral to the inner reaches of the Gulf of Finland and by the 1921 sailors' revolt in Kronstadt, which reduced to a minimum the willingness of the political leadership of the new Soviet state to concern itself with the navy. Teachers at the naval academy, some of whom were holdovers from Tsarist times, continued to advocate the classical concepts of naval power. But in reality the navy had to content itself with the modicum of power ceded to it by the leadership of the Red Army.

The Soviet navy's mission during this period was basically to protect the USSR from invasion by sea, i.e., from amphibious landings such as those by anti-Bolshevik expeditionary forces that had taken place in east, west, north, and south during the Civil War, and which had endangered the Soviet regime. The strategic concepts of the *jeune école* calling for the massive use of cheap mines, small submarines, fast torpedo boats, and airplanes were evident in the construction programs of the first two Five-Year Plans (1928-38). Emphasis was placed first on the construction of a large number of medium and small submarines; only a few small surface vessels were to be built. Not until the second program were some cruisers and destroyers provided for. The overriding strategic concept of the navy, as postulated as late as the beginning of 1937 by Naval Commander Admiral Vladimir M. Orlov, was active coastal defense with forward positions on and under the sea. As of 1937, 143 submarines, 55 destroyers, 7 destroyer leaders, and 6 cruisers had been ordered.

2. This situation was changed drastically by Stalin's purges, during which practically all proponents of an active coastal defense by means of lightweight vessels and submarines were liquidated. Younger officers not affected by the purges were rapidly promoted into leadership positions. Those from the Pacific navy in particular, who in the mid-1930's had cautiously begun to call for a renewed oceangoing force, but also officers who had served as advisers to the Spanish Republican Navy during the Spanish Civil War, rose to the fore. With these men, placed under the command of the young Admiral Nikolay G. Kuznetsov as People's Naval Commissar, Stalin in 1937-38 began to carry out a vast naval construction program in which the main emphasis lay clearly on battleships, battle cruisers, heavy cruisers, and large submarines.[5] As a result of the Republican defeat in the Spanish Civil War, Stalin realized that if the Soviet Union wanted to pursue the role of a world power it would need a navy which could give credibility to this claim, and that during the period of neo-navalism of the 1930's navy size was considered the primary criterion of the importance of a major power. After his appointment in 1939, Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov gave evidence of this realization by repeatedly promoting the large navy concept in his public statements.

Thus, during the Third Five-Year Plan period of 1938-42, Stalin gave high priority to ship construction in the overall Soviet rearmament program and initiated a shipbuilding program far more ambitious than even the famous

[5] See Rene Greger, "Soviet Battleship Construction," *Marine-Rundschau* (Munich), No. 71 1974, pp. 461-79; and Siegfried Breyer, "Soviet Battleship Construction," ibid., No. 72, 1975, pp. 141-63.

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Z-Plan Adolf Hitler drew up for Germany in 1938. Despite a tremendous expansion of wharf facilities and military supply industries, however, Stalin's ambitious third construction plan, which called for the completion of 8 battleships, 8 battle cruisers, 14 cruisers, 12 flotilla leaders, 96 destroyers, 48 escort ships, and 198 submarines, could not be realized within the time frame set for it. The outbreak of World War II interrupted work on the program before construction of the heavy ships could be completed.

3. When war came, the West was not aware of Stalin's naval expansion plans. The Soviet Union was perceived as self-avowedly a land power whose interest was focused on continental Europe. Due in part to such preconceptions on their part, Western experts—and experts on the side of the Soviet Union's enemies at that time—developed quite a negative image with regard to Soviet performance at sea. From the perspective of Western naval commanders, the Soviet navy did not fully utilize its "capabilities," nor even employ them to execute the navy's most important strategic missions, i.e., interrupting enemy traffic at sea and conducting offensive naval operations. It used them instead only for minor functions in support of land war operations.

This assessment, of course, is from a purely maritime perspective and ignores developments on land which forced the Soviet leadership to employ its naval forces not on the basis of the objectives of an independent naval war, but in accordance with the requirements of its total war effort. It is a remarkable fact that such a view of the Soviet navy during World War II has persisted in British and American scholarship when a great number of the Soviet publications now available have made it necessary to adjust this image.[6]

4. The precepts of naval strategy alone were not any more decisive in shaping the USSR's postwar naval reconstruction plans than they had been in determining deployment of the navy during World War II. Only when considered within the framework of the total arms race going on between the two superpowers, including in particular efforts on both sides to develop intercontinental strategic weapons systems, can the evolution in the character and purpose of Soviet naval armaments after 1945 be understood.

The years 1945-50 witnessed very extensive arms reductions in the United States. The American monopoly on nuclear weapons seemed to provide the US insurance against any emergency. The absence of an adequate delivery system for these weapons, however, seriously reduced their credibility in the eyes of Soviet military strategists. From Moscow's perspective, a serious military threat to the security of the Soviet Union was posed not by land forces or air forces with advanced weapons of mass destruction. The most serious threat to Soviet interests seemed to stem from the tremendous amphibious landing and assault potential of the American and British navies. As a result, the focal point of the first segment of Stalin's 20-year naval reconstruction program—which provided for the construction of 1,200 submarines, 175 destroyers, 35 cruisers, and only later on battle cruisers and aircraft carriers—was to construct a naval force capable of countering Anglo-American amphibious operations.

Despite repeated statements by Stalin during the late 1940's that the Soviet Union had to build a navy commensurate with its status as a major world power, differences of opinion concerning priorities clearly existed within the ranks of the Soviet leadership during this period. The removal from office and later reinstatement of naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral Kuznetsov attested to this fact. In practice certain limitations were placed on naval construction by the requirements of the general rebuilding of Soviet industry during the years immediately after World War II. These limitations were gradually removed only at the end of the 1940's; by that time Stalin had apparently resumed his prewar construction plans for annual delivery rates of about 200,000 tons for new warships.

5. While the US established the credibility of its nuclear potential by developing the Strategic Air Command and by including aircraft carriers in the country's nuclear deterrent force, the Soviet Union, in the throes of a leadership crisis following the death of Stalin in 1953, lagged considerably behind in the general deployment of complex weapons systems because of continued inadequacies of industrial capacity. Under these conditions, the Soviet leadership, in addition to building a defense system designed to counter the American strategic threat, gave first priority to the construction of its own

[6] On Western perceptions of the Soviet navy during World War II, see Jürgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, *Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939-1945*, 2 vols., London, Ian Allen, 1972 and 1974, for chronological data on all Soviet naval combat operations cataloged prior to the publication dates of the volumes; and the present author's "The Sea War in the Baltic. The Sea War in the Black Sea. The Sea War in the North Sea. 1941-1945," in Potter et al., Eds., op. cit., pp. 602-97, for a brief overview of naval combat and Soviet operational planning in the war theaters treated.

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nuclear deterrent force. The navy, whose weaponry was directed against a no longer relevant amphibious threat, had to accept a secondary position.

Under Nikita Khrushchev, who was enthusiastic about the potential of new technologies such as guided missile weaponry, the capacity of construction facilities assigned to the navy was reduced to less than half between 1954 and 1956, and construction priorities were changed. Admiral Kuznetsov, who protested against the downgraded role of the navy, was removed from office and demoted. His successor, Admiral Gorshkov, was ordered to concentrate primarily on the construction of a defense against the strategic threat of Western aircraft carriers. In essence, this represented another victory for the advocates of the *jeune école*, who hoped, as their predecessors had, to undermine the superiority of classic sea power by means of new technology.

The response adopted under Gorshkov to the aircraft carrier menace was to develop and deploy surface-to-surface missile systems on Soviet surface vessels and submarines. But before this undertaking could be completed —ships built within the framework of the anti-carrier program began active duty with the navy only in the early 1960's—it became clear that the USSR was facing a new, more dangerous threat from the sea. One result of Khrushchev's efforts between 1957 and 1962 to create the impression of Soviet superiority in missile weaponry, by means of a propagandistic presentation of the initial successes of Soviet rocket and space technology, which glossed over existing weaknesses, was to spur the US to tremendous efforts in the missile development field. As a consequence of this, the US quickly surpassed the USSR in missile capabilities. (Khrushchev's attempt to counter this turn of events in 1962 by means of a bluff, the Cuban adventure, failed because of US President John F. Kennedy's carefully measured use of US sea power.) Furthermore, while both the US and the USSR had moved to deploy missiles equipped with nuclear warheads on submarines, the Americans produced an operational system —the Polaris submarine—first. This confronted the Soviet Union with the need to supplement its anti-carrier program as quickly as possible with an anti-Polaris program, while still pressing forward with its plans to develop its own fleet of nuclear missile submarines. The emphasis in weaponry on ships completed before 1964 had been on surface-to-surface missiles; it shifted after 1964 to providing the ships with anti-submarine capabilities. This new change of plan again caused the total number of ships commissioned to decline drastically.

6. A further change became evident from the new Soviet ship types which entered service after 1969-70. The building of vessels with one-dimensional anti-carrier or anti-Polaris capabilities was abandoned in favor of the construction of multipurpose vessels —perhaps in reaction to the demonstrated effectiveness of the flexibility of American sea forces during the 1962 Cuban crisis.[7] Anti-carrier vessels had been best represented by the guided-missile cruisers of the *Kynda* class, and the anti-Polaris concept had been best exemplified by the helicopter-carrying anti-submarine cruisers of the *Moskva* class; newer vessels, such as the destroyers of the *Krivak* class, the cruisers of the *Kresta-II* and *Kara* classes, and the aircraft carrier *Kiev*, provide illustrations of the multipurpose concept, according to which the first priority mission is to combat submarines, the second priority mission is to combat aircraft carriers, and the third priority mission is to combat aircraft in flight and missiles already launched.

FROM THE overview provided thus far, it is clear that the underlying rationale of the development of Soviet vessel types since 1917 has been a function of the primary concern of Soviet naval strategy, namely, to counter the most dangerous perceived threat to Soviet security in each time period by means of a sea-based defense system. It should be noted, however, that during recent years the Soviet navy under the leadership of Admiral Gorshkov has produced far-reaching political effects with a naval force designed to fulfill a purely military mission in a nuclear test of strength between the superpowers. This has been so even though the Soviet leadership, during the 1950's and thereafter, drastically scaled down Stalin's grandiose plans for the creation of a naval force of classic design which could be deployed worldwide. The need created by technical advances in strategic weapons systems to move forward onto the high seas with defense weapons, gave Gorshkov the opportunity to reintroduce—through the back door—classical concepts of naval power, while continuing to agree publicly with the defensive *anti*-concepts of the *jeune école*.

[7] See the present author's "The *Kiev*: A Turning Point in Soviet Naval Strategy," *Marine-Rundschau*, No. 73, 1976, pp. 654-58.

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The forward deployment of anti-submarine units in potential areas of operation of American nuclear submarines—initially in the Norwegian Sea, after 1964 predominantly in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and since 1968-69 in the northwestern Indian Ocean also—had a very favorable effect on Soviet international political fortunes. An astute use of propaganda by the USSR drew attention to the role of the US Navy in the Vietnam war and hence smeared its image in the eyes of politicians in the Third World. As a consequence, the US navy has to use great caution in making its presence felt or demonstrating its might. The Soviet navy, on the other hand, has been able to project the image of friendly protector when appearing before the ports of developing countries and former Western colonies. As a result, it has at times been granted port privileges and even priority or exclusive access to naval facilities. This experience permitted Admiral Gorshkov to state in barely veiled terms in his most recent book reviewed here that the expansion of Soviet political power since the 1950's, beyond the USSR's immediate East European sphere of influence into the Near East, North Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and other Third World areas, can be maintained in the future only by means of a navy capable of neutralizing the effects of American sea power. His book probably needs to be viewed as an attempt to persuade the Soviet political leadership to adopt a *correct* classical assessment of the importance of naval power, by citing historical examples and experience gained during the immediate past.[8]

[8] See Geoffrey Jukes, "The Problem of Ship Obsolescence in the Soviet Navy," ibid., No. 74, 1977, pp. 4-9.

Gorshkov's major achievement is that he has been able to effectively promote the classical concept of sea power by pointing to the achievements of a navy whose construction capacity over the last 20 years—especially with regard to surface ships—has been less than half that planned during Stalin's time. The navy's record of success with meager resources will create a great temptation for the political leadership of the USSR to shift any production capacities freed by completion of the country's deployment of strategic nuclear submarine forces—clearly the top priority in naval armament over the last decade—to the construction of a fleet befitting a naval "power." Such an eventuality would certainly have to alter Western assessments of Soviet naval capabilities, and might well produce a growing consensus on how Moscow intends to employ these capabilities.

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Context in Chinese Foreign Policy

By James C. Hsiung

WARREN WEINSTEIN, Ed. *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.
ALAN HUTCHISON. *China's African Revolution.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1976.
GEORGE T. YU. *China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.
CRANFORD PRATT. *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
JANOS HORVATH. *Chinese Technology Transfer to the Third World.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

A COMMON AND possibly the easiest mode of analyzing Peking's foreign policy is to focus on the purported goals of the People's Republic of China (PRC), with lesser regard for actual behavior or outcomes. In fact, in much of the literature goals are treated as though they were of equal weight, and scanty attention is paid to the extent to which goals are formulated in response to external forces or circumstances (such as the abetting or contravening policy preferences of other international actors).

However, when we avoid using a special-case or idiographic model to explain Chinese behavior, we find that, like other actors on the world stage, the PRC must cope with changes in its external environment although, again like other actors, it may itself endeavor to initiate changes some of the time. In other words, Peking must often adjust its policy toward any given country in the light of leadership shifts, political change, socioeconomic development, and other occurrences that pertain to that country or to the international system as a whole. Such alterations in the external environment may at times require policy adaptations in conflict with, or even contrary to, Peking's own policy preferences (*qua* goals). Of course, at other times external change may open up new opportunities. When we go from what-must-be-true exercises to empirical work, it usually becomes clear that external conditions and events both serve as the impetus for fresh decisions and delimit the boundaries of Peking's policy options.

The five books under review thus represent a significant advance in that they all are empirical undertakings which, on the basis of hard data, seek to explain policy choices and outcomes within a comparative framework. The Weinstein collection of essays compares Chinese foreign aid with Soviet foreign aid in the African region, but places these comparisons in the larger context of Sino-Soviet political competition. Hutchison's study differentiates the PRC's stance toward different parts of the continent and relates Peking's evolving policies to changing political fabrics within the individual African countries. The book by Yu, although a case study focused on China's relations with Tanzania, poses questions of a larger concern regarding China's policy toward Africa as a whole. Yu goes beyond the usual "goal" analysis to examine the convergence of Peking's goals with Tanzania's national interests and policy needs. In contrast, Pratt's work is concerned mainly with Tanzania's foreign policy as viewed from Dar es Salaam. But the author also provides strong support for the thesis that at least part of the time Chinese decision-makers actually respond to policies initiated in other capitals. Horvath, in what is probably the most ambitious attempt of its kind to date, offers an analytic model for measuring the grant (as opposed to loan) elements in China's foreign aid programs. In Horvath's volume, we find not only a sharpening of our China-watching methodological tools but also a merger of "grants economics" analysis with foreign policy analysis.

Together, the five books offer a broader perspective than the typical idiographic concerns of many a bi-country study which has come our way (e.g., focusing on relations between China *and* Pakistan, or China *and* Japan).

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The larger picture that emerges depicts a rich network of complementary relations which Peking maintains with African countries, encompassing state-to-state ties, people's diplomacy, support for people's liberation movements, and party-to-party contacts.

Furthermore, state-to-state relations often include, in addition to diplomatic ties, a diverse and complexly layered structure involving trade, economic aid, technical assistance, military aid, resident "country teams," cultural ties, training programs for foreign personnel, etc. By comparing the relative distribution of China's commitments in terms of the various types of assistance and contacts and, more specifically, by examining the makeup of Peking's aid package to any single recipient country, it is possible to establish a rank order of importance among China's aid grantees and thereby locate and evaluate a specific relationship between the donor and any single grantee during a given period of time. It is in this sense that studies of China's foreign assistance programs are essential for an understanding of its foreign policy.[1]

For example, during the years 1956-72, 49 percent of Peking's total aid to the Third World (including credits and grants) went to Africa, followed by 34 percent to the Near East/South Asia, 10 percent to East Asia, 5 percent to Latin America, and 2 percent to Europe (i.e. Malta). By contrast, the largest share of Soviet aid to the Third World during roughly the same period (1954-72) went to the Near East/South Asia (77 percent), with much smaller shares reserved for Africa (15 percent), Latin America (5 percent), and East Asia (2 percent). According to these figures, Africa received a proportionately higher share of Peking's total aid commitments than of Moscow's (Weinstein, pp. 246 f.).

In addition, fully one third of China's total foreign aid during 1957-74 went to four countries: Pakistan, 11.3 percent; Tanzania, 9.5 percent; Zambia, 8.0 percent; and Sri Lanka, 4.5 percent. Moreover, each of the other countries surrounding India, besides Pakistan and Sri Lanka, also received a fairly impressive percentage of the PRC's aid commitments during the same period: Nepal, 2.9 percent; Burma, 2.2 percent; and Afghanistan, 2.1 percent. In comparison, such strategically important countries as then noncommunist Laos and Cambodia received 0.7 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively, while Indonesia's share was 3.0 percent (Horvath, p. 20). These statistics point to India as a dominant focal point of China's attention and suggest a possibly conscious policy on Peking's part to "contain" India and to counteract Soviet influence in the South Asian region. If accurate, this point deserves greater scrutiny than it has thus far received. Indeed, Peking's apparent overriding concern with India and the fact that the PRC's four leading aid recipient countries are at opposite sides of the Indian Ocean may evidence a Chinese appreciation of the strategic value of the lands bordering these waters which dates further back in time than we usually recognize.

Of course, foreign aid statistics alone are not a sufficiently sensitive indicator of one country's relationship with another. For one to make sensible policy evaluations, for example, economic aid must be examined together with military assistance. Thus, during 1971-72, at the time of the Bangladesh crisis, Pakistan received no economic aid from Peking but continued to receive military aid. Furthermore, economic aid cannot always be treated separately from trade relations, especially where such aid is financed through trade. In connection with the PRC's assistance to Tanzania and Zambia for construction of the "Freedom Railway" between Zambia's copper fields and Dar es Salaam, the two African governments financed the local costs of the project by selling Chinese consumer goods in their own domestic markets. The result was that in 1971, one year after work on the railway was begun, the PRC had replaced the United Kingdom as Tanzania's leading source of imports (Yu, p. 72).

HORVATH HAS DEVISED a formula for calculating what he calls the grant ratio[2] in an aid program, which can be used to compare the aid programs of various donor

[1] An alternate analysis based on the amounts of aid actually drawn rather than on figures for aid committed might yield a somewhat different picture of Peking's relationship with certain grantee countries. Decisions by the recipient government may account for part of the difference between aid commitments and expenditures in some instances, while occasional foot-dragging on the part of the PRC and other circumstances have undoubtedly also played roles. Still, the data on aid commitments, that are reported in the volumes under review and called upon in the discussion below, register decisions which are the nearly exclusive province of the grantor country and therefore may legitimately be treated as fairly reliable indicators of Chinese (and Soviet) foreign policy concerns.

[2] While Horvath based his calculations on an elaborate mathematical framework involving 12 different formulas (see pp. 32-36), "grant ratio" in simplest terms is the percentage of an aid program's ultimate value which is considered a "grant" as opposed to a "loan"—i.e., the percentage not subject to repayment by the aid recipient.

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countries. China's grant ratio is estimated at roughly 70-80 percent of the face value of each aid project. In light of the grant ratios of the aid programs of other donors, such as Canada (70-80 percent), Sweden (73 percent), the United States (69 percent), and the Soviet Union (52 percent), the People's Republic stands out as a very generous grantor (Horvath, p. 84). These comparisons, which are of a nomothetic order, provide new insights that might have been concealed in a more idiographic study of China.

A few of these insights are worth mentioning. First, grants economists usually see the expansion of foreign trade as an important motivation for a country's foreign aid programs. Whether this is true in the case of China has great relevance for the validity of the proposition. It is therefore significant that two thirds of China's exports are directed toward a relatively few countries —including Tanzania, Zambia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Sudan, and Syria—which have also been large recipients of Chinese aid (Horvath, p. 65).

Still more significant, Peking seems to have made much mileage out of its trading affinity with grantee countries, often at the expense of other competing aid givers. The situation with respect to Tanzania has already been noted. There is also evidence that increases in China's trade with Third World countries that receive Chinese aid have coincided with unfavorable shifts in US trade with the same countries (Horvath, pp. 65 ff.).

On a different dimension, it is interesting that in 27 of 37 Chinese aid recipient countries, there evidently has been a noticeable increase in the use of the public sector, at the expense of the private sector, for promoting national economic development. And, in comparison with a "control group" of countries that do not receive Chinese aid, Peking's grantees are found to accord greater priority to the public sector (Horvath, p. 80). To the extent that the downgrading of, or even discrimination against, private enterprise reflects an erosion of the attraction of capitalism, China's aid programs may have served the PRC's ideological cause rather well. In fact, the data may be seen as lending a certain empirical support to the long-held impressionistic view that Peking's foreign aid is ideologically motivated and has been effective in achieving ideological goals.

Yet another insight emerges from comparison of the rank order of China's grantees with that of Soviet grantees. In the adjoining list, the top 10 of China's 28 African aid grantees during the 1957-74 period are presented in the order of the amount of Chinese aid they received. The numbers at the right indicate these countries' positions on a similar list of 25 Soviet aid grantees for the period 1954-73.

Some Soviet grantees, such as Morocco (fifth on the Soviet list),[3] Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea, received no aid commitments from Peking during 1957-74. Conversely, several countries not on the Soviet list, including Zaire, Togo, Dahomey (now Benin), Mauritius, Burundi, and Malagasy, were recipients of Chinese economic assistance during the same period (1957-74).

Comparison of the two rank-order lists therefore does not seem to provide very strong evidence to support popular impressions of intense Sino-Soviet competition in Africa. Of course, temporal factors may account for some of the differences. China's aid to Zaire, for example, did not begin until 1973. Moreover, some PRC grant programs were only one-shot deals. Yet it would appear that, with few exceptions, the two communist donors have not operated in the same countries, or with equivalent degrees of commitment in the countries to which they have contributed.

THE DIFFERENCES between the foreign assistance allocations of the Soviet Union and China may better reflect the complexity of competition than its absence. One possible reason for differences is a self-exclusion factor that may

Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa

	Rank on PRC list (1957-74)	Rank on USSR list (1954-73)
1.	Tanzania	12
2.	Zambia	18
3.	Somalia	6
4.	Algeria	1
5.	Zaire	*
6.	Ethiopia	3
7.	Sudan	7
8.	Guinea	2
9.	Cameroon	15
10.	Mauritania	19

* No Soviet aid commitments in 1954-73.

SOURCE: For the list of Soviet grantees, see the article by John D. Essek in Weinstein, esp. the tables on pp. 84-87. For the data on Peking's foreign aid grantees, see Horvath, esp. Table 2.1, pp. 8-17, and Table 2.3, pp. 20-21. Figures on Soviet aid to Egypt are not included in Essek's tables, while the amount of Chinese aid to Egypt is included among Horvath's data. For the sake of comparability, PRC aid commitments to Egypt ($134 million in 1957-74) are excluded from the comparisons presented here.

[3] Morocco became a recipient of PRC aid in 1975. See US Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976*, ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977.

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operate when one or the other of the two communist donors chooses to avoid getting into a losing battle over a particular African nation. According to Yu (p. 87), China's unquestionable prior edge in Tanzania probably discouraged the Soviets from contesting the matter. Other reasons, perhaps more revealing, may be found by looking at both the range of possible motivations and the circumstances involved in Peking's aid giving. Some PRC grants, as Bruce Larkin notes, have consisted of credits to countries whose relations with the Soviet Union had gone awry, such as Sudan and Egypt (Weinstein, p. 13). Other grants seem to have been extended in order to make more attractive the opening or reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. Among commitments of the latter type might be included aid to Burundi — 1972, Rwanda — 1972, Cameroon — 1973, Togo — 1972, Tunisia — 1972, and Zaire — 1973 (Weinstein, pp. 70, 72, 75.) One might also note a third category of grants with which, circumstances permitting, China has attempted to balance off Soviet influence, such as in the cases of Ethiopia and Somalia, both of which states have ranked high on the Chinese and the Soviet grantee lists. Cases of this third type seem to have been relatively few, however.

MUCH OF THIS evidence reduces to a primarily "reactive" model of Chinese foreign aid allocations. Peking's aid decisions would seem as often as not to be a consequence of the opportunities open to the PRC and the extant circumstances at a given point in time, such as the economic needs of a particular Third World country and the relative availability or desirability from the grantee's perspective of alternative sources of aid. A good example is Tanzania, whose deepening involvement with the People's Republic resulted equally from the termination of British and West German support, refusal by the World Bank to help finance the Tanzania-Zambia railroad, and dissatisfaction with Canadian military assistance (Pratt, esp. pp. 152 ff.; and Yu, pp. 85, 103 f., 128). Still, Tanzania has kept careful control of its relations with China, which is only one—albeit a crucial —source of financial assistance. Although Chinese aid amounted to 56 percent of all the existing loan (capital assistance) commitments to Tanzania as of the end of 1971, the distribution of the remainder is revealing of Tanzania's deliberate strategy. Thus, Tanzania had received 15 percent of its aid from the World Bank; 10 percent from Sweden; 8 percent from the United States; 5 percent from the Soviet Union; 2 percent from Italy; and 1 percent each from Japan, West Germany, and Denmark. Such evidence of a policy of balancing off various donors should do much to dispel the common impression that Tanzania, in accepting massive Chinese aid, must dance to the tune of Peking.

Looking elsewhere on the continent, it evidently was the relatively inhospitable conditions in North and West Africa, such as some nations' strong ties with the US or Islamic hostility to communism, rather than Peking's own preferences, which forced China to concentrate on East Africa from 1964 on (Hutchison, pp. 80 ff.).

The "reactive" model also highlights the importance of sequentiality and chain reaction in Peking's changing relations with African countries. The PRC's newly kindled interest in Burundi and Rwanda in the 1960's, following its unsuccessful attempt to establish a sure foothold in the neighboring Congo (Leopoldville), is a case in point. China's ultimate interest in the Congo, based on the latter's strategic importance, apparently led Peking to meddle in the internal politics of Rwanda and Burundi, in an effort to make them what Mao once called a "stepping-stone" to the Congo. In Burundi the Chinese possibly hoped to effect that government's dependence on the PRC and thus supported the minority Tutsi regime against the more numerous Hutu. Peking also opposed the Hutu government in Rwanda, which had recently overthrown the Tutsi monarchy there but which was hostile to the Chinese.

In 1965 in the wake of Chinese support for the Tutsi refugees who had left Rwanda for Burundi, the Rwandan Hutu government became incensed and severed diplomatic relations with the PRC (Weinstein, p. 60). In Burundi in the same year, Peking was implicated in the murder of a Hutu leader who had been asked by King Mwami Mwambutsa IV to form a new government replacing the pro-Chinese Tutsi regime. As a result, the King closed down the Chinese Embassy (Weinstein, p. 64).

The suspension of diplomatic relations in both cases lasted until 1972 and reinforced Western impressions of Peking as the world's foremost champion of people's liberation wars. However, Chinese support for the elitist Tutsi, whose political inclinations bordered on the reactionary, actually would seem to offer rather clear evidence of the willingness of Peking's policymakers to play brute power politics at the expense of ideological consistency.

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Contrary to common assumptions, the data suggest that relatively little aid has been extended by Peking to liberation movements directed against existing black African governments. Where the Chinese have supported liberation movements against Western colonial or minority rule, the PRC has not always bet on the winning horse and occasionally has had to confront competing Soviet support for another faction, as in Angola and Namibia (Weinstein, pp. 19 ff.).

THE GAP BETWEEN Peking's verbal bellicosity and practical prudence can be explained in a number of ways. Apart from the PRC's doctrinal emphasis on "self-reliance" (meaning that each liberation movement must largely rely on its own resources) and from the limitations on its capabilities, the growing acceptance of the People's Republic by other countries and expanding diplomatic ties, especially after 1971, have probably placed increasing constraints on the PRC's freedom to aid those underground movements aimed at overthrowing the very governments with which Peking maintains formal ties (Weinstein, pp. 24 ff.; Hutchison, pp. 167 ff.).

To the extent that Peking before 1972 was attempting to promote civil disturbances in Africa so as to divert the attention of the US away from Asia (Weinstein, p. 57), Sino-American détente since then has surely weakened this rationale for Chinese support of local insurrections in the Third World. At minimum, improved relations with Washington now call for greater prudence on Peking's part, lest the shaky foundation of détente be undermined. Moreover, the Chinese still seem jittery about the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and, especially, the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" used to justify that intervention. Chinese foreign policy has therefore shifted its emphasis in Africa and elsewhere to state-to-state relations in order to promote a "united front from above" that might be of assistance in Peking's efforts to isolate the Soviet Union, and thereby relieve some of the pressure on China's borders (Hutchison, pp. 162 ff.). Hutchison is probably right in stating that according to the available data, Peking by mid-1973 was not supporting any dissident group in any African country with which the PRC was maintaining normal relations (p. 166). One additional reason for the change in the PRC's posture, one might add, may be that Peking is now consciously playing the role of global power; as such, it more than ever before has stakes in the existing structure of state-to-state relations.

This vital shift in China's policy orientation, from support for revolutionary movements to a stress on formal diplomatic ties, may explain the rapid expansion of Chinese influence, to the extent this can be gauged by the acceptance of PRC foreign aid in countries such as Ethiopia, Malagasy, and Zaire. Before 1971, all three countries were among those most opposed to the PRC, but each has begun to accept Chinese economic assistance since then (Weinstein, p. 68). It is important to note that in 1972 Malagasy, which stands watch over the western expanse of the Indian Ocean, accepted Chinese aid but no Soviet aid.

Now that Peking has learned to appreciate the significance of state-to-state relations, the future political scramble in Africa between the two communist powers will in all likelihood be fought more at this level and less in terms of support for underground movements. Support for local insurrections by dissident groups will probably be increasingly costly for Peking, from the standpoint of the latter's larger policy concerns vis-à-vis the two superpowers, especially the Soviet Union. If the recently improved ties of the PRC with Somalia, Zaire, Egypt, and the Sudan—achieved in the wake of falling Soviet influence—are any indication, the Chinese will in the foreseeable future probably concentrate on replacing or displacing the Soviets where the latter's relations with the host governments have gone sour.

If all this is true, Peking's policy in Africa, like its foreign policy in general and no less than the foreign policy of other major powers, is rationally pursued with both subjective interests (i.e., goals) and objective circumstances equally in view. The lesson in this is that we must not study China or its foreign policy in isolation. Our greatest mistake would be to segment the subject matter.

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Personalism in North Korea

By C. I. Eugene Kim

ILPYONG J. KIM. *Communist Politics in North Korea.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.
JOSEPH SANG-HOON CHUNG. *The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1974.
KOON WOO NAM. *The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965: A Study of Factionalism and Political Consolidation.* University, AL, University of Alabama Press, 1974.
IN-DOCK KANG, Ed. *Pukhan Chonch'i-ron* (Treaties on the North Korean Political System). Seoul, Institute for East Asian Studies, 1976.
DAE-SOOK SUH and CHAE-JIN LEE, Eds. *Political Leadership in Korea.* Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1976.

PERSONALITY CULT — *chuch'e* (self-identity)—monolithic power structure — doctrinal rigidity — Spartan-like state — centralized, socialized, and planned economy. Such terms as these are used to assail regimentation and the hold of communist leader Kim Il-song over the lives of the people in the northern half of the Korean peninsula, and they are not just propaganda. The studies under review show a remarkable consensus in their characterizations of North Korean political life and behavior, differing only in causal explanations and minor descriptive details.

The picture of North Korea that emerges from these volumes suggests both the virtues and the vices of Kim Il-song. Professor Ilpyong J. Kim's book emphasizes developmental imperatives, analyzing the "processes by which the North Korean leadership attempted to transform a traditional and backward society into a modern socialist industrial society" (p. vii). Following the general model set forth by John Kautsky,[1] Professor Kim attempts to look at North Korea as an example of forced modernization under communist rule. In his view, what has taken place is the "Koreanization of communism," the amalgamation of Soviet political development models with "indigenous Korean tradition and culture" and "certain aspects of traditional Chinese culture based on the philosophy of Confucianism" (p. 49). He argues that what Mao Tse-tung did in China, Kim Il-song has done in North Korea—an analysis that is perhaps carried too far. In the reviewer's opinion, Kim Il-song has not so much Koreanized communism as he has personalized communism.

In the process of creating a virulent personality cult, Kim Il-song has resorted to blatant pretensions concerning his roles both as a revolutionary and as a national leader, yet he has been forceful and politically astute enough to carry off these claims. The obscure guerrilla of Manchurian days has been inflated into the foremost revolutionary fighter and thinker of the nation. The economic success of North Korea—which Joseph Sang-hoon Chung systematically analyzes in his book—has been personally attributed to Kim and has helped to legitimize his absolute control of the people. To further enhance his supremacy, Kim has relied on a messianic call for the reunification of the Korean peninsula under his aegis. This intense personalization of the leadership role suggests that once Kim Il-song is gone from the scene, a new "supreme" leader may find it necessary to devise a new set of rationales for his position and power. In fact, Kim Il-song's departure may shake North Korea's political foundations more severely than the death of Mao Tse-tung appears to have agitated mainland China.

THE MORE one learns about Kim and his myth, the more discernible the dynamics of North Korean politics become. To begin with, the name of Kim Il-song is an assumed one, changed from Kim

[1] See John H. Kautsky, *Communism and the Politics of Development,* New York, NY, John Wiley & Sons, 1968.

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Song-ju. The original Kim Il-song was a legendary figure known to the Korean people as a national revolutionary fighter against Japanese colonialism in Korea. No information exists to pinpoint when Song-ju became Il-song—perhaps during his guerrilla days in Manchuria. He first came on the scene as Il-song in North Korea in 1945 as a young major in the Red Army of the Soviet Union, and his ultimate rise to power was achieved with the help of Soviet occupation authorities, as Professor Koon Woo Nam testifies in his book. The Soviet Union remained in North Korea only long enough to accept the Japanese surrender in World War II, but the firm foundation for a communist North Korean state with Kim Il-song at its head was laid during this period.

The question is often asked why Kim was singled out by the Soviets for the leadership mantle rather than someone who was more politically mature and better known among the Korean people. There is no satisfactory answer. Perhaps Moscow, hoping to mastermind the extension of communism throughout Korea, regarded Kim as the most malleable among many possible power contenders. Certainly, Kim's relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1945-48 period was subservient, and his servile role extended much beyond this initial period. As Ch'ang-sun Kim shows in the In-Dock Kang volume under review, Kim relied essentially on aid from the Soviet Union in his initial state-building efforts, during the Korean War, and in the period of postwar reconstruction (Kang, pp. 13-71).

Kim followed the lead provided by the Soviet Union as long as it was necessary to do so. By 1955, however, he was experiencing growing disillusionment with the Soviets. Undoubtedly, he felt that Moscow could have aided him more in the execution of the war in 1950; yet it was the People's Republic of China that had dispatched troops to save North Korea when it was threatened with annihilation. He must also have been perturbed by the sweeping political changes that began to overtake the USSR after the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953 and the rise of Nikita Khrushchev to power—most notably, the rising tide of destalinization and Khrushchev's new tilt toward coexistence with the United States and other capitalist countries. On the pragmatic side, the year 1955 brought Kim less extensive aid commitments from the USSR and Eastern Europe than he had expected for his five-year plan (1957-61). Moscow's pretense of superior authority and its abrasive self-centered dealings with North Korea also galled Kim. Thus, he was forced to look for his own means of continuing North Korean development through austerity and mass mobilization.

It was in this context that he began to speak of *chuch'e*-ism in 1955. In briefest definition *chuch'e*-ism encompassed the concepts of "independence in politics, self-reliance in economy, and self-defense in military affairs" (Ilpyong J. Kim, p. 3). So conceived, it was a noble enough ideal, and one that also appealed to the nationalistic urge of the Korean people, who had suffered so long as a pawn in the game of politics related to the Korean peninsula. Once enunciated, as Professor Yang Ho-min points out in the Kang volume, the idea became popular (Kang, pp. 295-367). The concept well suited Kim's game plan for absolute power, mass mobilization for development, and eventual promotion of a cult of personality. It also offered an answer to his search for political legitimacy, providing a counter to political opponents associated with the Soviet or the Chinese position.

In the years since *chuch'e* became the hallmark of Kim's rule, his nationalism and his independent-mindedness have never been in dispute. As a person, he is more outspoken than scheming, and his actions are more outgoing than secretive and coldly calculating. Of his past, he seems to remember most vividly his guerrilla days in Manchuria. The vital lifeline of guerrillas is loyalty. Their authority structure is hierarchical; their style of operation, hit-and-run. They see no possibility of defeat, for any encounter with the enemy is a victory.

The logical extension of the institutionalization of *chuch'e* was the personality cult of Kim Il-song. Kim is said to be surrounded by close, loyal followers who are well entrenched in North Korea's power structure and whose political fates are closely tied to his own undisputed power. No information is available regarding the inner workings of this core leadership group, although Professors Chong-sik Lee, Dae-Sook Suh, and Sang-woo Lee have attempted to identify its personnel (Suh and Lee, pp. 159-222; Kang, pp. 368-406). No one, for instance, knows for sure just who has been responsible for Kim's theoretical writings. Kim has been known as more of an activist than a contemplative, theoretical type. His early schooling, unlike Mao's, was rather meager and haphazard, and his formal schooling did not extend beyond four or five years of middle school in Manchuria at most. Furthermore, he was educated more in Chinese than in Korean.

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What Kim does and what he says, however, is ritualized and given theoretical justifications, and in the process Kim is further deified.

Through the voluminous North Korean writings about him, Kim Il-song emerges as an unprecedented genius. He is revered as a creative thinker in his application of Marxism-Leninism to the Korean situation. He is praised as the foremost of Korean nationalists and the rightful leader of the Korean people. His authority is beyond dispute, and his words and actions are law. In the frenzy of his cult, several members of his immediate family, including his brothers and father-in-law, have risen to important positions of power. Even his genealogy has been enhanced to proclaim that "the family of Comrade Kim Il-song is a patriotic and revolutionary family that has fought from generation to generation for the independence of the country and the freedom and liberation of the people against foreign aggressors." [2] Thus glorified are Kim's great-grandfather Ung-wu, grandfather Po-hyun, father Hyong-jik, and eldest son Chong-il.

The further logical extension of *chuch'e* and the personality cult of Kim Il-song has been the assertion of his infallibility and the lack of policy disputes surrounding his decisions. This does not necessarily mean that conflicts are nonexistent in North Korea, as Professor Nam seems to assume. One recent indication of conflicting pressures on Kim has been his failure thus far to officially designate his son Chong-il as his successor.

CLEARLY, Kim Il-song wishes to have his brand of revolution in Korea carried on from generation to generation. That he favors his son in the leadership role was strongly implied on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers' Party (October 10, 1975), when the KWP saw fit to distribute among its cadres at all levels a text entitled *The Textbook for Cadres on the Immortal Classic Work of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-song*. The text contained two pages (pages 26 and 27) exclusively devoted to announcing Kim Chong-il as the "sole successor-designate" to Kim Il-song. This announcement read in part:

The revolutionary task of the working class is a historical task that can be accomplished only in generations and certainly not a task that can be done in a single generation.

Experiences in the international communist movement amply make it clear that, unless the generations of the revolution are succeeded correctly, the revolutionary task launched by the leader of the working class is destined to be interrupted half undone, inevitably running into many difficulties.

Our party has managed to have beloved comrade Kim Chong-il venerated as the sole successor to the great leader and as the brilliant instructor of our party and people, making it possible for us to accomplish the revolutionary task launched by the leader in the most brilliant manner.

Our beloved instructor comrade Kim Chong-il is the genius of ideology, the genius of leadership and the loving instructor of the people, who has successfully personified the revolutionary thinking, the immortal "chuch'eism," the outstanding art of leadership and the lofty communist virtues of the great leader in the most perfect manner at their sublimest heights.

Thanks to the absolute guidance of comrade beloved instructor, we have the firm assurance that we can pursue accomplishment of the revolution generation after generation.[3]

While the groundwork thus seems to have been laid for Chong-il's succession to his father's position, no official public announcement has been made to that effect. Chong-il continues to be a mysterious figure to the outside world, and the whole succession question in North Korea remains enigmatic. Subtle, persistent pressures against Chong-il's assumption of his father's dictatorial power do apparently exist. On February 5, 1976, the *Tongil Ilbo*, a Korean-language daily newspaper published in Japan, reported an ongoing struggle within the North Korean leadership over the succession problem, a struggle between supporters of Kim Chong-il and opponents who included Kim Yong-ju (Kim Il-song's brother), among others.

WHETHER or not Kim Il-song succeeds in naming Chong-il as his successor, there is a more fundamental question that arises. Will Kim's system endure? If by "Kim's system" is meant communism, the answer is definitely yes. Since the forced introduction of the communist state system by the Soviet Union in 1945, enough vested interests have developed in North Korea to make a wholesale

[2] The Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Ed., *Brief History of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Il-sung*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969, p. 3.

[3] See *Tongil Ilbo* (Tokyo), Mar. 16, 1976; cited in Lee Dong-bok, Seoul Side Spokesman, South-North Coordinating Committee, "Succession in North Korea: Facts and Mysteries about the Rise of Kim Chung-il," unpublished manuscript.

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overhaul in the foreseeable future most unlikely. But, as argued thus far in this review, the precise character of the North Korean political system has derived from *chuch'e* and the personality cult of Kim Il-song. Will the system retain similar features?

Professors Chong-sik Lee and Dae-Sook Suh, in their book, and Professor Sang-woo Lee, in his contribution to the Kang volume, provide inputs that bear on this issue. Chong-sik Lee stresses the entrenched nature of the existing arrangements. According to him, North Korea's 1972 constitution was designed to reaffirm the changes that had occurred in North Korea during the previous two decades. It elevated Kim Il-song constitutionally to his supreme leadership role, unfettered by any institutional constraints. Kim is now President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As President, he is the chief executive, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the "beloved leader" of the people. He is likewise head of the Korean Workers' Party, chief policy-maker, and chief justice. Lee also concludes from an analysis of the assignment of personnel to various institutions that "about fifteen of the President's close followers constitute the inner circle of power or the top echelon elite in North Korea" (Suh and Lee, p. 217). He adds, however, that

The pattern of personnel assignment in the North Korean power structure reveals a trend toward functional specialization among the top elite. . . . Until about ten years ago, many of the top elite circulated with relative ease among the military, government, and party posts. But there now seems to be a trend in North Korea to reduce this movement and to let each individual develop his specialty in a given area. (p. 217)

Dae-Sook Suh explicitly argues that Kim's system may indeed survive Kim (Suh and Lee, p. 159). He notes, to be sure, that the country is undergoing a "gradual but complete change in the character of the leadership with the vigorous recruitment of new leaders, who replace the leaders of various factional groups of the old Communist movement" (p. 189). These new leaders are young, technically oriented, and mainly educated in North Korea. At the same time, Suh underscores that the most important trait required of a new leader is *tangsong,* which means "party spirit"—"an absolute and unflinching loyalty to the party" (p. 187). Furthermore, he finds no evidence of factional groups among these emergent leaders.

Sang-woo Lee, on the other hand, sees growing signs of divergence between "reds" and "experts" with respect to the future direction of North Korean development (Kang, p. 386). According to him, the model members of the "new class" elite in North Korea —Deputy Premiers Yi Kun-mo, Ch'oe Chae-u, Ho Tam, and Chong Chun-ki—are simultaneously red and expert. But, as he points out, North Korea's cultural revolution and emphasis on ideology run counter in many ways to the imperative needs of the country as it matures into a fully industrialized state, and there is no precedent in other Communist states for experts' remaining permanently and infallibly red (p. 406).

In this reviewer's opinion, the disappearance of Kim Il-song from the political arena will probably lead to competition for power among various groups. Identification of these groups is necessarily speculative, but one can suggest two criteria distinguishing them —institutional affiliation and personal perspectives and backgrounds. With respect to the first, individuals may belong to the military, the civilian administration, or the party bureaucracy. As regards the second, they may be members of Kim's family, "experts," or "reds." Thus, nine potential groups exist—e.g., military "experts," party "experts," military "reds," administrative "reds," etc.

Could any one leader manage to get all these different groups to work together? Perhaps Kim Il-song's designation of a successor could stabilize the situation for a short time immediately after Kim's death. Moreover, some domestic or international crisis—or a crisis involving both realms—could cause various factions to unite at least temporarily. However, the most likely outcome in the long run is an intense struggle for power.

WHO, then, might emerge as the supreme leader of North Korea after Kim Il-song? What will his political style and his policies be? Will there be any change in North Korea's relationship with the South, in Pyongyang's obsessive stress on the reunification theme?

None of the studies reviewed here have managed to answer these vital questions convincingly. The fault does not lie entirely with the authors. As these studies reveal, scholars in both the United States and South Korea have made serious efforts to address the questions, but we still possess so little factual information about the inner dynamics of politics and decision-making in North Korea that confident conclusions and answers are, for now, impossible.

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The Vatican's Ostpolitik Reexamined

By M. K. Dziewanowski

JOZEF MACKIEWICZ. *W Cieniu Krzyza* (In the Shadow of the Cross). London, Kontra, 1972.
JOZEF MACKIEWICZ. *Watykan w Cieniu Czerwonej Gwiazdy* (The Vatican in the Shadow of the Red Star). London, Kontra, 1975.

WITH A POPULATION of about 700, Vatican City is the world's smallest state. Yet it also serves as central government of the world's largest religious community, numbering some 500 million people as members, and directs formal diplomatic relations with as many as 77 different nations.[1] The Vatican's diplomacy has occasioned numerous studies concerned with its aims and methods and with the implications of its efforts. But the Papacy's recent more conciliatory stance toward the communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has provoked special scrutiny and more than a little controversy.

One view of the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* is contained in two little-known studies by Jozef Mackiewicz, a Polish émigré who has lived in London since the end of the Second World War. Mackiewicz is the author of many novels and short stories and of several nonfictional volumes as well, such as *The Katyn Wood Murders* published in 1951.[2] Both of the books currently under review concentrate on Vatican foreign policy under Popes John XXIII (1958-1963) and Paul VI (1963-), and for our requirements may be treated as a single work. The author's central purpose is to advance a passionate, often sarcastic, and even vitriolic indictment of the two Vicars of Christ for having abandoned the anti-communist stance of their predecessors, Pius XI and Pius XII. Although he is extreme and one-sided in his analysis, Mackiewicz's arguments are useful nevertheless for helping to focus the debate over the effects of the Vatican's policy and for delineating certain basic attitudes in that debate.[3]

THE VATICAN'S earlier position received clear if blunt expression in a 1937 encyclical of Pope Pius XI:

Communism is intrinsically wrong and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any field whatsoever.[4]

This opposition was no less implacable after World War II, and the first postwar decade witnessed the nadir of Church-State relations in East Central Europe. The communist governments of those states in the region which had had diplomatic relations with the Holy See severed them after the war, and all launched more or less violent antireligious campaigns. The Vatican, in turn, decreed in 1949 that any Catholic who freely and consciously collaborated with the Communists would be excommunicated. Following Stalin's death, however, forces released by domestic decompression and the evolving foreign policy doctrine of peaceful coexistence gradually prompted all European communist regimes, with the exception of that of Albania, to seek some improvement in relations with the Church. But these efforts found little response on the part of the Roman Curia as long as Pope Pius XII was alive.

A change in attitude on the Vatican's part first surfaced in connection with the *aggiornamento* policy of Pope John XXIII. In 1963, in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, John modified significantly the earlier stance of Pius

[1] The 1976 Vatican Yearbook lists Papal ambassadors accredited to 77 nations, including two communist regimes: Cuba and Yugoslavia. See *L'Annuario Pontifico*, Vatican City, 1976, pp. 1094-1109.

[2] With a foreword by A. B. Lane, London, Hollis and Carter, 1951. In addition, the first of the two books reviewed here is now available in English translation. See Jozef Mackiewicz, *In the Shadow of the Cross*. Tr. by Witold Moszczynski, London, Kontra, 1973.

[3] For a more balanced treatment, see especially Hansjakob Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans, 1917-1975*, Munich, Piper Verlag, 1975.

[4] *Divini Redemptoris* (Devine Redemption), Vatican City, March 19, 1937.

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XI by making a "clear distinction between false philosophical teachings . . . and movements which owe their inspiration to these false tenets." He pointed out that "while the teaching, once it has been clearly set forth, is no longer subject to change, the movements, precisely because they take place in the midst of changing conditions, are readily susceptible to change." [5]

With this declaration, issued on the eve of his death, John XXIII launched in a new direction the Vatican's internal and external policies, and his line has been continued by his successor. The emergence of polycentric communism and growing East-West détente have acted as catalysts in improving relations between the Vatican and various members of the Soviet orbit. On the one hand, the Soviet Union has sought Church support for several of its diplomatic initiatives, including the European Security Conference and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the other hand, the Vatican has been anxious to improve the position of Catholics suffering discrimination and persecution under various forms of communist oppression. In the words of Pope Paul VI, the Vatican's goal is to obtain "sufficient breathing space" for the Church in communist Europe, or "to save what can be saved" (*Salvare il salvabile*), as he remarked later.[6] Finally, because of the Pope's moral prestige among Western political leaderships, a few East European states, such as Romania and Yugoslavia, have regarded the Vatican as a potential ally in their efforts to obtain more "breathing space" of their own by balancing Western influences against Soviet power.

While pursuing the objective of less religious persecution by communist governments, the Vatican has also reconsidered its traditional enmity to Marxist ideology. This reappraisal has been symbolized by the Pope's support for a series of Christian-Marxist dialogues which began in the 1960's. Without accepting the ideology's fundamental philosophic tenets, the Holy See concedes that Marxism has attracted considerable support among broad masses of the disaffected in many countries and has proposed remedies for social problems which many Christians could endorse as well.

MACKIEWICZ ARGUES that the Vatican's objectives are misguided and its methods naive and ineffective. In his view, the Vatican, in its quest for good diplomatic relations, has paid insufficient attention to internal religious oppression by the various communist regimes. For example, Mackiewicz assails the Vatican for, in effect, making a sacrificial lamb of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, and in this respect he supports the Ukrainian Cardinal Slipyi.[7] Thus, it is argued, the Vatican has not denounced the oppression of the Ukrainian Catholics because of its greater concern for obtaining what are regarded as insignificant concessions for Latin rite Catholics in Latvia and Lithuania—e.g., the nomination of bishops or apostolic administrators to vacant bishoprics, or the admission of additional students to theological seminaries.[8]

At the same time, Mackiewicz charges that some communist states, especially Romania and the Soviet Union, have been far more enthusiastic about the Vatican's support for their diplomatic objectives than about making domestic concessions to their religious believers. He stresses that most Vatican agreements with the communist regimes, notably that with Hungary, have been restricted to the subject of ecclesiastical appointments and have not entailed any substantial liberalization of policies affecting internal religious matters.

Mackiewicz devotes much of his argument to what he views as the penetration of the Catholic Church by various crypto-communist individuals and organizations. The strongest crypto-communist organization at the present time, according to Mackiewicz, is "Christians for Socialism" (CSF). This movement is very active in Argentina, Peru, Cuba, Mexico, and other parts of Central America, and is spreading rapidly in Europe. In recent years there have been CSF meetings in Spain and Italy, and full-fledged CSF groups have been formed for migrant workers in France, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands. Embryonic groups have appeared in the United States, Canada, the Philippines, and several countries in Africa. While the CSF movement carries different names in different countries,[9] Mackiewicz insists that all its constituent organizations adhere to the same fundamental lines.[10]

[5] *Pacem in Terris* (Peace on Earth), Vatican City, April 11, 1963.

[6] *Kultura* (Paris), April 1976, p. 49.

[7] *In the Shadow of the Cross*, pp. 98-99.

[8] *Kultura*, March 1976, pp. 91-92.

[9] For example, in Ecuador it is called "Christians for Liberation," in Argentina "Priests' Movement for the Third World," and in Mexico "Priests for the People" or "Christians for Liberation."

[10] Cf. the interview with Gonzalo Arroyo, S.J., "Christians for Socialism," *New Blackfriars* (Oxford), No. 55, 1974, pp. 12-16; and Denys Turner, "Can a Christian Be a Marxist?" ibid., No. 56, 1975, pp. 6-18.

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IN HIS ATTACK on the Vatican's *Ostpolitik,* Mackiewicz makes use of an impressive array of books and periodicals in a dozen languages. He brings to bear an especially formidable number of sources in his effort to document Soviet "penetration" of the Catholic Church. Mackiewicz is not a professional scholar and does not pretend to account for all of the relevant literature. Yet it strikes this reviewer that the author overlooked several books which he might have used with profit, in particular that of Pedro Garcia Lorente published more than a decade ago.[11]

More serious criticism should be directed at Mackiewicz's frequent lack of critical judgment and indiscriminate condemnation of individuals who actually oppose the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* as it is presently conducted. A good example is Mackiewicz's treatment of the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. As spiritual head of the largest mass of Catholics in communist Europe,[12] Cardinal Wyszynski has proved a courageous and skillful opponent of the communist regime in Poland and its encroachments on Catholic liberties. He is on record for repeatedly, and often publicly, having expressed his criticism of the Vatican's diplomacy. He recently warned Rome not to serve unwittingly the Communists' objectives by issuing high-sounding but largely meaningless joint declarations in favor of international peace, while continuing to neglect concrete violations of the rights of Catholics by communist rulers. Thus, referring to recent meetings between a Vatican emissary, Archbishop Luigi Poggi, and Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister, Jozef Czyrek, whose conversations focused exclusively on "international matters of common interest," the Polish prelate reportedly insisted that "when the representative of the Holy See arrives in Poland, it is not enough to discuss peace between nations and talk about securing people against hunger," and that future talks should examine first the problems of the "Church and its believers in Poland."[13] Despite this and many similar statements, Mackiewicz includes the Cardinal among the "naive" enthusiasts of the Vatican's allegedly "capitulatory" policy toward communism.

* * *

Mackiewicz's books are impressively documented and should prove useful to specialists in Church-State relations under communism and to more general students of communist systems as well. Yet because of his one-sided approach and extreme conclusions, the picture which Mackiewicz conveys of the nature and consequences of the Vatican's policy is neither complete nor entirely fair. The prospective reader is advised to supplement these studies with others.

[11] Pedro Garcia Lorente, *Espionaje sovetico en la Iglesia Catolica, el 'affaire pax'* (Soviet Espionage in the Catholic Church: The "Peace Affair"), Madrid, Afrodisio Aguado, 1965.

[12] Of the estimated 59 million Catholics in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, no fewer than 32 million live in Poland.

[13] *Radio Free Europe Research: Poland* (Munich), March 21, 1975, p. 7.

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The Lessons of Allende

By Roger P. Hamburg

ARTURO VALENZUELA and J. SAMUEL VALENZUELA, Eds. *Chile: Politics and Society.* New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1976.
PHILIP O'BRIEN, Ed. *Allende's Chile.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.
I. LAVRETSKIY. *Sal'vador Al'ende* (Salvador Allende). Moscow, "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1974.

THE BRIEF AND tempestuous rule of Salvador Allende Gossens as President of Chile—from his installation in autumn 1970 to his overthrow by a military coup on September 11, 1973—has provoked an outpouring of strong emotion and intensive postmortem analysis. There were many who greeted the Chilean experiment with the same enthusiasm they had displayed toward the Dubcek phenomenon in Czechoslovakia, believing that the ultimate promise of the two undertakings was quite similar. In the Chilean case, however, they anticipated that a "stunted" capitalist (not socialist) state would be transformed by socialist (not capitalist) economics, and that "bourgeois-democratic" freedoms would simultaneously be preserved (rather than restored). The fact that Allende fell at a time when the leftist Armed Forces Movement was emerging in Portugal and when elsewhere in Western Europe (especially in Italy) communist parties were manifesting increasing strength and cohesion, lent his overthrow by the military a significance far beyond that normally afforded a coup in a geographically remote Latin American country. In fact, in terms of the attention paid it, the Allende period has fast become the Spanish Civil War of the 1970's.

The three books under review are but a small part of a considerable and growing literature on the Allende period. The first is a collection of studies written before the coup primarily by North American academics. It focuses on the "constraints" that Allende encountered in the institutional, political, and economic realities of Chile. Although outside influences are touched on, the stress is on the internal dynamics of Chilean society. The O'Brien symposium, written after the coup by European and Chilean authors, analyzes the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Allende regime and seeks to explore alternative strategies that *might* have led to a different conclusion. (However, as we shall see, none of the authors express any confidence that the coup could have been averted.) The third study, by a Soviet author, joins a growing Soviet scholarly literature on Chile, much of it, unfortunately, unavailable to English-speaking readers.[1] In many ways, the Soviet critiques of Allende—including Lavretskiy's—are the most astringent, "realistic," and devoid of romantic notions of sending Chile's Communists to the barricades in the face of overwhelming opposition in Chile and the general unavailability of external assistance.

ANY ASSESSMENT of Allende's policies must begin with examination of the "correlation of forces" in Chile as Allende took over the reins of executive power. As the contributors to the Valenzuela volume make clear, the Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular*—UP) government faced a formidable set of obstacles as it sought to proceed along the "peaceful road to socialism."

Some of the obstacles were of an institutional nature. In the first place, there were the Chilean armed forces, which historically (by Latin American standards) had stayed out of politics but whose continued neutrality or loyalty to the new government were far from guaranteed. Then there was the

[1] Particular attention has been paid to the Allende period in the pages of *Latinskaya Amerika*, the chief Soviet academic journal on Latin America. The journal's last two issues for 1974 and the first two for 1975 carried commentaries under the topical heading of "The Chilean Revolution: Experience and Lessons." The author has also seen an announcement in Soviet publishers' circulars of a forthcoming work by A. V. Borisova and V. G. Tkachenko entitled *Uroki Chiliyskikh sobytiy* (The Lessons of the Chilean Events).

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legislature—the National Congress—which was dominated by the opposition, especially the Christian Democrats, who had demanded assurances from Allende that he would preserve the democratic system before they agreed to support him for president in the run-off election conducted in the parliament. The Chilean judicial system remained independent of executive control and proceeded to discipline the UP government on several occasions. Finally, there was the *Contraloria,* a uniquely Chilean institution—a kind of super administrative court with a variety of functions ranging from auditing of public accounts to ruling on the legality of executive decrees. All these institutions defended their prerogatives when challenged. Allende adapted to these institutional barriers by pursuing a "politics of conciliation," i.e., an approach that stressed incremental rather than radical change.[2]

Chances for a breakthrough did not appear any more promising in the electoral than in the institutional arena. As Robert L. Ayres points out in his contribution to the Valenzuela volume, Chilean presidential elections have not ordinarily brought about an enduring realignment of party loyalities on behalf of change or innovation. For example, in 1970 the Communist Party was strong where it had been strong throughout the 1960's and weak where it had been weak. Its basic strength was "confined to a relatively reduced bastion or small geographical part of the country," and there were a number of electoral communes where the Communists had made few inroads over the decade. Furthermore, in contemplating attempts to mobilize new electoral support among the peasants, the marginal urban population, and elements of the petty bourgeoisie, Allende and the UP had to confront considerable anticommunist sentiment in large portions of the Chilean electorate, an ongoing resurgence of the Right as an electoral force, and the fact that the opposition Christian Democrats continued to enjoy the support of from one fifth to one fourth of the total electorate.[3]

After Allende's installation, his policies raised apprehensions and enmity not only among wealthy individuals but also in middle- and lower-class groups. Recognizing these fears, the Socialists, and even more so the Communists, engaged in a politics of "paternalistic cooptation"—i.e., a piecemeal distribution of benefits designed to appeal to lower-class constituents without unduly upsetting the more privileged elements of society.

However, these efforts did not yield notably satisfactory results. As Alejandro Portes observes in his piece in the Valenzuela volume, the previous two decades had witnessed extension of the electoral franchise to increasing numbers of lower-class Chileans, but these new voters generally had not become "ideologized" or radicalized. While some portions of the industrial proletariat did support radical ideologies, the rest of the urban poor gave little or no support to this trend. As a consequence, the proletariat as a whole was by no means prepared to accept shortages and to work harder to bring about some "new social order."

Instead, as noted by James W. Prothro and Patricio E. Chapparo in their chapter in the Valenzuela book, the lower classes tended to judge government performance quite pragmatically. They blamed economic ills, such as inflation and shortages, on the ineffectiveness of the Allende administration and did not accept any suggestions that the dislocations reflected opposition sabotage of the programs of the Popular Unity government. In effect, the lower classes failed to support the UP with the same unanimity that its enemies manifested toward it. Even on the issue of the constitutional amendments sought by Allende—such as conversion of the parliament to a unicameral body—members of the lower classes failed to give unanimous support; many staunchly opposed the move as a violation of Chilean democratic traditions.

While concentrating on these internal obstacles faced by the Popular Unity government, the contributors to the Valenzuela volume do note external constraints. The large foreign (particularly US) holdings in the Chilean economy posed a thorny problem. Even as the Allende government was nationalizing North American copper companies, it was seeking to reassure the United States and insure continued US economic assistance to cope with growing indebtedness. Allende apparently hoped that the UP's accession to power by the electoral route would lend it a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the US administration and prevent Washington from setting up an economic blockade. Nevertheless, the US increasingly lowered credits, instead of bailing out the UP as it had previous Chilean regimes. Credits from other sources, including the USSR, were not an adequate replacement for US short-term credits, for the new

[2] See Arturo Valenzuela's "Political Constraints to the Establishment of Socialism in Chile," in the Valenzuela collection, pp. 1-29.

[3] See Ayres' chapter "Unidad Popular and the Chilean Electoral Process," in Valenzuela, pp. 30-66.

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funds were tied to purchases in the creditor countries rather than in US markets, where Chile still had to look for the bulk of its imports of food and spare parts.[4]

The Valenzuela volume thus makes clear that from the outset the prospects for the Allende regime were not bright. Faced with broad opposition at home and with limited opportunities for foreign forbearance or largesse, Allende sought to build up his electoral base as support for the constitutional and socioeconomic changes he wanted to accomplish. This might reduce the support for a coup by showing that the "masses" were behind the government. But such a strategy was a frail reed on which to lean so long as the armed forces remained unified and potentially hostile to the UP government.

THAT ALLENDE'S chances for success were slim is likewise the message of the O'Brien collection. Alec Nove's contribution, based in part on the author's own experiences in Chile in the midst of the Allende period, is particularly pivotal for understanding the UP government's economic problems—the increasing shortages, mounting foreign debts, and "galloping" inflation that contributed to the polarized atmosphere in which the coup of September 1973 took place.[5]

Nove notes that Allende sought to socialize the Chilean economy gradually, through the application of existing laws. One method consisted of purchase by the government of controlling shares in large Chilean firms. Another involved establishment of executive control (by appointment of a government *interventor*) over enterprises that were not being operated in the public interest. Finally, there was "action from below," in which workers occupied factories and demanded that the government take control from the owners. While the last approach was sometimes inspired by parties belonging to the UP, it more often arose spontaneously. Indeed, radical elements complained about the government's foot-dragging, and the government did try, unsuccessfully, to control "action from below" to prevent it from unduly antagonizing the middle class or bringing the military fully into the political arena. To the same end, Allende continued to maintain that most industrial production (around 70 percent) would remain in the private sector.

In 1971, Allende decreed large wage increases accompanied by price controls. But wages rose even more precipitously than planned, spurred by demands of autonomous trade unions and workers who thought that the advent of a socialist regime meant redistribution of benefits and not increased production. Real wages rose 34 percent from January to October 1971, an indication, Nove argues, of the inadequacy of the government's political-economic strategy. While there was some slack to be taken up in the Chilean economy, production could not grow rapidly enough to absorb the wage increases, particularly when investment was declining in both the private and nationalized sectors of production. To compound difficulties further, much of the inflated domestic demand was for food. Chile's agriculture could not meet this demand; therefore, food imports had to rise. Additional imports, in turn, increased Chile's foreign debt, as did the concurrent drop in world prices for copper—the country's traditional export commodity.

It is Nove's judgment that by 1972, material shortages, exaggerated worker expectations, and the fall in investments made a major crisis inevitable. Moreover, as if the developing economic crisis was not serious enough, the Popular Unity leaders were preoccupied with political issues. As one Chilean official who participated in these events indignantly told Nove later, *"we were not concerned with economic efficiency, we were concerned with power."* [6]

This quest for a political solution—the gaining of mass support either to amend the constitution or to establish workers' power—seemed promising after the municipal elections of April 1971. At that point, when the economic costs of Allende's policies had not yet become apparent, the UP parties won close to 50 percent of the vote. Why, then, not mobilize? To this Nove responds that even if Allende had been able to effect a "drastic political change" to the UP's advantage, there would still have been serious economic difficulties. At best, Nove concludes, a shift in the power balance might have put the government "in a stronger position to repress the resultant discontent." [7]

However, such a drastic power shift was not effected. The blame, most of the contributors to the O'Brien volume seem to argue, lay in Allende's pursuit of an essentially reformist course, which impeded the process of mobilization of industrial workers into armed units (*cordones*) as urged by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de la Izquierda*

[4] See Elizabeth Farnsworth, Richard Feinberg, and Eric Leenson, "The Invisible Blockade: The United States Reacts," in Valenzuela, pp. 338-73.

[5] See Alec Nove, "The Political Economy of the Allende Regime," in O'Brien, pp. 51-78.

[6] Ibid., p. 62. Emphasis added.

[7] Ibid.

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Revolucionaria—MIR) and others, including a segment of his own Socialist Party. This "revolutionary" tendency in the Socialist Party saw armed confrontation as inevitable, viewed the country's economic problems as "the result of a struggle against imperialism and the sharpening of the class struggle," sought establishment of a "war economy" and "popular organs of power" to combat scarcities and to supply the workers, and wanted to extend nationalization as "a question of life and death." [8]

The sympathy for such revolutionary calls for "advance without compromise" manifested by most contributors to the O'Brien book may have reflected a reasoning similar to that contained in the following statement by the late Oscar Lange:

A Socialist government really intent upon socialization has to decide to carry out its socialization program at one stroke or give it up altogether. The very coming into power of such a government must cause a financial panic and economic collapse. Therefore, the Socialist government must either guarantee the immunity of private property and private enterprise in order to enable the capitalist economy to function normally, in doing which it gives up its socialist aims, or it must go through resolutely with its socialization program at maximum speed. Any hesitation, any vacillation and indecision would provoke the inevitable economic catastrophe.[9]

The Allende administration is also criticized for not having developed a military strategy of its own. As noted above, the Popular Unity government failed to develop a revolutionary militia as an armed counterweight to the regular armed forces. And having previously done little significant recruiting work in the ranks of the armed forces, it was not in a position to purge or reform the military. The best Allende could do was to attempt to stave off intervention by offering the military a combination of higher wages and involvement in the process of governing.[10]

While making these criticisms of Allende's failure to carry out socialization "with maximum speed," none of the contributors to the O'Brien volume seems to suggest that such a course would have permitted the UP to triumph. As Ian Roxborough cogently reiterates in his essay, Allende faced a most unpromising "prerevolutionary situation" when he assumed the presidency of Chile, one in which

the bourgeois state apparatus was intact. . . . There had not been a civil war or revolution, nor a crisis in the ruling class resulting from a major war or civil disaster. The bourgeois social order, the bourgeois political parties, the armed forces and the police, and the capitalist economy were all intact.[11]

The same basic situation still existed in September 1973, but there was little Allende could have done to alter it. To have attempted to restrain his critics on the Left any further would have split his ruling coalition. To have adopted their program would have sharpened the delineation of class forces and probably brought an earlier coup.

WHILE BOTH the Valenzuela and O'Brien volumes stress developments inside Chile, there is some attention paid to external factors. On the one hand, considerable attention is paid to the "invisible" or "informal" economic blockade by the US, which sought to constrict the flow of credits to Allende's Chile. On the other hand, it is noted that the Soviet Union was not overly generous in filling the gap, despite the fact that Soviet commentators hailed the ideological significance of the Allende victory. "We overestimated greatly the amount of aid we might get from socialist countries," one Chilean official said after the coup.[12]

One gets a sense of the cautiousness of the Soviet approach from the Lavretskiy volume, particularly from a look at the Soviet author's comments about the Chilean policy of the United States.[13] He asserts that the US was "enraged" by Allende's election, but believed that the Soviet Union had had little to do with it and that Chile would not be dominated by Cuba or the USSR. Therefore,

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[8] See Philip J. O'Brien's "The Military in Power and the Lessons of Chile," in O'Brien, pp. 273-94. The description of the revolutionary tendency is drawn from a March 1973 document of the Cordillera Regional Committee of the Socialist Party, quoted on pp. 291-92 of this chapter.

[9] Cited in Brian Loveman, "The Transformation of the Chilean Countryside," in Valenzuela, p. 292, fn. 57. On the dilemma faced by Allende—whether or not to mobilize—see also Henry A. Landsberger and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970-1973," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1976, pp. 502-42.

[10] See Ian Roxborough, "Reversing the Revolution: The Chilean Opposition to Allende," in O'Brien, pp. 192-216, especially p. 213; and Pablo Lira, "The Crisis of Hegemony in the Chilean Left," in ibid., pp. 27-50, especially pp. 43-44.

[11] Roxborough, loc. cit., p. 196.

[12] Nove, loc. cit., p. 71.

[13] On the laudatory but cautious nature of early Soviet commentary on the Allende victory, see also Roger Hamburg, "The Soviet Union and Latin America," in Roger E. Kanet, Ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 192-93.

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Moscow had believed that, in opposing Allende, the United States would not directly intervene but would resort to various economic sanctions. As for charges of Soviet niggardliness in furnishing economic assistance to Allende's government, Lavretskiy insists that "in the middle of 1973 the Chilean economy was far from cut off from the outside world" (p. 240).

In his assessment of Allende's policies, Lavretskiy is remarkably candid and clear-eyed. While he tries to absolve Allende and Luís Corvalán (Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Chile) of charges of excessive optimism about the possibilities of cooperation with the bourgeoisie, Lavretskiy observes that Allende "was not able to explain to his labor supporters that revolution meant not only achievement but difficulties" (p. 193). Allende is also chided for seeking compromise with the military and for believing that he could "control" (*sovladat'*) it. According to Lavretskiy, the military "lulled his [i.e., Allende's] vigilance by too private declarations of devotion and readiness to defend him." Finally, Lavretskiy reproaches Allende's government for a "too scrupulous observance of bourgeois legality and law and order" (pp. 222, 278).

Other Soviet commentaries have been more sympathetic concerning Allende's refusal to enter into confrontation with the armed forces. They note that the army had remained undivided despite the political crisis and thus presented a unified front to a proletariat that lacked weapons. Nor was "ultra-left work" in the ranks justified, for preparation of an uprising of soldiers and sailors would only be possible at a time when the armed forces were demoralized by defeat in war.[14]

Such perceptions informed a Soviet policy which offered Allende some moral and political support but in an inconspicuous manner. The Chilean Communists were advised to avoid civil war, to allay the fears and suspicions of the bourgeoisie, and to create organs of mobilization only where prudent. The Soviet Union had little hard currency to spare for Chile, and Moscow did not want to antagonize the United States unduly at a time when détente was being worked out with the Nixon administration. Soviet state and military-strategic interests were far more focused on Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, any Soviet military intervention was precluded for reasons of logistics alone.

THE ALLENDE EPISODE amply demonstrates that when a regime has not been discredited by war, when there is no major communist military force in the area to play an auxiliary role (as in Eastern Europe), where there is no major insurgent force or parallel government (as in Vietnam), or where the right combination of leadership and luck is lacking, the Soviet Union has no ready-made recipes to apply for revolutionary success. However, the conclusions to be drawn from the Allende phenomenon for communist strategy elsewhere continue to be debated. This is particularly true among the communist parties of Western Europe and the Soviet Union. In Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain, local communist parties operate in societies with a number of economic and structural deficiencies and stand a chance of taking or sharing power. Such developments present both opportunities and dilemmas for the Soviet Union. Among the risks are possible overcommitment of Soviet economic resources, deterioration of relations with the United States, and even pressures for change in the character of the Soviet regime. Hence, it is important to Moscow how its West European colleagues view the Chilean events and their applicability to Western Europe.

In fact, West European communist sources do not appear to have derived the same "lessons" from Chile as Soviet observers, who

[14] See, for example, K. L. Maydanik, "Concerning the Lessons of Chile," in *Latinskaya Amerika* (Moscow), September-October 1974, p. 126.

CORRECTIONS

The photo of the Bolyai Janos secondary school on page 26 of the November-December 1977 issue was serviced by Camera Press, not Eastfoto.

* * *

A factual error appears in the book review by John B. Starr published in the July-August 1977 issue. The author of *To Phoenix Seat,* Leslie R. Marchant, did not make the specific mistake (in his citation of a Mao quote) which was attributed to him on page 61 of that issue. The editors bring this correction to the attention of *Problems of Communism* readers in the interests of accuracy and to express their regret, and wish also to state that they intend neither endorsement nor disapproval of Mr. Starr's review or of Mr. Marchant's work. *Problems of Communism* provides a forum for responsible scholarship in its subject-matter area. For this and other reasons, views of contributors do not necessarily reflect the policies of the US Government. Contributors are responsible for the accuracy of factual information as well as for the professional judgments they make in material they submit for publication.

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have emphasized the need in such situations for orthodox Leninist control, i.e., dominance by a cautious, prudent communist party over "reformist" elements on the right and "adventurist" critics on the left. Instead, West European communists would appear to have been drawn to one or the other of these extremes.

The analysis of the Italian Communists has stressed the reformist aspects of the Allende period—the actions which were generally acceptable to the non-communist Left and Center, to the established pillars of Chile's capitalist society, and, by inference, to the military. This commentary has pointed to the continued pluralism of Chilean political life under Allende.[15] By contrast, Portuguese Communist thinking (and actions) has often been to the left of the Soviet position on revolutionary strategy.[16]

The interplay between Soviet ideological and strategic priorities, on the one hand, and the somewhat conflicting imperatives of "Eurocommunism" or individual West European communist parties, on the other, continues, and the Chilean experience remains an important focal point of the debate. However, one factor clearly distinguishes the situation of European communists from that of the members of the UP. In Europe, the relative proximity of strong Soviet military power and the increasingly repressive actions by the Soviet regime at home cast increasing doubts on the viability and permanence of "reformism" in communist solutions to Western Europe's woes.

[15] On the differing reactions of the Soviet and Italian communist parties to the Allende phenomenon, see Joan Barth Urban, "Socialist Pluralism in Soviet and Italian Communist Perspective: The Chilean Catalyst," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1974, pp. 482-509.

[16] For the Portuguese CP's position on the role of the communist party in a favorable revolutionary position, see Arnold Hottinger, "The Rise of Portugal's Communists," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1975, especially pp. 5, 6, and 17. See also Oriana Fallaci's interview with Alvaro Cunhal in *Chicago Tribune*, July 20, 1975.

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"Eurocommunism" and the PCE

By Stanley G. Payne

GERALD H. MEAKER. *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1974.
GUY HERMET. *The Communists in Spain—Study of an Underground Political Movement.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1974.
MARCO CALAMAI. *Storia del movimento operaio spagnolo dal 1960 al 1975* (A History of the Spanish Workers' Movement from 1960 to 1975). Bari, De Donato, 1975.
SANTIAGO CARRILLO. *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* ("Eurocommunism" and the State). Barcelona, Editorial Critica, 1977.

THROUGHOUT ITS history the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has tended toward the extremes. As a Stalinist party it became the only West European communist party to play a hegemonic role in government—in the Republican zone of Spain during the second half of the Civil War—while in its current tactical transmogrification it has adopted the most advanced democratic posture of all the Latin communist parties.

Surprisingly, the origins of the PCE contained no hints of this anomalous course. The party developed in large measure from the radical fringes of the Spanish Socialist Party, an orthodox Marxist/Guèsdist Second International group.[1] Gerald Meaker's magisterial account of the revolutionary Left in Spain during the era of World War I and the Russian Revolution—while principally concerned with the revolutionary labor movement, i.e., the anarcho-syndicalist National Confederation of Labor (CNT) and the Socialists—provides the best and fullest account that we have of the PCE's emergence.

After a few hopeful moments in 1920-23, Spanish Communism languished for a decade, reduced to insignificant political status as a sectarian group somewhere to the left of even the anarchists. The rise of a mass revolutionary Left and the polarization of Spanish society under the Republic saw the revival of a fully orthodox Stalinist PCE in 1934-35. However, the party's real opportunity came with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, when arms embargoes in the West and the inefficiency of Socialist and anarchist military leadership eventually provided the PCE with an opportunity to assume a hegemonic role—although it remained a numerical minority among the leftist forces that sustained the wartime People's Republic. Historiographic coverage of this "high period" of the Spanish Communist Party—from 1936 to 1939—is proportionately weaker than for later times. We must still rely in large measure on the standard monographs by David T. Cattell and Burnett Bolloten on the Spanish revolution,[2] although a new, expanded version of Bolloten's work is soon to be published.

The communist orthodoxy of the party persisted for nearly three decades after the Civil War. It could for long have been said that the PCE was simply the extension of the Russian communist party in Spain, the true Spanish communist or, more specifically, Leninist force of the Worker Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) having been crushed by Communist and Republican police during the Civil War. Yet the party benefited from Soviet domination in that it had a clear organizational model and enjoyed greater financial backing than other leftist parties. As a result, the PCE was able to play a major role in organized opposition to the Spanish dictatorship throughout the long life of the Franco regime. During the 1960's and 1970's, the party seemed to possess a stronger and broader organization of cadres than any other Spanish leftist party, and thus to be in a position

[1] Jules Guèsde in 1879 founded the French Labor Party, for which Karl Marx had drawn up the statutes.

[2] See David T. Cattell's *Communism and the Spanish Civil War,* New York, NY, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1955, and *Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War,* New York, NY, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1957; and Burnett Bolloten, *La Revolución Española* (The Spanish Revolution), Stanford, CA, California Institute of International Studies, 1964.

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to resume a dominant role should complete political democracy be restored.

Guy Hermet has provided a first-rate description and analysis of the nature and development of the Communist Party in the later phases of the Franco regime. His book, originally published in French in 1971, deals primarily with the recent history of the party and its organization, the PCE's functioning as an underground force, the image of communism in Spain during the 1960's, and the party's possible future role in Spanish politics. These matters are discussed with full objectivity and with broad and deep knowledge of party affairs. The book constitutes by far our best guide to the structure and activities of the party during the 1950's and 1960's.

Marco Calamai's putative history of the Spanish workers' movement after 1960 pertains to an entirely different order of things. Calamai writes not as an objective scholar but as a regional secretary of the Communist-controlled Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and as a political publicist. Though his book purports to deal with the many variegated strands of Spanish worker groups between 1960 and 1975, it is primarily a sympathetic account of PCE labor policy and practice, particularly the development of the largely Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions (*Comisiones Obreros* —CCOO). Nevertheless, the book serves two useful functions. First, it does provide sufficient historical analysis of Spanish opposition labor activity to permit the reader to place Calamai's presentation and evaluation of PCE efforts in broader perspective. Second, the volume includes 155 pages of opposition political and labor documents from the post-1960 years. While a disproportionately large share of the documents are from PCE and CCOO sources, there is also a variety of samplings from other groups. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that at the time that Calamai wrote this study—in late 1975 or roughly at the time of Franco's death—many would have agreed with Calamai that the CCOO had become the predominant new group within the Spanish labor movement and that, if the state syndical system were fully dismantled, a national Communist-dominated network of Workers' Commissions would probably emerge as the strongest labor force in Spain. However, this expectation has not been fulfilled, for reasons that will be touched on shortly.

IF THE PCE has for many years drawn the attention of observers and students of Spanish politics, it has attracted truly inordinate international interest in the West during the last two years—the months of Spanish democratization. This is because of the advanced posture of "Eurocommunism" assumed in this period by Santiago Carrillo, PCE Secretary-General since 1960. The attention became even more acute after Carrillo managed to codify and publicize some of his ideas in the form of the book-length essay, *"Eurocommunismo" y Estado,* reviewed here. Ironically, the very limited success that the PCE registered in the Spanish parliamentary elections of June 1977—when it polled 9.2 percent of the popular vote—served to make Carrillo's Eurocommunism even more attractive to some observers; not only did his brand of communism seem more emphatically and pronouncedly independent than that of, for example, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), but it was also clear that for the time being the PCE remained much weaker than the PCI and thus was in no position actually to lead a government in Spain.

The leadership of the Spanish party has had much greater leisure to ponder the relationship of theory to tactics than its Italian counterpart. Carrillo himself found the time to write this essay during 1976, when the PCE was still illegal and he was in clandestine residence in Madrid. Since it is the most coherent effort at a full statement by a major West European communist leader of what is meant by the *vía democrática,* the work certainly merits the attention currently being paid it.

By placing the term "Eurocommunism" in quotation marks, Carrillo correctly identifies its journalistic, noncommunist (in fact, rather anticommunist) origin. Nevertheless, he obviously finds the expression of considerable tactical utility. The major question asked of Eurocommunism in the West concerns the sincerity or reliability of its commitment to a gradualist approach to revolution —one which respects democratic values. Carrillo does not in fact try to answer this queston directly in his essay in any detail. His main concern is not to outline a complete strategy or systematic model of the *vía democrática* (no ultimate model is discussed at all), but to interpret it within the framework of communist theory and practice, justifying it both with respect to the latter and in terms of the political, institutional, and cultural changes that have occurred in Western Europe during the past generation.

At various times in recent years Carrillo has defined the tactical limit of the *vía democrática* as that point at which society is con-

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fronted with illegal and undemocratic coercion by rightist forces in power or when a progressive or socialist government is attacked by a rightist coup.[3] This may seem theoretically clear, but in practice it can quickly become totally vague, all the more so because there is no clear philosophical commitment by Carrillo to democratic procedure or individual rights. Nor does he delineate any pluralistic, non-Stalinist model of ultimate socialism.

"Eurocomunismo" y Estado is thus the justification of a tactic, rather than of an end or of a value system. The basic premise of this tactic is twofold. On the one hand, it is recognized that communist movements come to power through revolutionary means only in countries massively destabilized by international or civil war, conditions unlikely to obtain in the advanced countries of Western Europe. On the other hand, an alternate, more peaceful tactic, the *vía democrática,* has become feasible in Western Europe by the 1970's because of a series of fundamental social-democratic changes within "capitalist" society—transformations of both an economic and cultural nature. Forms of pre-socialism are widely accepted by "capitalist" society in terms of state regulations, state investment, and state ownership, while significant elites, ranging from the radical intelligentsia through media journalists to the young clergy, educate the society in socialist values. Hence, the *vía democrática* is not just viewed as a theoretical alternative to revolution; it is seen as a fully practicable route to power. If slower than insurrectionary tactics, the *vía democrática* will lead to more solid results, as it should produce a society more thoroughly prepared and trained for socialism. As some form of assurance to those who fear that Eurocommunism would "throw off the mask" and renounce its gradualist approach as soon as it reached power, Carrillo emphasizes that in Spain mixed economic forms will have to coexist "for a long period" (p. 99).

All this is cogently and at times impressively argued. However, *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* is equally significant for what it does *not* do. Some of the most important gaps are the following: (1) There is no discussion of party structure or the absence of intra-party democracy. Though Carrillo defines democracy as "the active participation of everyone" (p. 186), he does not explain how a party of highly authoritarian leadership and structure can participate in maintaining democratic processes. (2) As noted above, Carrillo offers no alternative systematic model of a final "democratic socialism." The discussion of democracy is limited exclusively to matters of the tactics to be used against capitalism. Though the East European countries are criticized for the absence of democracy, there is no explanation in philosophical or structural terms as to why democratic values should be viewed as necessary for complete and final socialism, or how communist "hegemony" is different from a one-party system. No theory of inherent individual rights is presented. (3) There is no fundamental and categorical repudiation of Leninism-Stalinism. Though Stalinism is rejected as a model for Spain, and qualified as a political system subject to "aberrations" and even as a form of "totalitarianism," Leninism and even Stalinism are declared to have been justified to some extent by Russian conditions. (4) Despite Carrillo's denunciation of the Soviet reoccupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and his well-publicized differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he does not categorically reject Soviet imperialism. He has elsewhere taken a stand against Soviet military bases in Eastern Europe,[4] but he did so only as a bargaining ploy aimed at the elimination of American bases in Western Europe. Only the United States is categorically guilty of "imperialism"; in the Soviet case, militarism and imperialism are more aberrations than basic flaws.

THE DEBATE over Carrillo's Eurocommunism will continue. Carrillo will contend that the *vía democrática* is more than a mere tactic and that it will lead to a higher form of democratic socialism—which he has yet to define structurally or constitutionally. In truth, he has had little choice but to pursue this path. Although his Portuguese counterpart, Alvaro Cunhal (himself a source of acute embarrassment to Carrillo) was handed major power gratuitously by a revolutionary military regime, Carrillo has never suffered from any illusion that such a possibility existed in Spain. Unlike other West European communist parties, the PCE has had to work its way up from clandestinity and illegality while encouraging the democratization of an institutionalized authoritarian regime. Any other tactic but the *vía demo-*

[3] *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado,* p. 168. Cf. other remarks cited in Ramón Chao, *Después de Franco, España* (Spain after Franco), Madrid, Ediciones Felmer, 1976; and in María Eugenia Yagüe, *Santiago Carrillo,* Madrid, Editorial Cambio 16, 1977.

[4] This was also referred to in the *New Times* (Moscow) denunciation of Carrillo, as quoted in *Cambio 16* (Madrid), July 4, 1977.

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crática would have been suicidal.

Just how much the PCE has gained in the short run is debatable. Its organizational strength and popular appeal among blue-collar workers have proven to be considerably exaggerated. The party fell short of the minimum 10 percent of the popular vote for which Carrillo hoped in the 1977 elections, and in the more recent maneuvering concerning syndical elections and dominance of Spanish labor, the CCOO have been falling behind the Socialist General Workers' Union (UGT).

At least for the time being, Spanish Communism is probably suffering the consequences of its own history. While there is little in the Italian past to contradict the gradualist claims of the PCI, the brutality and oppressiveness of the period of PCE hegemony in the 1930's is still at least a lingering memory for the Spanish Left. Carrillo's own reputation is somewhat clouded by unresolved charges of responsibility for Civil War atrocities. Most Spanish workers evidently prefer a more convincingly democratic alternative.

Moreover, Spain resembles France and Portugal in that the Socialist competition confronting the communists is stiffer than in Italy. Whereas the Italian Socialists have almost succeeded in destroying themselves, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) has responded to the post-Franco environment with effective organization and dynamic, charismatic leadership (assisted by West German and Venezuelan financing). Thus for the time being the secondary status of the PCE seems destined to continue. Spanish Communism will have to struggle harder to overcome its own history, and this among other things will probably help to guarantee its indefinite continuation along the *vía democrática*.

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